The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice by Stearns, Maxwell L
The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice
Maxwell L. Stearns'
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................... 1221
A. The Intellectual History of Social Choice ...................... 1221
B. Social-Choice-Based Normative Proposals ..................... 1225
C. The Nirvana, Isolation, and Composition Fallacies ............... 1229
II. MARKETS, LEGISLATURES, AND THE EMPTY CORE ................... 1233
A. The Case of the Polluting Firms ............................ 1234
B. Location of Toxic-Waste Disposal Facility ..................... 1240
FIGURE 1. Proposed Locations of Toxic Waste Dump .......... 1241
C. Alice, Bob, and Carole as Siblings .......................... 1246
Il. DEFINING THE "IDEAL" NORM ................................. 1247
A. The Arrow's Theorem Criteria ............................. 1247
B. The Condorcet-Winner Criterion ............................ 1252
IV. THE SUPREME COURT AND CONGRESS THROUGH AN ARROVIAN LENS ..... 1257
A. Range .............................................. 1258
B. Universal Domain ..................................... 1271
C. Unanimity and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives ............ 1276
D. Nondictatorship ....................................... 1281
E. Rationality ........................................... 1283
F. Summary ............................................ 1285
TABLE 1. The Supreme Court and Congress Through
an Arrovian Lens ................................ 1286
t Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. B.A. 1983, University of
Pennsylvania; J.D. 1987, University of Virginia School of Law.
I would like to thank the following for their helpful comments and suggestions: Lawrence Baxter,
Lloyd Cohen, Harold Demsetz, Einer Elhauge, Hehry Hansmann, Bruce Kobayashi, Bill Kovacic, Aaron
Krauss, Saul Levmore, Nelson Lund, Henry Manne, Richard McAdams, Timothy Muris, Jeffrey Parker,
Larry Ribstein, Glen 0. Robinson, Linda Schwartzstein, David Skeel, and Gordon Tullock. I would also
like to thank the participants in the GMUSL brown bag lunch series for their helpful comments, the
GMUSL library staff for their assistance in tracking down hard-to-find source materials, Wendy Payton for
her assistance in creating the tables that appear in the text, and Melissa Austin for her research assistance.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge the generous research funding provided by the John M. Olin and Sarah
Scaife Foundations.
1219
1220 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 103: 1219
V. COLLECTIVE DECISIONMAKERS THROUGH A WIDE-ANGLE ARRovLAN LENS . 1287
A. M arkets ............................................. 1287
B. Legislatures and Appellate Courts .......................... 1288
C. Agencies ............................................ 1289
D. Summary ............................................ 1290
TABLE 2. Collective Decisionmakers Through
a Wide-Angle Arrovian Lens ........................ 1290
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................. 1291
VII. APPENDIX ............................................... 1291
A. Arrow's Theorem Proof .................................. 1291
B. Arrow's Theorem Explanation ............................. 1292
1994] Social Choice 1221
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Intellectual History of Social Choice
In a world in which relatively few people were formally educated and
fewer still could honestly describe themselves as intellectuals, it is perhaps not
surprising that both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison were familiar with
the noted French philosopher and mathematician,' the Marquis de Condorcet.2
As Minister to France, Jefferson personally knew Condorcet.3 Jefferson owned
several of Condorcet's works, including the famous Essai sur l'application de
l'analyse at la probbbilitg des dicisions rendues i la pluralitg des voix written
in 1785.4 The Essai describes what has become known as the "Condorcet
Paradox,"5 the seminal insight underlying what Condorcet described as "social
mathematics" and what is presently known as social choice theory.
6
The paradox is fairly straightforward. Consider the plight of three law firm
associates, Alice, Bob, and Carole, who need to decide which flavor to order
for an ice cream cake that they intend to serve at a party honoring their
departing colleague Diane. Three flavors are available: coffee, chocolate, and
1. H.P. Young, Condorcet's Theory of Voting, 82 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 1231 (describing Condorcet as
a "mathematician and social philosopher"); DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMrrIEES AND ELECTION
159 (1963) (describing Condorcet as a "mathematician, philosopher, economist and social scientist").
Describing the Marquis de Condorcet as a philosopher and mathematician is a bit misleading. In the late
18th century, spheres of knowledge were not delineated with the precision that they are today. Instead,
intellectuals of the day, including the three men identified in the text, were well versed across a wide
variety of what we today call mathematics, philosophy, history, law, architecture, and the natural sciences.
2. See lain McLean & Arnold B. Urken, Did Jefferson or Madison Understand Condorcet's Theory
of Social Choice?, 73 PUB. CHOICE 445, 445, 453 (1992).
3. See 8-12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950); Arnold B. Urken, The
Condorcet-Jefferson Connection and the Origins of Social Choice Theory, 72 PUB. CHOICE 213, 215, 218
(1991).
4. McLean & Urken, supra note 2, at 447 ("Jefferson owned a copy of Condorcet's 1785 Essai and
several of Condorcet's other works in social choice."); Urken, supra note 3, at 215, 218.
5. McLean & Urken, supra note 2, at 446 ("Condorcet's standing as the principal founder of social
choice rests largely, but not entirely, on his Essai sur l'application de l'analyse a la probabilitJ des
decisions rendues a la pluralitj des voix of 1785 .... This work investigates the logical relationship
between voting procedures and collective outcomes.").
6. The name social choice theory is derived from the title of Kenneth Arrow's famous book, Social
Choice and Individual Values, for which, along with other works, he was awarded a Nobel Prize in 1972.
See Noiman Macrae, Towards Smaller Government, ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 1978, at 48 ("Professor Kenneth
Arrow won a Nobel Prize in economics by trying to discover a 'social welfare function,' designed to be
useful in guiding the planning authority for a society-and then discovering to his surprise and chagrin that
it is logically impossible for any such function to exist."); KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951). Arrow initially set out to determine a method of aggregating collective welfare
and instead proved mathematically that the Condorcet Paradox was an intractable problem in collective
decisionmaking. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE H1 2-3 (1989).
The Marquis de Condorcet was not the first to identify the voting paradox that bears his name. Some
fifteen years earlier, Jean Charles de Borda read a paper to the French Academy of Sciences demonstrating
the paradox and proposing a different solution from that which Condoret offered in his 1785 Essai. See
Young, supra note 1, at 1236-39 (describing and evaluating Borda method); BLACK, supra note 1, at 178-
80 (describing relationship between the theories of Condorcet and Borda). See infra note 124 for a
description of the Borda method.
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vanilla. Assume further that each announces his or her preferences in advance.
Alice ranks her preferences "coffee, chocolate, vanilla;" Bob ranks his
"chocolate, vanilla, coffee;" and Carole ranks hers "vanilla, coffee, chocolate."
Bob suggests that they put the choice of flavor to a series of votes, two flavors
at a time. Carole, amused by the suggestion, remains silent. In the first vote,
vanilla versus coffee, vanilla prevails two to one, with Alice losing to Bob and
Carole. In the second vote, vanilla versus chocolate, chocolate prevails two to
one, with Carole losing to Alice and Bob. Carole explains that she truly
dislikes chocolate and asks for one final vote, this time chocolate versus
coffee. Alice and Bob, a bit surprised at the suggestion of their colleague,
whom they had always considered to be quite bright, explain that the final vote
is obviously unnecessary; given that chocolate prevailed over vanilla and that
vanilla prevailed over coffee, chocolate would obviously prevail over coffee.
Carole, who double majored in French and intellectual history before going to
law school, asks her friends to indulge her. Much to the surprise of Alice and
Bob, in a final pairwise vote between chocolate and coffee, coffee prevails,
with Bob losing to Alice and Carole. Carole then explains that if everyone
voted sincerely in accordance with his or her preannounced set of preferences,
there was no rational means of choosing a flavor through pairwise voting.7
This fundamental insight, that absent clear majority support for one of
three or more options presented to a collective decisionmaking body there may
be no rational means of aggregating individual preferences, contributed to what
Condorcet hoped would become a social science, founded upon the laws of
probability, no less rigorous than the natural sciences.8 While Madison did not
know Condorcet personally, he received copies of the Essai from at least two
independent sources, Thomas Jefferson and Philip Mazzei.9 In addition, in a
7. As shown in infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text, there may be other rational ways for Alice,
Bob, and Carole to choose a flavor, including strategic voting and logrolling.
8. See KEITH M. BAKER, CONDORCET: FROM NATuRAL PHILOSOPHY TO SOCIAL MATHEMATICS 188
(1975) ("In this probabilistic philosophy, Condorcet found a model for social science that made it no less
certain-no less susceptible of the precise and measured evaluation of mathematical calculation-than the
physical sciences."); McLean & Urken, supra note 2, at 445 ("Condorcet was the last of the Enlightenment
philosophes. A dedicated liberal and the founder of what he called 'social mathematics', he believed that
rigorous social science, founded on the laws of probability, was no less obtainable than rigorous natural
science."); BLACK, supra note 1, at 184 ("The hope had sprung up to carry the methods of rigorous and
mathematical thought beyond the physical and into the realms of the human sciences.").
In addition to describing the cycling phenomenon, Condorcet devised a partial solution. Assume that
Carole's preferences are changed to "vanilla, chocolate, coffee," while her friends' preferences remain
unchanged. Now, even though chocolate is not the first choice of a majority of voters, it prevails over any
alternative flavor in a pairwise vote. Choosing the option that prevails over all other options in a series of
pairwise votes, called the "Condorcet criterion" or the "Condorcet winner," see ARROW, supra note 6, at
94, is only a partial solution to the voting paradox because such a winner will not always exist. See Saul
Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REv. 971,993-
96 (1989). If the original orderings are left unchanged, for example, there is no Condorcet-winning flavor.
The Condorcet-winner and non-Condorcet-winner paradigms are described in more detail in note 122.
9. See McLean & Urken, supra note 2, at 453-54. McLean and Urken describe Mazzei, who resided
in Virginia before relocating to Paris, as "an Italian adventurer," who although "vain and pompous" was
"shrewd about French and American politics." Id. at 450; see also Urken, supra note 3, at 226 (providing
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direct but failed attempt to influence the drafting of the United States
Constitution, Mazzei sent Madison a series of four "well-reasoned letters" in
which he claimed that Condorcet's work provided mathematically sound
support for a unicameral legislature,'0 based upon principles of social choice.
While the historic evidence is not conclusive, lain McLean and Arnold B.
Urken recently reviewed all available primary sources and determined, first,
that while Jefferson and Madison owned copies of the Essai, it is unlikely that
either of them actually read the fairly short section that described the voting
paradox;1' and, second, that no available evidence supports the claim that an
understanding of the voting paradox influenced the drafting of the United
States Constitution. 2 In addition, McLean and Urken conclude that Madison,
historical background information on Mazzei).
10. Letter from Philip Mazzei to James Madison (Aug. 14, 1786), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 102-03 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1975). Saul Levmore has recently argued, somewhat ironically,
that bicameral legislatures are better suited to act on Condorcet winners than are unicameral legislatures
with a supermajority consensus requirement. See Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions
Better than One?, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 145, 156 (1992). Professor Levmore explains that a bicameral
legislature with a simple majority rule in each house will produce .'strong-Condorcet' altemative[s],"
defined as the simultaneous Condorcet winner in both houses, because the motion-and-amendment
procedure within each house is conducive to yielding Condorcet-winning options. Id. In contrast, in any
body that requires supermajority consensus, Levmore explains, a minority can block a Condorcet-winner.
Id. For an explanation of how and why motion-and-amendment procedures yield Condorcet winners, see
infra notes 169-87 and accompanying text. In contrast, other theorists have argued that bicameralism
functions to prevent a minority from controlling the outcome of the legislative process. JAMES M.
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 242 (1962) (showing that many more votes are needed to control a
bicameral legislature than a unicameral one). Levmore explains that while both a unicameral legislature
with supermajority rule and a bicameral legislature with majority rule can expand the base of support
needed to pass ordinary legislation, only the latter is successful in producing legislation that satisfies the
Condorcet criterion. Levmore, supra, at 156-58 ("Both bicameralism and supermajoritarianism can serve
to stop legislation or special interests, but only bicameralism can at the same time preserve all strong-
Condorcet alternatives.").
11. See Urken, supra note 3, at 219 (observing that Jefferson's typical margin notes do not appear in
the copies of the Essai that scholars believe he may have owned); McLean & Urken, supra note 2, at 454
(positing that Madison's correspondence implies that the Essai passed only briefly across Madison's desk
and that he probably did not read it).
12. See McLean & Urken, supra note 2, at 455-56; see also Urken, supra note 3, at 222 (positing that
Jefferson "seems not to have assimilated [Condoreet's] theoretical approach to the design of constitutions.").
Dennis R. McGrath takes a contrary position in James Madison and Social Choice Theory: The Possibility
of Republicanism (1983) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland). McGrath states:
"Madison was aware of some of Condorcet's work [related to the voters' paradox] from the Encyclopedia
Methodique and when he was writing Federalist 10 Condorcet's practical applications of these theories were
fresh in his mind." Id. at 37; see also id. at 40 ("Madison ... had [I some knowledge of the Paradox of
Voting."). While McGrath notes that Mazzei sent Madison the four "well-reasoned letters" referred to in
the text, id. at 37, he produces no direct evidence that Madison read either the Encyclopedia Methodique
or those letters. McGrath comments, for example, that "Madison reviewed this work just weeks before he
wrote Federalist 10," id. at 38, but admits in a footnote that "[t]he letter in which Madison commented on
the book was written November 5, 1787; but it has been lost." Id. at 73 n.8 (citing PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1975)). The only direct evidence McGrath produces concerning
Madison's familiarity with Condorcet's letters is Madison's rather curt reply to Philip Mazzei: "If your plan
of a single Legislature, as in Pennsylvania, &c., were adopted, I sincerely believe that it would prove the
most deadly blow ever given to Republicanism." Id. at 38 (citing Letter from James Madison to Philip
Mazzei (Dec. 10, 1788), in I LETTERS AND OTHER WRmNGS OF JAMES MADISON 444 (New York,
Worthington 1884)). This reply does not demonstrate familiarity with the basis of Condorcet's theory for
unicameralism. Indeed, McGrath hedges on Madison's familiarity with the voters' paradox, stating:
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who was strongly committed to creating a bicameral federal legislature, likely
did not read the Condorcet letters attempting to prove the superiority of
unicameralism. 3 Duncan Black, a modem founder of social choice theory,
along with Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, reached a similar conclusion,
claiming that E.J. Nanson, who described the voting paradox in 1882, was the
first English speaker to understand Condorcet's insights on social choice. 4
While Condorcet's efforts to influence the framing of the Constitution
failed, his intellectual descendants have attempted to combine his insights with
modem understandings of social choice to influence constitutional
interpretation two hundred years later. In 1972, Kenneth Arrow won the Nobel
Prize in large part for proving mathematically that no legislative process can
simultaneously satisfy the five assumptions on legislative fairness set forth
below and remain rational, where rationality is defined as the capability of
aggregating individual preferences into transitive group orderings.' 5 Since
then, literature in the field of social choice has proliferated. 6 This
proliferation has both influenced and been influenced by the law reviews.
Although no court to date has expressly recognized the significance of Arrow's
Impossibility Theorem on collective decisionmaking, social choice theory has
had a very significant impact upon legal scholarship. t7 Perhaps more
[I]t is not unlikely that a technician, busy attempting to construct something and thoroughly
familiar with many similar attempts in the past, discovers empirically a problem not yet
anticipated in theory. This, I maintain, is what happened to Madison. Busy trying to find a
reason for republican failures of the past and the perceived failures of the 1780's in the new
states of America, Madison developed an explanation of those failures which corresponds
remarkably to the theoretical prediction of Kenneth Arrow.
Id. at 3.
One reason why Jefferson and Madison may not have read Condorcet's work on social choice is that
it was "buried in a few pages of the enormous Essai." McLean & Urken, supra note 2, at 446. Jefferson,
for example, catalogued the Essai under the heading, "Mathematics. Pure. Arithmetic," suggesting that he
did not recognize its significance to collective decisionmaking. Id. at 449.
13. McLean & Urken, supra note 2, at 455 (explaining that while Madison had been presented with
letters containing Condorcet's theory of voting, "[t]here is no direct evidence that he had read it at all, and
both it and the text encasing it put forward views to which Madison was strongly opposed").
14. See id.; see also BLACK, supra note I, at 186-88.
15. See Michael E. Levine & Charles R. Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 VA. L. REv.
561, 561 n.2 (1977). In short, Arrow proved the intractability of a wide range of collective preference
aggregation problems, including the Condorcet Paradox. Accord WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST
POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL
CHOICE 116 (1982) (explaining that Arrow's Theorem "is a generalization of the paradox of voting").
16. See Levine & Plott, supra note 15, at 562 n.2 (observing that "[a]n entire literature has grown out
of [Arrow's] effort, consisting mostly of attempts to escape the rather depressing implications of this
theorem and of attempts to identify the range of circumstances to which it applies" and adding that
"attempts to sabotage the theory or to weaken its implications ... have not been nearly as successful as
originally hoped"); Amartya Sen, Social Choice and Justice: A Review Article, 23 J. ECON. LIT. 1764, 1765
n.7 (1985) (observing that the "number of books and papers published in formal social choice theory has
now certainly exceeded a thousand, the bulk of it coming in the last decade and a half"); see also Levmore,
supra note 8, at 985 ("The [voting] paradox is surely one of the best known insights or topics in the social
sciences.") (footnote omitted). While this Article in no sense attempts to "sabotage the theory," it does
provide a framework for assessing Arrow's Theorem's relevance in analyzing our constitutional collective
decisionmaking bodies that may limit some of the theory's "depressing implications."
17. A recent LEXIS search in the law review data base using the query "Arrow's Theorem" yielded
ninety-three articles. In contrast, not a single case in the Genfed or Allstate data bases mentions Arrow's
1224
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astounding than the quantity of literature generated under the label "social
choice" is the range of propositions that Condorcet's initial insight has been
used to support in recent years.
B. Social-Choice-Based Normative Proposals
Scholars have used Arrow's Theorem to argue that legislative bodies are
fundamentally incompetent, justifying significantly expanded judicial
review."t In addition, scholars have used Arrow's Theorem, often in
Theorem. One case, Branion v. Gramley, 855 F.2d 1256, 1264 (7th Cir. 1988), mentions Condorcet, but
in a context that does not involve the voting paradox.
18. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry into Fundamental
Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 GEO. LJ. 1787, 1822 (1992) ("Some of those who argue against
substantive judicial review of legislative judgments believe democratic rule is inherently desirable. Arrow's
Theorem cautions otherwise.") (footnote omitted); see also RIKER, supra note 15, at 137 (arguing that "the
consequences of [Arrow's Theorem] are either that power is concentrated in society or that any system of
voting can be manipulated to produce outcomes advantageous to the manipulators or at least different from
outcomes in the absence of manipulation"); id. at 167 (concluding that "the meaning of social choices is
quite obscure"); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAv § 1-7, at 12 n.6 (2d ed. 1988)
(positing that Arrow's Theorem "[a]t the least ... puts the burden of persuasion on those who assert that
legislatures (or executives) deserve judicial deference as good aggregators of individual preference").
Stout's article is among the most notable examples of using social choice theory to advance far-
reaching claims for expanded judicial review. Professor Stout argues that social choice theory provides a
strong basis for supporting several Supreme Court decisions applying strict scrutiny to invalidate statutes
under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses and for attacking other
Supreme Court decisions that have upheld statutes against similar constitutional challenges. This Article
is not intended to demonstrate that the Supreme Court decided any of the particular cases that Stout
describes correctly or incorrectly; it does, however, demonstrate that the theory of social choice fails to
provide an independent basis with which to determine the outcome of these cases.
Stout argues, for example, that binary legislative voting fails to account for the intensity with which
some persons are harmed by a wide range of privacy-infringing or discriminatory statutes. See Stout, supra,
at 1789 ("When a legislature's majority voting rules fail to incorporate preference intensities or encourage
rent seeking, the result may be legislative failure, statutes that diminish rather than increase citizens'
average level of well-being.") (footnote omitted). Stout cites as examples laws that classify based upon
immutable traits or that single out discrete and insular minorities for disparate treatment, id. at 1817
(discussing United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)); laws that prohibit intimate
homosexual acts, id. at 1827 (criticizing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)); and laws that prevent
individuals from choosing to terminate life support equipment, id. at 1802-04 (discussing Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)). Stout argues that because legislative voting
procedures are deficient, Arrow's Theorem justifies placing decisional authority over such issues in the
Supreme Court. Id. at 1789 ("An independent judiciary that strictly scrutinizes these statutes can protect
against the welfare losses that flow from legislative failure."). If this Article's thesis is correct, Stout's
analysis is precisely backwards. Legislatures, because they condone logrolling and strategic voting, have
a comparative advantage relative to appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, which base their
decisions upon legal principles, in taking intensity of preferences into account in their decisional processes.
See infra notes 213-36 and accompanying text (applying unanimity and independence criteria to Supreme
Court and Congress to demonstrate that the latter institution is superior at taking intensity of preferences
into account).
In fact, Stout appears to recognize at least some of the difficulty with her own thesis, see Stout, supra,
at 1795 (acknowledging that legislators logroll); id. at 1826 n.164 (acknowledging that appellate courts,
because they are collective decisionmakers, are subject to the tenets of Arrow's Theorem). Stout attempts
to avoid these problems by proposing a regime in which courts themselves logroll. Id. at 1826 n.164. Stout
contends, somewhat oddly, that judges can logroll at lower cost than legislators if judges "act as
representatives of different constituencies." Id. Recognizing however that appellate courts have often
thwarted the very rights that she seeks to advance, Stout argues that this anomaly is due to the Article III
appointments process. If judges were appointed with the goal of creating a "diverse judiciary" consisting
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 103: 1219
combination with the more interest-group-oriented public choice literature,' 9
to support a wide variety of normative proposals for statutory interpretation.
These proposals include, first, strictly honoring the terms of legislative
bargains, eschewing the notion of collective intent;2" second, reading a public-
regarding purpose into statutes to minimize the impact of special interest group
of judges "from a variety of ethnic, racial, and class backgrounds," Stout contends, then federal judges
would find the process of achieving the necessary consensus to protect such rights easier to achieve. Id.
at 1829 & n.177. While I am certainly not opposed to increasing diversity within the federal judiciary
(although I do oppose altering the constitutional appointments process to achieve this end), this Article
demonstrates that Stout's analysis of the supposed benefits that diversity would provide, based upon social
choice, is also backwards. Ironically, Stout's proposal for judicial reform, if adopted, would likely replicate
in federal appellate courts the very causes of legislative cycling that Stout claims justify shifting decisional
responsibility from legislatures to appellate courts in the first place. See infra note 90 and accompanying
text (explaining that cycling problems are exacerbated when participants' preferences are multi-peaked and
ameliorated when preferences are uni-peaked). This is not to suggest that individuals with diverse
backgrounds cannot share like preferences; it does, however, cast substantial doubt on Professor Stout's
thesis that increasing the diversity of substantive viewpoints in federal appellate courts, including the
Supreme Court, will ease the process of achieving appellate court consensus, thus increasing judicial
rationality and reducing social welfare losses.
19. Indeed, some of the scholars whose works are cited below, infra notes 20-24 and accompanying
text, mention the insights from the social choice literature as merely one reason among many for departing
from conventional methods of constitutional or statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein,
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 410 (1989) (citing social choice
literature in support of proposition that "those who emphasize the findings of public choice theory would
treat statutes as lacking coherent normative underpinnings") (footnote omitted); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L.
REV. 275, 284 (1988) (positing that Arrow's Theorem demonstrates that "results achieved under
'democratic' voting rules are arbitrary. The mere fact that Decision I is adopted may mean nothing more
than that Legislator A controls the agenda (e.g., holds the chair during the proceedings).") (footnote
omitted). Specifically, these authors and others combine the axiomatic social choice literature with the
public choice interest group literature. This Article will focus primarily on social choice, although it will
draw on some public choice literature where necessary to explain relevant social choice concepts. See infra
notes 193-201 and accompanying text.
20. In Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHi. L. REV. 533,547 (1983), the author argues
based upon Arrow's Theorem that "[a]lthough legislators have individual lists of desires, priorities, and
preferences, it turns out to be difficult, sometimes impossible, to aggregate these lists into a coherent
collective choice." (footnote omitted). After explaining that agenda control renders the process of
determining even an individual legislator's preferences difficult and that logrolling provides a potentially
misleading appearance of unanimity among legislators as a whole, id. at 547-48, Easterbrook goes on to
state:
In practice, the order of decisions and logrolling are not total bars to judicial
understanding. But they are so integral to the legislative process that judicial predictions of how
the legislature would have decided issues it did not in fact decide are bound to be little more
than wild guesses, and thus to lack the legitimacy that might be accorded to astute guesses.
Moreover, because control of the agenda and logrolling are accepted parts of the legislative
process, a court has no justification for deciding cases as it thinks the legislature would in their
absence. It might as well try to decide how the legislature would have acted were there no
threat of veto or no need to cater to constituents.
Id. at 548; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Forward: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 51 (1984) ("Interest-group legislation requires adherence to the
terms of the compromise. The court cannot 'improve' on a pact that has no content other than the exact
bargain among the competing interests, because the pact has no purpose.'); Richard A. Posner, Economics,
Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHi. L. REv. 263, 270-72 (1982). But see
Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution,
37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 179, 195-96 (1986) (arguing that "[a] document can manifest a single purpose
even though those who drafted and approved it had a variety of private motives and expectations.");
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTs 286-93 (1985) (arguing for "imaginative reconstruction" of
statutes).
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influence;2 and third, varying levels of judicial scrutiny according to the
extent and malignancy of interest group involvement.22 Ironically, perhaps,
given Condorcet's alleged commitment to liberalism,23 the theorem has even
been used to support imbuing our legislative processes with a modified
republican hue.24
21. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 250-56 (1986). Macey explains:
When the legislature has passed a statute that claims to be in the public interest but in fact
benefits an interest group, that interest group may meet with frustration in the courts when it
tries to enforce the statute. The statute is unlikely to serve the ends it claims to serve and at the
same time enrich a particular group. When the court interprets the statute so as to serve the
public, the court may... inadvertently invalidate a legislative bargain. But when this happens
it is all to the common good.
Id. at 254. After reviewing Easterbrook's application of Arrow's Theorem to the Supreme Court, Macey
goes on to state, "the inconsistency of Supreme Court decisions ought not to be viewed as an unmitigated
evil. While inconsistency is detrimental when it leads to the misapplication of public interest statutes, it is
beneficial when it results in nullification or misapplication of special interest group bargains." Id. at 259-60.
22. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 19, at 448 ("[F]ar from having a good constitutional pedigree, the
pluralist understanding [that courts should recognize legislation as codified deals among special interests
and enforce them as such] runs afoul of the fundamental constitutional norm against naked interest-group
transfers."); Cass Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1698-1704
(1984) (positing that statutes enacting "naked preferences" should be narrowly construed); Eskridge, supra
note 19, at 319-37 (noting that courts, in interpreting statutes, should vary the level of scrutiny depending
upon the combination of benefits conferred and costs imposed).
23. See McLean & Urken, supra note 2, at 445 (describing Condorcet as a "dedicated liberal").
Notwithstanding this characterization, Condorcet's views reflect the influence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's
republican writings. See Young, supra note 1, at 1231 (discussing and comparing views of Condorcet and
Rousseau). For example, in the Essai, Condorcet premised his assertion that legislators, in choosing among
options before them, should not be influenced by options that may be introduced in the future on the notion
that legislators seek to determine what is objectively best for society. Id. The concept is strikingly similar
to Rousseau's republican concept of the general will. See generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL
CONTRACt (Maurice Cranston trans., 1968).
24. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP B. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (1991). The authors explain:
To the extent that recent advocates of republicanism have rejected total pluralism, public choice
supports them.... We are skeptical of the more utopian strands of neo-republican thought. A
careful reading of the public choice literature does support, however, a more modest version of
republicanism, in which concern about the public interest and legislative deliberation play a role
in politics.
Id. at 61 (citations omitted). The authors further state:
Democracy cannot be equated with pure majority rule, because pure majority rule is incoherent.
Rather, a viable democracy requires that preferences be shaped by public discourse and
processed by political institutions so that meaningful decisions can emerge. Given this richer
understanding of democracy, Arrow's Theorem holds fewer terrors.
Id. at 61-62.
In his recent book advocating federal term limits, George Will made a similar, albeit more direct, plea
for classical republicanism, although his argument is not based upon Arrow's Theorem. See GEORGE F.
WILL, RESTORATION: CONGRESS, TERM LIMITS AND THE RECOVERY OFDELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1992).
The author states:
[Term limitation is an idea nourished by two intellectual streams. One is the Founders'
understanding of the institutional prerequisites for deliberative democracy .... [The other] is
the idea of classical republicanism. That idea had a larger role in the American founding, and
hence has a larger relevance to contemporary American governance, than most Americans
realize.
Id. at 151. While the term limit debate is beyond the scope of the present discussion, the Article does
demonstrate that without the need to infuse a classic republican mindset into our political actors, Arrow's
Theorem does not render our system of governance inherently irrational.
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This Article demonstrates that this social choice renaissance, at least its
renaissance in the legal literature, has been largely misguided. The purpose of
this Article is certainly not to undermine the relevance of social choice. The
theory has made and continues to make significant contributions to an
understanding of our collective decisionmaking institutions.25 Social choice
has made impressive contributions to political and economic theory.26 In fact,
this Article relies upon social choice theory to explain decisional processes in
the Supreme Court and in Congress that absent a social choice framework
appear counterintuitive. 2 In addition, the Article draws upon insights from
other scholars who have used social choice to argue against several of the
normative proposals outlined above, especially those that call for greater
judicial intervention in lawmaking processes. In short, the objective of this
Article is twofold: (1) to demonstrate that social choice theory does not compel
the vast majority of normative proposals outlined above; and (2) to provide a
framework for social choice theory that renders it more useful in analyzing our
constitutionally established lawmaking bodies.
Frank Easterbrook and others, for example, have observed that appellate
courts, including the Supreme Court, are collective decisionmakers subject to
the tenets of social choice. 28 This insight undermines arguments for expanded
judicial review that are premised on the ground that legislatures are uniquely
susceptible of cycling. In addition, Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey have
recently counseled against adopting far-reaching normative proposals for
legislative reform based upon social choice, claiming that sophisticated
mathematical models demonstrate that legislatures are more stable and rational
than early social choice theorists thought possible.29 Finally, some have taken
25. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 8 (developing evolutionary hypothesis, based upon Arrow's
Theorem, that demonstrates that various rules of parliamentary procedure are similar where they are capable
of yielding Condorcet winners and are dissimilar where they are not).
26. A complete listing of the numerous sources that could be cited for this proposition is impossible,
see Sen, supra note 16, at 1765 n.7 (compiling partial bibliography and describing proliferation of social
choice literature in the last several years). A preliminary list of citations would include ARROW, supra note
6; BLACK, supra note I; MUELLER, supra note 6; RIKER, supra note 15.
27. This Article differs from the social-choice-based legal scholarship thus far in that it provides an
explanation as to why legislative voting processes are better suited to identify and to act upon Condorcet
winners than are appellate courts. This explanation, as demonstrated below, has significant implications for
a wide range of modern jurisprudential theories.
28. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802 (1982); see
also Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts. IL Legal Doctrine, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION
441 (1992); Levine & Plott, supra note 15, at 563 ("Decisionmaking by multi-judge appellate courts ...
[and other collective decisionmakers] display[s] features that may make them vulnerable to similar
theoretical criticism [based on social choice]."); Lewis A. Komhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking
the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82 (1986). While these authors have recognized that appellate courts are subject
to Arrow's Theorem in some form, this Article demonstrates that these authors have misunderstood the
theorem's significance for appellate court decisionmaking. In addition, these authors and others have
misunderstood the theorem's significance when assessing both legislatures and appellate courts, given that
these institutions operate in conjunction with, rather than in isolation from, each other.
29. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 24, at 50-51, 54 & n.45 ("The 'sense of the legislature' or
the legislative center of gravity corresponds to the solution sets (yolk, strong point, uncovered set or
whatever) of recent formal models."); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public
1228 [Vol. 103: 1219
1994] Social Choice 1229
an altogether different tack, namely, attempting to prove the theorem wrong,
or at least, irrelevant, by challenging the underlying assumptions and
definitions, especially Arrow's definition of rationality."
C. The Nirvana, Isolation, and Composition Fallacies
While this Article draws on much of this literature, it takes a substantially
different approach in criticizing social-choice-based normative proposals that
seek to tinker with our constitutional scheme. More importantly, the Article
devises a rigorous framework with which to assess all future social-choice-
based normative proposals. The Article's thesis applies with equal force to
normative proposals that seek to modify judicial review 31 and those that seek
to modify legislative practices.32 Underlying most, if not all, social-choice-
based normative proposals, is one or more of three fundamental flaws. First,
through the "nirvana fallacy," scholars erroneously compare real-world
institutions with some abstract or ideal institution, even if the ideal institution
Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 432-33 (1988). Farber and Frickey, in arguing that legislatures are more
rational than Arrow's Theorem suggests, however, merge two concepts that are critically distinct in social
choice theory. In characterizing and responding to an argument by Judge Easterbrook, for example, Farber
and Frickey state:
Although Judge Easterbrook acknowledges the importance of agendas in legislatures, he seems
to view them as an additional source of arbitrariness and unpredictability. On the contrary, the
recent public choice literature suggests that agenda rules make outcomes more predictable and
therefore more understandable.
Id. at 431 (footnote citing Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, supra note 20, at 547-48, omitted).
The authors' contention that legislative processes are predictable and understandable does not
undermine Judge Easterbrook's argument, based upon social choice theory, that the results of those
processes are arbitrary in their failure to reflect the majority's preferences. Indeed, a wholly irrational
process may be quite predictable and understandable, for example, vesting substantial agenda control in a
person whose preferences, although shared by no other legislator, are well-known. For a simple illustration,
consider a rule that allows only two pairwise votes for three options, vanilla, chocolate, and coffee. As
demonstrated infra note 200 and accompanying text, the choice of flavor is fully within the control of the
person given the power to set the agenda. Indeed, the person who controls the agenda, with this rule in
place, can achieve any desired outcome. Assuming that the preferences are known in advance, the outcome
of the process, while admittedly predictable and understandable, remains arbitrary and irrational if the
procedure is intended to reflect the preferences of a majority of the participants. As shown infra notes 228-
31, however, social choice theory can be used to strengthen the argument advanced by Farber and Frickey
that agenda control, if understood and anticipated by legislators, can enhance both legislative predictability
and rationality.
30. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social
Choice Theory Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 CoLuM. L. REV. 2121, 2146-58,2192 (1990).
The authors criticize the rationality assumption on the ground that it fails to consider that numerous
fundamental values are inherently diverse (or plural) and incommensurable. As shown below, this criticism
misconceives Arrow's definition of rationality. See infra note 115; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow's
Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government, 75 IOWA L. REV. 949 (1990) (arguing that formal
assumptions of Arrow's Theorem's rarely hold).
31. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 24, at 55 (arguing for germaneness and single-subject
rules based on social choice theory); Pildes & Anderson, supra note 30, at 2201 n.211 (arguing that social
choice theory, unlike the authors' proposed participatory democracy model, operates from the erroneous
premise that majoritarian preferences as such have an independent and legitimate value, and claiming
instead that "preferences must be backed up by publicly acceptable reasons").
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has never existed or, as in this case, has been proven impossible to devise.33
Indeed, Arrow's Theorem proves that it is impossible to devise a collective
decisionmaking institution that simultaneously satisfies five specified fairness
assumptions and the condition of rationality (or transitivity).34 Beginning with
the premise that our constitutionally created collective decisionmaking
institutions do function, the relevant inquiry is which assumptions must be
relaxed to render those institutions functional. In other words, the Arrovian
criteria should be used as an ideal, or norm, against which to assess
divergences within real-world institutions. Second, through the "isolation
fallacy," scholars fail to consider that the collective decisionmaking bodies
they are studying have never operated, and were never intended to operate, in
isolation, but rather were intended to operate in an inherently complementary
fashion with other collective decisionmaking institutions. Finally, through the
closely related "fallacy of composition,"35 scholars fail to recognize that even
33. For an excellent discussion of the "nirvana fallacy," coincidentally directed at an article by
Kenneth Arrow (albeit in a different context), see Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another
Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1969). Demsetz explains the fallacy as follows:
The view that now pervades much public policy economics implicitly presents the relevant
choice as between an ideal norm and an existing "imperfect" institutional arrangement. This
nirvana approach differs considerably from a comparative institution approach in which the
relevant choice is between alternative real institutional arrangements. In practice, those who
adopt the nirvana viewpoint seek to discover discrepancies between the ideal and the real and
if discrepancies are found, they deduce that the real is inefficient. Users of the comparative
institution approach attempt to assess which alternative real institutional arrangement seems best
able to cope with the economic problem; practitioners of this approach may use an ideal norm
to provide standards from which divergences are assessed for all practical alternatives of interest
and select as efficient that alternative which seems most likely to minimize the divergence.
Id. at 1. In short, Demsetz maintains that markets are not superior at resource allocation because they are
maximally efficient, but because they are less inefficient than any alternative. While an omniscient being
might be able to increase aggregate utility by altering the allocation of resources resulting from a series of
market transactions, that does not undermine the claim that the market remains a superior resource allocator
to an alternative regulatory regime, given that regulators are neither omniscient beings nor capable of
cardinalizing preferences with market precision.
Ronald Coase, in criticizing scholarly works that study a world with zero transactions costs, has made
a similar argument illustrating the nirvana fallacy:
[W]hile consideration of what would happen in a world of zero transaction costs can give us
valuable insights, these insights are, in my view, without value except as steps on the way to
the analysis of the real world of positive transactions costs. We do not do well to devote
ourselves to a detailed study of the world of zero transaction costs, like augurs divining the
future by the minute inspection of the entrails of a goose.
R.H. Coase, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core: A Comment, 24 J.L. & ECON. 183, 187 (1981)
[hereinafter Coase, The Empty Core]; see also R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON.
1, 43 (1960) [hereinafter Coase, The Problem of Social Cost] ("Actually very little analysis is required to
show that an ideal world is better than a state of laissez faire .... But the whole discussion is largely
irrelevant.., since whatever we may have in mind as our ideal world.... we have not yet discovered how
to get to it from where we are.").
34. See discussion infra Part III; cf. Demsetz, supra note 33, at 1. The analysis considers one
additional criterion: the ability of a collective decisionmaker to act upon a Condorcet winner, when one is
available.
35. The isolation and composition fallacies are closely related but distinct. The isolation fallacy is the
failure to recognize that a particular institution that cycles might not cycle if it works in conjunction with
another institution. The fallacy of composition is the failure to recognize that, even if two separate
institutions cycle, collectively they may reduce cycling. The two remain distinct because (1) the
decisionmaker that prevents a given institution from cycling may be a single person, thus implicating the
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if two or more collective decisionmaking institutions are susceptible of cycling,
working together they avoid cycling unless they happen to cycle in the same
manner and in response to the same factual phenomena.36 To understand the
implications of Arrow's Theorem for our constitutional division of lawmaking
responsibility it is essential to analyze each of these analytical errors.
Avoiding the "nirvana fallacy" requires a novel Arrow's Theorem analysis
of our collective decisionmaking bodies. This Article begins with the
seemingly obvious premise that Arrow's Theorem is correct insofar as it is an
axiomatic proof.37 The theorem proves that five assumptions, each associated
with fair collective decisionmaking, cannot coexist in an institution that renders
rational decisions, where rationality is defined as the ability to aggregate
individually ranked preferences into transitive group orderings. 38 The five
assumptions are: (1) "range," allowing all participants to rank all available
choices; (2) "universal domain," allowing all aggregate rankings regardless of
individual rankings; (3) "unanimity," proceeding with any proposal that leaves
at least one person better off and no person worse off;39  (4)
"nondictatorship," disallowing any one participant to impose her preferences
on the group; and (5) "independence of irrelevant alternatives," disallowing
choices that may be presented in the future to influence decisions in any given
pairwise vote.40
This Article departs from existing work in the significance it attaches to
the theorem. Given that Congress and the Supreme Court actually
function4 -meaning simply that Congress passes bills for the President to
isolation fallacy, but not the composition fallacy; and (2) there may be circumstances in which two
institutions cycle in the same manner and in response to the same factual phenomena, thus preventing the
institutions from having a positive synergistic effect in reducing cycling when operating together. Both
fallacies come into play when the two decisional bodies each have multiple members, such that are capable
of cycling, and when the factual phenomena that cause one to cycle do not cause the other to cycle.
36. See, e.g., FARBER & FRIcKEY, supra note 24, at 55 ("In a sense, the Riker/Easterbrook thesis
[demonstrating the susceptibility of legislatures to cycling] proves too much. If chaos and incoherence are
the inevitable outcomes of majority voting, then appellate courts (which invariably have multiple members
and majority voting rules) and even the 1787 Constitutional Convention are equally bankrupt. As a result
the Riker/Easterbrook thesis is bereft of any implications for public law, since it tells us to be equally
suspicious of all sources of law. If we accept the thesis as to legislatures, we are left with nowhere to
turn."); cf. Hovenkamp, supra note 30, at 972 (arguing that "Arrow's theorem is not a constraint on
'distributive' legislation as opposed to 'efficiency' legislation.... Arrow's theorem suggests that all
legislative solutions, whether efficient or otherwise, are inherently unstable and cannot yield determinative
social welfare functions.").
37. Cf. JOHN CRAVEN, SOCIAL CHOICE: A FRAMEWORK FOR COLLECTIVE DECISIONS AND INDIVIDUAL
JUDGMENTS 1 (1992) ("If Arrow's result were not true, we could then stop.").
38. See RIKER, supra note 15, at 116 ("The essence of Arrow's theorem is that no method of
amalgamating individual judgments can simultaneously satisfy some reasonable conditions of fairness on
the method and a condition of logicality on the result.").
39. This is simply a restatement of the Pareto optimality criterion. See CRAVEN, supra note 37, at 34-
35 (describing relationship between Arrovian unanimity requirement and Pareto optimality criterion).
40. See Easterbrook, supra note 28, at 823 (listing conditions of Arrow's Theorem); see also
discussion infra Part III.A (providing more detailed explanation of Arrow's Theorem assumptions).
41. Much of the analysis in this Article applies equally to other appellate courts and legislatures. For
clarity of presentation, the Article focuses largely on Congress and the Supreme Court and points out
differences where necessary.
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sign or veto and that the Supreme Court issues opinions that resolve cases
before it42-- at least one of the five fairness assumptions or the requirement
of rationality must not hold, in practice, for each of these institutions. It is in
that respect that Arrow's Theorem is axiomatic. Deriving the theorem's real
significance, then, for comparative purposes, requires the following three-step
process:43 first, identifying which assumption(s) is relaxed for each institution;
second, analyzing how relaxing each assumption affects the relevant
institution's ability to render meaningful collective decisions; and, third,
comparing the ability of a given institution to which collective decisionmaking
responsibility has been assigned under the Constitution to issue a rational
collective decision, with the ability of an alternative institution for which
decisionmaking responsibility is proposed after applying the first two parts of
this analysis to the alternative institution. This three-step process for avoiding
the nirvana fallacy explains the Article's overall structure and methodology:
it uses the Arrovian criteria as an ideal against which to measure, then
compare, collective decisionmaking bodies.44
The analysis also exposes the "isolation fallacy," demonstrating that
Congress and the Supreme Court operate together to achieve a greater level of
rationality than each would if it operated alone.45 Finally, the analysis exposes
the "fallacy of composition," demonstrating that multiple collective
decisionmaking bodies, even if each is independently susceptible of cycling,
can operate together to reduce cycling when each cycles in a different manner
and in response to different factual phenomena. The analysis of the isolation
and composition fallacies demonstrates that the prevalence of cycling across
institutions is substantially less cause for alarm than it first appears.4 6
Part II uses three hypotheticals involving markets and lawmaking bodies
to define and to illustrate, first, the isolation and composition fallacies; second,
the game-theoretical problem of the empty core, which provides a deeper
understanding of Arrow's Theorem; and, third, the differences in factual
42. This Article considers the extent to which, these activities notwithstanding, these institutions
remain dysfunctional. See discussion infra Part IV.
43. Cf. Demsetz, supra note 33, at I (distinguishing comparative institutional analysis of economic
institutions from nirvana analysis).
44. See discussion infra Parts III ("Defining the 'Ideal' Norm") and IV ("The Supreme Court and
Congress Through an Arrovian Lens").
45. The Article also places appellate courts and legislatures within a broader framework of collective
decisionmaking institutions, including markets and agencies. See discussion infra Part V. widening the
Arrovian lens not only demonstrates how multiple collective decisionmakers may work better together than
alone, but also demonstrates that each institution, most notably markets, is subject to a version of the
Condorcet Paradox. See discussion infra Parts II and V.
46. See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 24, at 55 (explaining that because Arrow's Theorem
presumably applies to both appellate courts and to legislatures, arguments that legislatures are inherently
chaotic and incoherent, in effect, "tell[] us to be equally suspicious of all sources of law. If we accept the
thesis as to legislatures, we are left with no where to turn."); Pildes & Anderson, supra note 30, at 2139-40
(explaining that if the Court were to abandon the attempt to reason from legislative outcomes, as Judge
Easterbrook and others have suggested, "[riather than curing legislative irrationality, ... judicial
irrationality [would] merely coexist[] alongside it").
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phenomena that give rise to market and legislative cycling. Part I revisits
Arrow's Theorem to demonstrate the similarities between the Condorcet
Paradox and the problem of the empty core. This Part also describes and
illustrates the concept of a Condorcet winner, which is essential to
understanding the differences between congressional and Supreme Court
decisional processes. Both the Arrow's Theorem assumptions and the
Condorcet criterion provide the ideal norm or benchmark against which to
assess departures for purposes of evaluating the relative competence of any
collective decisionmaking body. Part IV describes how Congress and the
Supreme Court depart from the Arrovian ideal in different ways. 47 This Part
also demonstrates how these two institutions, working together, behave in a
substantially more rational manner than each would working alone and
suggests that several normative proposals based upon social choice would
undermine, rather than enhance, the collective rationality of those institutions.
Perhaps most importantly, Part IV demonstrates why legislatures are better
equipped than appellate courts to identify Condorcet winners, those options
that prevail over all alternatives in pairwise contests. Finally, Part V draws and
expands upon the thesis advanced in the prior parts by placing legislatures and
appellate courts within a broader framework of collective decisionmaking
institutions, including markets and agencies.
II. MARKETS, LEGISLATURES, AND THE EMPTY CORE
To illustrate the isolation and composition fallacies, this Part presents three
hypothetical case studies that involve the interplay between markets and
legislatures and that demonstrate the different circumstances that lead to market
and legislative cycling. The first case study was presented in a 1981 article by
Varouj A. Aivazian and Jeffrey L. Callen.4" Their article intended to establish
that the Coase Theorem, "which states that in the absence of transaction costs
resource allocation is neutral with respect to liability rules,"4 9 is sometimes
indeterminate with more than two participants.5" For present purposes, the
more important analysis is offered in Ronald Coase's response. He
demonstrates that while an empty core, as explained below, can in fact render
the Coase Theorem indeterminate, contract damage rules may restore
determinacy.5' The second case study, based on the recent Supreme Court
47. As indicated above, supra note 41, this discussion is intended to apply generally to appellate courts
and legislatures.
48. Varouj A. Aivazian & Jeffrey L. Callen, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core, 24 J.L. &
ECON. 175 (1981) (arguing that Coase Theorem is indeterminate in three-person game with empty core).
49. Id. at 175; see also Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 33, at 6 (demonstrating Coase
Theorem in two-participant context).
50. Aivazian & Callen, supra note 48, at 175 ("[W]ith more than two participants the Coase theorem
cannot always be demonstrated.").
51. Coase, The Empty Core, supra note 33, at 187.
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decision, New York v. United States,52 illustrates the difference in factual
circumstances that lead to market and legislative cycling. The third case study,
which involves intestacy law, further illustrates that off-the-rack legal rules can
restore stability among private decisionmakers negotiating in the absence of a
core.
A. The Case of the Polluting Firms
In the 1950's, at the same time that social choice theory was reemerging
in economic theory, economists discovered a phenomenon nearly identical to
the Condorcet paradox within private markets. 3 The problem, known as the
"empty core,"54 demonstrates that in certain circumstances, participants in
private markets may be unable to arrive at any conclusive set of contractual
arrangements and may therefore cycle indefinitely.55 The only significant
difference between this phenomenon and the Condorcet Paradox, is that the
"empty core" takes place among private market participants rather than among
lawmakers. The 1981 Aivazian and Callen article 6 presents a hypothetical
which is particularly helpful for present purposes.
Two factories, A and B, pollute a river to the detriment of a large laundry,
C. If A, B, and C operate independently and do not negotiate with each other,
the profits per day for each company, noted as V(A, B, or C), are as follows:
V(A) = $3000; V(B) = $8000; and V(C) = $24,000. If any two companies
form a coalition, their joint profits increase 7 as follows: V(A,B) 51 =
$15,000; V(A,C) = $31,000; and V(B,C) = $36,000. These two-party coalitions
do not affect the profits of the remaining party. Finally, a grand coalition of
all three companies would yield aggregate profits of V(A,B,C) = $40,000.59
Assume that in any coalition that includes the launderer, C, the other
participant(s) agree to close down, leaving C to operate with reduced (or in the
52. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
53. See John S. Wiley Jr., Antitrust and Core Theory, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 556, 557 n.10 (1987)
(explaining that while "[t]he core has precursors in the last century,... it was introduced as such in 1953
by Gillies and by Shapely [sic: Shapley] in unpublished works. The idea surfaced in specialized
publications later in the 1950's.").
54. For a thorough analysis of core theory, see generally LESrER G. TELSER, ECONOMIC THEORY AND
THE CORE (1978). While this Part will present a formal definition of the term empty core, after providing
an illustration, the concept can briefly be described as follows: The core is the set of stable outcomes that
can be predicted using the standard tools of economic analysis. An "empty core" means that no such
predictable and stable outcomes exist. The more formal definition, infra note 68 and accompanying text,
will be easier to understand in light of the example provided in the text.
55. Because no one really knows what happens in the absence of a core, a more accurate statement
may be that economic theory cannot be used to predict what will happen in the absence of a core.
56. Aivazian & Callen, supra note 48.
57. The authors explain that "[iun the merger literature this phenomenon is known as synergy. In the
game-theory literature the characteristic function V is said to be superadditive." Id. at 177.
58. V(A,B) means the profits of both A and B if A and B create a coalition.
59. Aivazian & Callen, supra note 48, at 176.
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case of the grand coalition, with no) pollution. This means that if A and B
both stop polluting,60 C's profits would increase from $24,000 to $40,000.
Any combination that includes a two-party coalition generates greater
aggregate profits than does the status quo in which A, B, and C operate
independently. 61 For example, if A and B form a coalition, their joint profits
become $15,000, as opposed to $11,000. Because C's profits remain
unchanged with the coalition (A,B), aggregate profits increase by $4000 for all
three companies through that coalition.62 The grand coalition (AB,C) yields
the maximum possible profits, $40,000. To see why, consider the coalition
(A,B) with C operating independently. Because V(A,B) = $15,000 and V(C)
= $24,000, the profits total $39,000.63 Thus, if A, B, and C operate with no
coalitions, maximum profits are $35,000. Any combination that includes a two-
party coalition yields maximum profits among all three parties of $39,000,
$1,000 less than the grand coalition profits of $40,000.
Aivazian and Callen demonstrate that in this hypothetical, the Coase
Theorem is indeterminate because the bargaining lacks a core. As a result, the
presence or absence of a pollution liability rule may affect which coalitions
form and thus whether A and B continue to operate.64 Assume, first, for
example, that the polluters, A and B, are liable for all pollution damages that
they cause C. In that case, the core is not empty and the grand coalition is
stable. C will operate without pollution and A and B will close because A and
B cannot generate sufficient profits independently or in the coalition (A,B) to
bribe C into letting them operate.65 Because no party or group of parties can
bribe C into changing the status quo, the game, with a pollution liability rule
in place, has a core.
Complications arise when there is no pollution liability rule. While it is
obvious that the grand coalition is the most efficient, it is not obvious that the
grand coalition will form. The critical point, however, is that whether the
parties are likely to achieve a grand coalition, thus causing A and B to close,
depends upon whether there is a liability rule for breach of contract. Any two
parties can increase their aggregate profits relative to the status quo by forming
a coalition, and all three parties can increase their aggregate profits relative to
60. This assumes that there are no polluting firms other than A and B.
61. To simplify matters, assume that if A and B form a coalition, their profits increase through
economies of scale.
62. The reader can confirm that the same holds true for coalitions (A,C) and (B,C).
63. Similarly, a combination that includes the two-party coalition (A,C), with V(AC) = $31,000 and
V(B) = $8000, yields total profits of $39,000, as does a combination that includes the two-party coalition
(BC), with V(B,C) = $36,000 and V(A) = $3000.
64. This is directly contrary to the Coase Theorem, which provides that, absent transactions costs and
with perfect information, liability rules do not affect resource allocation. See Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, supra note 33, at 6.
65. C earns $16,000 more without A and B operating than with A and B operating. The maximum
profits A and B can generate is $15,000, V(A,B) = $15,000, which is therefore insufficient to bribe C into
letting them continue to operate.
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any combination that includes a two-party coalition by forming the grand
coalition. The difficulty is that no coalition, including the grand coalition, is
stable because the bargaining lacks a core.
To see why, consider either of two alternatives: first, an initial decision by
two parties, A and C, to enter into a coalition without B ;66 and second, a
decision by A, B, and C to enter into the grand coalition. If A and C form a
coalition, their joint profits are $31,000. As stated above, all of the profits are
earned by C, which means that A is required to close down. If A and C
operated independently, A would earn $3000 and C would earn $24,000, for
a total of $27,000. The two-party coalition increases the profits of A and C by
$4000. To induce A to join coalition (A,C), C must bribe A to close down
with at least $3000, the amount A would earn by operating independently. To
simplify the analysis without changing it, assume that A is a good negotiator
and requires that C split the $4000 superadditive surplus. A now earns $5000
($3000 plus $2000) and C earns $26,000 ($24,000 plus $2000). Is the coalition
(A,C) stable? No.
B can now lure either A or C to form coalitions (A,B) or (B,C), thus
increasing the profits for the (defectorB) coalition. For example, if A defects
to form coalition (A,B), A and B earn joint profits of $15,000. In the new
coalition, the superadditive surplus is again $4000. This time, however, A
earns $3000 from operating. If B will give A more than the $2000 coalition
surplus that C gave to A, A has an incentive to defect from (A,C) to form
(A,B). Assume that A is again savvy and requires that B split the difference
between the surplus that C was willing to pay, $2000, and the total additional
profits generated by the new (A,B) coalition, $4000, such that A now earns an
additional $3000 and B earns an additional $1000. Is the coalition (A,B)
stable? No.
Now C has an incentive to bribe either A or B to defect. C can again earn
$4000 more by forming coalition (B,C), and B will defect to form that
coalition if C pays B more than the $1000 surplus that B earned in coalition
(A,B). Similarly, A will defect to form (A,C) if C pays A more than the $3000
surplus that it earned in coalition (A,B). In short, no two-party coalition is
stable because there is always an alternative (defectorexcluded party) coalition
that can improve the lot of its members.
The same phenomenon arises if all three parties agree to form the grand
coalition (A,B,C). Assume that they divide the $5000 superadditive profits
evenly, $1666 each. Now A earns $4666, B earns $9666, and C earns $25,666.
Any two of the three can now increase their profits by defecting to create a
two-party coalition. Thus, A and B can increase their joint profits from
$14,332 to $15,000 by defecting; A and C can increase their joint profits from
66. The reader is free to confirm that the same analysis applies with the remaining two-party
coalitions, (A,B) and (B,C).
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$30,332 to $31,000 by defecting; and B and C can increase their joint profits
from $35,332 to $36,000 by defecting. Of course, once two parties defect to
form a coalition, the above analysis demonstrating the instability of two-party
coalitions holds. In short, assuming no contractual damages and zero
transactions costs, no two-party or three-party coalition is stable in this
hypothetical because the core is empty.67
With this illustration in mind, John Shepard Wiley Jr.'s general description
of the empty core phenomenon is quite helpful:
The core of a game is the set of solutions that leaves no coalition in
a position to improve the payoffs to all of that coalition's members.
A solution ... in the core thus offers no possible subset of players an
option to defect to a different coalition and do better on their own. If
some group can improve its collective lot by playing in a different
way, then that subset will reconstitute itself as a new coalition that
will play the game in a different way and, hence, distribute the
game's proceeds differently. Because the new coalition will block the
first round's result from emerging as the stable or permanent
resolution of the game, the first round solution is said to be outside
the core. If some new coalition of players can block all possible
solutions of a game, no solution is within the core. Synonymously,
any such game has an empty core.6
67. One interesting potential solution to the cycling problem is vertical integration. This may not,
however, provide a means with which to avoid the cycling problem, but may, instead, simply create a new
outlet for cycling. Presumably a fourth company, D, or even one of the present companies, could engage
in the necessary takeovers to "internalize" the superadditive gains in the example. The problem is that if
we assume perfect information and zero transactions costs, each time a prospective takeover bid is
anticipated, the excluded party or the object of the bid could make a new bid aimed at forming a different
combination or a bid aimed at forming the same combination at a higher price. Given the superadditivities,
the result might be a "bidding war" that becomes merely another outlet for endless cycling. It may instead,
as Coase suggests, see Coase, The Empty Core, supra note 33, at 186-87, reach a conclusion if the gains
from the continuous bids and counterbids asymptotically approach the potential gains available from
forming the maximally integrated firm, which merges all of A, B, and C. See infra text accompanying note
73. In short, the same indeterminacy from cycling results whether the participants attempt to form coalitions
or to vertically integrate.
68. Wiley, supra note 53, at 558. In other words, the core is empty when there is no Nash equilibrium.
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law and Economics, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 293, 312 (1992) ("A
Nash equilibrium is a set of choices such that no player has any incentive to deviate from the set, given
the options available to the opponent."); see also Keith N. Hylton, Efficiency and Labor Law, 87 Nw. U.
L. REV. 471, 502 (1993) ("The equilibrium of a game is in the core if it is 'coalition-proof' in the sense
that no subgroup has an incentive to form a coalition in order to change the existing coalition."); Telser,
supra note 54. While defaulting to the status quo may be the outcome of the hypothetical in the text, that
outcome is not stable. Given the superadditivities, the parties will always have an incentive to depart from
the status quo to form coalitions, just as they will always have an incentive to depart from any particular
coalition that is formed. This is why it is impossible to predict a stable outcome.
Wiley criticizes George Bittlingmayer's thesis that core theory may provide a basis for exempting
some industries from the per se prohibition on horizontal price-fixing announced in United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Wiley, supra note 53,
at 580-87. Bittlingmayer, relying upon the analysis of Lester Telser, attempts to demonstrate that some
horizontal price-fixing may be a necessary means to enhance output among multiple market participants
competing in the absence of a core. See generally George Bittlingmayer, Decreasing Average Cost and
Competition: A New Look at tire Addyston Pipe Case, 25 J.L. & ECON. 201 (1982). While an analysis of
the antitrust implications of core theory is well beyond the scope of this Article, Wiley's response to
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In an insightful, albeit mixed, metaphor, Wiley goes on to state: "A finding
that a market situation has no core upsets theorists because they cannot state
that the situation has a tendency to align individual conduct with social
advantage; the Invisible Hand lurches off on a random walk.
6 9
The empty core problem is a generalization of the Condorcet Paradox.70
In the ice cream cake hypothetical, for example,7' if the coalition (Alice,Bob)
decides that it will impose chocolate upon the group, Carole can lure Alice
away and make the new coalition (Alice,Carole) better off by selecting coffee.
Then Bob can lure Carole away to form the coalition (Bob,Carole) in favor of
vanilla. This time Alice lures Bob away to reform the coalition (Alice,Bob) in
favor of chocolate. While the group has completed its first cycle, there is no
means to predict the outcome precisely because the hypothetical, which
exemplifies the Condorcet Paradox, has an empty core.
In response to Aivazian and Callen, Ronald Coase demonstrated that
contract rules could render the market substantially more determinate even in
the absence of a pollution liability rule.72 Assume an expectancy damages rule
for breach of contract. Further assume the grand coalition, with profits divided
evenly as outlined above: A earns $4666, B earns $9666, and C earns $25,666.
While it remains true that any two parties can increase their profits by
defecting, the contract damages rule consumes these profits and thus removes
Bittlingmayer's argument is noteworthy. Wiley asserts, remarkably, that judges "should wholly ignore core
theory's implications for antitrust." Wiley, supra note 53, at 557. He bases his categorical response on the
following insight: "Telser's idea [of exempting from the Addyston per se rule those industries that, based
upon core theory, engage in benign horizontal price-fixing] is worth pursuing only if the costs it saves
outweigh these losses from cartelization." ld. at 578. Wiley adds: "But when we ask just how costly empty
cores are likely to be, the rather surprising answer is that, to date, the theory of the core hasn't a clue." Id.
at 578-79. While Wiley is certainly correct that the costs and benefits should be assessed before proceeding
with any proposal, such analysis is most often used to attack proposed regulatory regimes. Wiley instead
uses the analysis to support sustaining a regulatory regime, namely the Addyston Pipe prohibition on
horizontal price-fixing. The same analysis, however, can be readily turned against Wiley: Given the
uncertain costs associated with prohibiting horizontal price-fixing, in light of core theory, do the benefits
of the per se prohibition necessarily outweigh the costs?
69. Wiley, supra note 53, at 579. This may explain a phenomenon which, although based upon
anecdotal evidence, I have observed on repeated occasions. Persons who describe themselves as
conservative often tend to gravitate toward law and economics until they stumble across game theory, at
which point they immediately become uncomfortable. In contrast, persons who describe themselves as
liberal tend to find law and economics relatively unattractive until they discover game theory. In part, this
Article is intended to demonstrate that while game theory is helpful in explaining how some of our legal
institutions operate, it should be less influential in affecting the prior status quo between these two groups.
In contrast with games involving three or more persons, the outcomes of two-person games are not
susceptible to cycling because no move from a given outcome can improve the situation of one player
without leaving the other player worse off. See Aivazian & Callen, supra note 48, at 176 (explaining that
in "the two-participant case.., the core is always nonempty"). In other words, two-person games, unlike
games with three or more persons, always have Nash equilibria.
70. See Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective, 67 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 707, 726 n.63 (1991) ("The core of the game is identical with the Condorcet Paradox.");
Hovenkamp, supra note 68, at 332-33 ("In short, the intransitivity problem shows up in exactly the same
fashion as it does in the legislative situation.").
71. See supra p. 1221.
72. Recall that if a pollution liability rule is present, there is no empty core problem. See supra notes
64-65 and accompanying text; Coase, The Empty Core, supra note 33, at 186-87.
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the incentive to defect. While any two parties can defect and increase their
joint profits by $668, they Will face a $1666 penalty for breach of contract. In
short, the contract damages rule renders the grand coalition stable. It remains
unclear whether the parties will cycle endlessly in negotiations before they
formally enter into a coalition, grand or two-party. As Coase points out,
however, they should quickly realize, assuming they consistently divide the
superadditive gains, that their maximum joint profits from repeated two-party
negotiations and defections will asymptotically approach $39,000, while the
grand coalition will yield $40,000.71 If the parties know that contract damages
will eat up any superadditive profits from defection, the grand coalition may
become an attractive alternative to negotiation and defection.74
This hypothetical illustrates an important aspect of this Article's central
thesis.75 While an empty core may render the market susceptible to cycling,
an appropriate legal regime will reduce this tendency (at least
postcontractually).76 Of course, markets are not the only collective
decisionmaking institutions that cycle. How can the legal system, then, help
reduce market cycling when the legislature, and indeed appellate courts, also
cycle?77 The answer is twofold.
73. Coase, The Empty Core, supra note 33, at 186-87.
74. See id. at 184-87.
75. Of course, both courts and legislatures will presumably respond to the factual phenomena giving
rise to the empty core in this hypothetical differently than do market participants. While this example
presents a state law issue, the same analysis is readily extended to cover bankruptcy questions arising under
federal law. Assume no federal or state bankruptcy rules or other rules on creditors' remedies. Further
assume that company A has $10 in assets and owes $50 each to companies B and C, and that a majority
vote (here two out of three companies) will determine how A's assets will be divided. The reader is free
to confirm that the result will be endless cycling because the hypothetical lacks a core. In other words,
given the superadditivities, no two- or three-party coalition is stable. While this may explain why Congress
or state legislatures are better suited than the participants themselves to create off-the-rack bargaining rules,
in the form of bankruptcy laws, it is also consistent with recent "chameleon equity" proposals. See
generally Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 311, 362-63 (1993) (outlining chameleon equity proposal); Michael Bradley & Michael
Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1079 (1992) (outlining contingent
equity proposal); see also Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate
Bankruptcy, 71 TEx. L. REV. 51, 100-07 (1992) (advocating alternative menu approach). For a critical
review of these and other bankruptcy proposals, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave
New World of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 465. In other words, provided that the parties foresee
the potential for cycling in the event that company A becomes insolvent, and that they iron out an
agreement ex ante as to how to proceed in that event, the legal system maximizes all parties' utility only
if it allows the parties to substitute their preferred rules for legislatively created off-the-rack rules. See infra
p. 1244. Indeed, even under existing federal bankruptcy rules, which require that creditors in the same class
be treated in a like manner, similar cycling problems can arise among the equity holders and the various
classes of creditors.
76. While ex ante legal rules reduce the tendency of markets to cycle, they also violate the formal
dictates of Arrow's Theorem by giving decisional authority to nonparticipants. One caveat, however, is
essential. Given that no solution to the cycling problem is, or can be, perfect, this partial solution appears
justifiable on the ground that ex ante legal rules are a "less bad" proxy than any alternative for what the
market participants would have chosen had they thought about the cycling problem and hammered out an
agreement.
77. For a discussion of how legislatures and courts cycle, see infra Parts II.B (describing legislative
cycling) and IV.A (describing appellate court cycling).
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First, the difference between the creation of legal rules in legislatures and
courts on the one hand and market negotiations by private parties on the other
is that legal rules are created ex ante, before the facts arise that lead to cycling,
while negotiations occur ex post, after the facts arise that lead to cycling.
While A, B, and C, left to their own devices, may be unable to avoid cycling
in a game in which every repeat defection yields a gain, that does not mean
that a legislature or court, empowered to create prospective rules-even if that
lawmaking body tends to cycle-cannot reach a meaningful consensus. Indeed,
even if A, B, and C were the only participants in the legislative process, for
example at a town meeting with three citizens, they might well agree on an
efficient expectancy damages rule for breach of contract before an actual set
of facts arises creating the empty core problem outlined above.78 Of course,
many more people than the participants in any particular game are involved in,
and affected by, the enactment of ex ante legal rules. Thus, even if A, B, and
C actually enjoyed endless negotiations and defections that lead nowhere, it is
unlikely that the community in which they live would agree to indulge them
in this costly regime, precisely because such a regime may prevent that
community from avoiding costly cycling in the future.79 Instead, the citizenry
at large will prefer a set of contractual rules that allows economic actors to
assume that when parties breach their contractual obligations, nonbreaching
parties can obtain appropriate sanctions so that they may continue to rely upon
the benefits associated with contracting.
B. Location of Toxic-Waste Disposal Facility
Now consider a situation in which the legislature is likely to cycle.
Assume that a federal statute requires states to become self-sufficient in
radioactive waste disposal by creating disposal facilities in-state.80 Assume
78. Expectancy damages is, in fact, the majority rule. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
CoNrRACrS § 14-4, at 591-92 (3d ed. 1987).
79. This is not to suggest that the government itself should enforce the contracts that are formed and
then breached or that the legislature should choose to prevent the parties from contracting around the off-
the-rack rules that it establishes. The point remains, however, that individuals benefit by assuming that off-
the-rack rules are in place to punish breaches.
80. This hypothetical is based upon an adaptation of tha facts in New York v. United States, 112 S.
Ct. 2408 (1992). In New York, the Court held the take-title provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act of 1985 unconstitutional because the amendments penalized states that failed either
to enter into regional pacts for low-level radioactive waste disposal or otherwise to become self-sufficent
within a preset time frame. Id. at 2427-28. Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, held that the 1985
amendments exceeded Congress' delegated powers under Art. I, § 8, because Congress did not have the
power to "commandeer" the states into legislating and because the amendments did not leave the states with
the power to do nothing. Id. at 2420, 2428-29. The opinion also suggested that the holding was compelled
by the Tenth Amendment, which O'Connor stated was the "mirror image[]" of the delegation of
congressional powers. Id. at 2417; see also id. at 2419 ("In the end, just as a cup may be half empty or
half full, it makes no difference whether one views the question at issue in this case as one of ascertaining
the limits of the power delegated to the Federal Government under the affirmative provisions of the
Constitution or one of discerning the core of sovereignty retained by the States under the Tenth
Amendment.").
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that New York determines that the statute requires it to create one waste
facility and identifies three possible sites that satisfy the environmental criteria
for such a facility. Assume further that each proposed site is located in the
center of one of three triangular shaped districts, A, B, and C, such that A is
to the north, B is to the southeast, and C is to the southwest. Each district is
adjacent to the other two such that all three form a point in the middle. Figure
1 illustrates this hypothetical.
FIGURE 1. Proposed Locations of Toxic Waste Dump
Each district contains a significant residential area within 100 miles of the
proposed site. Finally, assume, that a substantial majority of the voters in each
district consider a facility in their district the worst option; that they consider
a facility in the district situated counterclockwise from them the second worst
option; and thus they prefer that New York build the facility in the district
The case has been cited as partly restoring the Supreme Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence in
the aftermath of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding that
the Tenth Amendment does not prevent the application of minimum wage laws to municipalities and
reversing the contrary holding in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)). See, e.g., Ira
C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1, 57 (1993) ("New York v.
United States has in a limited way restored the state sovereignty barrier erected in National League of Cities
v. Usery and demolished in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority a decade later ......
(footnotes omitted).
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located clockwise from their home district. The districts' preferences are then
as follows:
8'
District A: B, C, A
District B: C, A, B
District C: A, B, C
A quick comparison will demonstrate that these preferences are identical to
those in the ice cream cake hypothetical. Indeed, this is the non-Condorcet
winning paradigm case which leads to cycling because there is an empty
core.
82
Why in this hypothetical does the legislature cycle when in creating the ex
ante rule for contract damages it does not? The answer is critical to
understanding both the isolation fallacy and the fallacy of composition. In the
waste storage hypothetical, New York has, as a result of the federal statute,
suffered the equivalent of a capital loss. 83 The issue facing the legislature,
then, is how to allocate that loss. There is no core because the victim-district
of any coalition formed to impose the loss on that district can lure away a
coalition participant to form a (victim, defector) coalition that makes the new
coalition members better off.8 This phenomenon is therefore identical with
the market cycling phenomenon that occurs in the absence of a core. In
contrast, in creating ex ante legal rules, the legislature is not allocating the
burden of a capital loss. Instead, it is determining how a market should best
operate to facilitate private transactions. Assuming participants legislate
without knowing how the rules they devise will affect particular constituents
in future transactions, all parties then have an interest in selecting efficient,
utility-maximizing rules.85
81. To simplify the analysis without changing it, assume either that the remainder of the legislators
are evenly divided among the same sets of preferences or, to make the analysis even easier, that these are
the only legislators.
82. The New York case arose precisely because the state of New York did not create a mandated waste
facility. 112 S. Ct. at 2416-17 (explaining that after the state identified five potential sites, residents in two
of the counties in which sites were proposed, and the state, brought suit against the United States). This
suggests that inaction is at least one viable response to legislative cycling.
83. As shown in the next example, infra Part II.C, the same cycling phenomenon arises in attempting
to divide the benefits of a capital gain.
84. Thus, if the representatives from Districts B and C form a coalition to place the waste site in
District A, the representative from District A can lure his colleague in District B away to form a new
coalition (District A, District B) to place the site in District C, leaving Districts A and B better off. The
same analysis holds for any other two-party coalition.
85. Indeed, legislatures may be able to create rational ex ante rules even when a majority is not formed
around a single option. See infra note 90 and accompanying text (describing decisionmaking with uni-
peaked preferences). The analysis in the text differs significantly from that offered by Herbert Hovenkamp.
Hovenkamp states:
The implications of [Arrow's Theorem indeterminacy] should not be overlooked: Arrow's
theorem is not a constraint on "distributive" legislation as opposed to "efficiency" legislation.
It does not suggest that pork barrel legislation is prone to cycling while efficient legislation
designed to correct market failures will yield stable social welfare functions. Arrow's theorem
suggests that all legislative solutions, whether efficient or otherwise, are inherently unstable and
1242 [Vol. 103: 1219
Social Choice
This demonstrates the isolation and composition fallacies. Because the
market and the legislature, in the context of devising prospective bargaining
rules, do not work in isolation, and because the legislature does not cycle in
response to the same phenomena that cause the market participants to cycle,
the two institutions can reduce cycling when working in conjunction. This
holds true even though in a different context, for example, in dividing the
burdens of a capital loss, the legislature itself cycles.
While the foregoing discussion was obviously not an exhaustive analysis
of the empty core problem or of the interplay between legislatures and courts,
on the one hand, and markets, on the other, it did illustrate several important
points. First, it demonstrated that markets have a comparative disadvantage
relative to legislatures, or other lawmaking bodies, in devising off-the-rack ex
ante rules designed to govern negotiations in the absence of a core, at least
after the facts take place giving rise to the empty core.8 6 This is not to
suggest that private market participants are unable to devise rules to govern
future negotiations. But when negotiating begins after the facts arise that create
an empty core, the legislature and the courts have a comparative advantage
relative to the market participants themselves in devising facilitating rules. In
this respect, the empty core problem is precisely analogous to the negotiating
problems that arise when parties are forced into an unexpected market
relationship or when an unanticipated contingency arises requiring
postcontractual negotiations.8 7 In both sets of circumstances, the lawmaking
body has a comparative advantage in devising facilitating rules because, unlike
the market participants themselves, it behaves as if those underlying facts had
not yet taken place.88
cannot yield determinative social welfare functions.
Hovenkamp, supra note 30, at 972. Hovenkamp adds: "As a result, one cannot use Arrow's theorem as a
basis for dividing the territory between types of legislation and suggest that legislatures confine themselves
to correcting market failures." Id. at 972-73. While this Article does not advocate limiting legislative action
to "correcting market failures," the analysis offered in the text, contrary to that offered by Hovenkamp, does
demonstrate that the legislature may have a comparative advantage, relative to market participants, in
correcting certain kinds of market failures and may lack that comparative advantage when engaging in
certain kinds of distributive legislation. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
86. As Herbert Hovenkamp has suggested, legislatures and courts may also have a comparative
advantage relative to market participants in providing rules designed to facilitate, or to obviate the need for,
postcontractual negotiations or negotiations arising when parties are forced into an unanticipated market
relationship. Like negotiations in the absence of a core, post contractual negotiations can break down. See
Hovenkamp, supra note 68, at 297 (providing examples of difficult negotiating circumstances resulting from
markets that are not competitive). The two situations are analogous in that standard economic analysis
cannot be used to predict, with any reasonable degree of certainty, the negotiated outcome. Lawmaking
institutions, whether courts or legislatures, have a comparative advantage in designing off-the-rack rules
in these circumstances because they behave as if the operative facts giving rise to the difficult negotiating
circumstances had not yet taken place. Moreover, in the course of designing such rules, they reduce market
transactions costs by defining postcontractual obligations ex ante, provided they allow the market
participants to accept the legal regime's rules or to contract around those rules.
87. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 68, at 297.
88. The positive synergy between markets and legislatures may work in both directions. Not only can
the legislature reduce market cycling by creating appropriate facilitating legal rules, but the market may
be able, by responding differently to the same factual phenomena, to reduce the effects of an inefficient
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In short, the analysis demonstrates that core theory has much the same
relevance as does the Coase Theorem in a world of positive transactions costs.
To the extent that transacting is expensive, lawmaking bodies, in devising off-
the-rack rules, do well only to the extent that they are successful in replicating
what the parties would have agreed to had they thought about the problem
giving rise to the particular difficult negotiating circumstance and hammered
out a negotiated agreement. Otherwise, the parties may be stuck with a legal
regime that they would not have chosen and be prevented from achieving their
preferred negotiated outcome by virtue of the transactions costs. This
perpetuates inefficient outcomes. Thus core theory suggests that, as with the
Coase Theorem, the legal regime should attempt, where possible, to reach the
solution to problems that the parties did not consider and provide for in terms.
In the pollution example, that meant providing a contract damages rule. But
while the legal regime attempts to achieve the postcontractual solution that the
parties would have achieved in the case of the Coase Theorem, the legal
regime attempts, in the case of the empty core, to establish background rules
that avoid cycling.
While custom may suffice as a substitute for off-the-rack legal rules when
little is at stake,89 the Coase Theorem and empty core problems both call for
default legal rules in more serious cases. In addition, the tendency of both
markets and legislatures to cycle does not necessarily mean that the two will
regulatory rule. While prohibitions on insider trading have the effect of reducing market efficiency by
preventing insiders from moving the price of stock more quickly toward the market clearing price than in
the absence of a prohibition, see generally HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET
(1966), diversification of market portfolios may ameliorate this inefficiency by reducing its financial impact
for most people who hold securities. See Robert G. Hansen & John R. Lott, Jr., Externalities and Corporate
Objectives in a World with Diversified Shareholder Consumers (unpublished draft 1993). In short, if some
companies' stock prices are effectively understated as a result of the prohibition on insider trading and other
companies' stock prices are effectively overstated as a result of the prohibition on insider trading, a
consumer can significantly reduce the risk of holding either category of stock by diversifying her portfolio.
While this does not cure the inefficiency resulting from the insider trading prohibition, it significantly
reduces the significance of that market imperfection for diversified investors.
89. Daniel A. Farber and Philip B. Frickey have argued that equal division based upon simple fairness
may provide a stable "value solution," in at least some empty-core games. See Farber & Frickey, supra note
29, at 434. The authors explain:
[T]his solution is a sort of equilibrium. It is true that any player could offer an amendment that
would beat this outcome-but what would be the point of doing so and thereby setting off a
round of endless cycling? In a sense, the existence of massive cycling provides the basis for a
new form of equilibrium adopted precisely to avoid the cycles.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also MARTIN SHUBIK, GAME THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: CONCEPTS AND
SOLuTIONS 179-216 (4th ed. 1987) (describing value solutions to empty-core games). Shubik cautions:
"while there is a growing economic literature on fairness [as a value solution to empty-core games]...
[it] is only tangentially related to game theory." Id. at 413. In other words, the merits of the Farber and
Frickey contention that fairness provides a proxy for a core remains an empirical question, the foundations
of which lie outside formal game theory. Moreover, while fairness may dictate the outcome of some empty-
core games, e.g., when parties anticipate future games with the same players; when other factors, like
familial relationships, dictate fairness; and where the stakes are small, the fact remains that fairness cannot
be expected to dictate the outcome in all circumstances. When there is an empty core and when fairness




cycle when operating in conjunction, if they do not cycle in the same manner
and in response to the same factual phenomena. Finally, the legislature may
not have a comparative advantage in avoiding cycling when it is attempting to
allocate the burdens of a capital loss (or, for that matter, the benefits of a
capital gain) in the absence of a core.
To reiterate, the examples illustrated first the "isolation" fallacy, namely
that market participants negotiating in the absence of a core will not endlessly
cycle, at least postcontractually, if the market works in conjunction with an
appropriate legal regime that punishes breach; and second, the "fallacy of
composition," namely that multiple collective decisionmaking bodies, even
when each is susceptible of cycling, will not cycle when working together if
they do not cycle in the same manner and in response to the same factual
phenomena. In short, using the language of game theory, multiple collective
decisionmaking institutions have a superadditive effect in reducing cycling.
The next Part will apply the same analysis to the Supreme Court and Congress.
These two examples further illustrate that commonality of preferences
among decisionmakers increases the likelihood that the collective
decisionmaking body will reach rational decisions. In the language of social
choice, the above example illustrates the distinction between uni-peaked and
multi-peaked preferences. In the waste disposal hypothetical, the legislature
cycled because the legislators' preferences could not be aggregated along a
single dimension. In contrast, when legislators are not attempting to allocate
the losses imposed by a federal statute or trying to divide the gains of a federal
grant, but instead are attempting to establish ex ante rules to facilitate market
transactions, it is more likely that they will share common preferences, e.g., for
utility maximization. In the language of social choice, it is more likely that
their preferences will be uni-peaked. 90 Uni-peakedness is one means to avoid
90. See Levmore, supra note 8, at 985-87 & n.47, 1002-03 (explaining how uni-peaked preferences
function and how they operate to avoid Arrow's Theorem aggregation problems). Imagine, for example,
that legislators A, B, C, D, and E need to determine how much money to spend on a particular project and
the choices are, in increments of $100,000, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. Using a motion-and-amendment procedure will
not lead to cycling, even if each of five legislators has a different preference among the five options,
because the preferences are uni-peaked. In fact, if you drew a graph with the legislators on one axis and
the allocations on another, you could create a single peaked curve, sloping downward, from the legislator
favoring the maximum expenditure to the legislator favoring the minimum expenditure. Given the uni-
peaked preferences, it does not matter whether the motion-and-amendment process starts from the highest
proposal and works down or the reverse because as the votes move toward the center, for each increment,
the proposal picks up one additional voter. A majority is achieved at 3, regardless of procedure. See id. at
1002-03.
William H. Riker explains that "single-peakedness implies transitivity and hence ensures the existence
of a Condorcet winner." RIKER, supra note 15, at 126. Riker further states:
Single-peakedness is important because it has an obvious political interpretation. Assuming a
single political dimension, the fact that a profile ... is single-peaked means the voters have a
common view of the political situation, although they may differ widely on their judgments.
d. In contrast, Riker explains: "This kind of agreement is precisely what is lacking in a cycle, where voters
disagree not only about the merits of alternatives but even about where alternatives are on the political
dimension." Id. at 128.
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cycling, even when a majority of a collective decisionmaking body does not
favor one of three or more options.9'
C. Alice, Bob, and Carole as Siblings
To demonstrate the pervasiveness of the empty-core problem, this next
example takes place in a context that does not involve business actors.
Consider the plight of three siblings who have just inherited $180,000 with no
background law and no instructions. They decide on only one governing rule;
they will divide based upon the decision of a majority, which in this case is
two out of three. Otherwise, they are entirely free to decide how to divide the
money.9" An obvious solution, based upon simple fairness, is for each to take
$60,000. 93 It should be obvious that this result, and for that matter any other,
is unstable.94 The core is empty and the cycles may continue indefinitely in
the absence of some default legal rule.
Now assume that a legislature is devising an inheritance law governing the
allocation of an intestate estate. Ex ante, there is no obvious reason for the
legislature to prefer any one sibling over any other, e.g., based upon birth order
or sex,95 and thus the obvious legal solution is an even division among
siblings. Indeed this is the rule in virtually all jurisdictions today.96 Again,
One interesting implication of this analysis is that appellate courts may turn out to be quite rational
in line-drawing situations, which are often touted as breeding grounds for judicial abuse. Line drawing by
an appellate court may be rational because it is in that situation that the preferences of the court's members
are most likely to be uni-peaked.
91. This analysis is directly contrary to that of Professor Stout, who has argued that increasing
diversity among federal appellate judges, including Supreme Court Justices, will ease the task of
invalidating statutes that create social welfare losses. See Stout, supra note 18, at 1829 n.177. In fact, the
above analysis, see supra note 90, demonstrates the opposite: increasing dommonality of outlook increases
the likelihood of rational decisions while increasing diversity of outlooks increases the likelihood that the
collective decisionmaking body will cycle. Cf. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More
Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 106 (1991) (positing that relaxing restraints on judicial range
may exacerbate Arrovian cycling problems). Again, the Article is not intended to suggest that increasing
diversity among federal judges is undesirable. It does suggest, however, that the justification for such a
proposal must lie outside social choice theory.
92. The following analysis would also apply, for example, to state legislators attempting to divide the
proceeds of a federal grant.
93. For a discussion of the (lack of) game-theoretical foundations for such fairness solutions, see supra
note 89.
94. With equal division, for example, if Alice and Bob choose to defect and keep all the money for
themselves, they stand to gain $60,000. If they decide to split the gain evenly, they each take $90,000.
Carole then has an incentive to enter a coalition with either Alice or Bob and to pay either more than
$90,000 for defecting. If Alice defects and insists upon splitting the superadditive gains evenly with Carole,
then Alice receives $135,000 and Carole receives $45,000. Of course, Bob now has an incentive to bribe
Alice or Carole to defect. The cycling result is the same as in the pollution game.
95. Of course, the decedent may well have had reasons to favor one child over another. For this
reason, virtually all jurisdictions allow bequests to supersede the off-the-rack rule. See WILLIAM M.
MCGOVERN Er AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES: INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS § 1.4,
at 21 (1988) (observing that wills allow decedents to supersede rules of intestacy through which, for
example, "a wealthy or unloving child is treated the same as a needy and devoted one").




even though private collective decisionmakers and legislatures may cycle on
their own, when working in conjunction, the two institutions may not cycle.
While the frequency of empty core problems and the ways they are
resolved remain empirical questions,97 the point remains that any analysis of
how collective decisionmakers respond when faced with an empty core is
incomplete without first determining whether the institution in which collective
decisionmakers operate was intended to, and in fact does, operate in isolation.
Only by considering the market mechanisms, for example, in conjunction with
the legal regime can one meaningfully predict the ultimate outcome of
negotiations in the absence of a core.98
I. DEFINIG THE "IDEAL" NORM
Before demonstrating how the isolation fallacy and the fallacy of
composition apply to congressional and Supreme Court decisionmaking, it is
first necessary to revisit Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and to consider the
Condorcet criterion, a partial solution to the Condorcet or voters' Paradox. As
stated above, the Arrow's Theorem criteria and the Condorcet criterion provide
the ideal, or benchmark, for judging the relative competence of real-world
decisionmaking bodies.99
A. The Arrow's Theorem Criteria
Arrow's Theorem proves that five assumptions, seemingly necessary for
fair collective decisionmaking, cannot coexist with a process that is capable of
aggregating individual preferences into transitive group orderings. The
following analysis considers each of the underlying assumptions and the
rationality criterion in turn.1°
1) Range: "Range" requires that participants in the decisionmaking
process not be limited in their ability to choose from available options.
Limiting individuals in their choice of options presented to the decisionmaking
97. See Aivazian & Callen, supra note 48, at 181. The authors note: "Examples of negotiations where
the core does not exist are easy to concoct and may be quite common in practice." Id.
98. This discussion is consistent with the intuition that markets remain superior at resource allocations,
assuming preexisting resource endowments and zero transaction costs. But markets have a comparative
disadvantage relative to legislatures in enacting ex ante rules that are necessary to guide market participants
in negotiations in the absence of a core after the facts arise that create an empty core.
99. See supra note 33 (describing "nirvana fallacy"). While the Arrovian criteria provide the most
obvious basis for defining the "ideal" collective decisionmaking institution, as shown below, the Condorcet
criterion provides an additional, almost universally accepted, benchmark against which to measure the
soundness and rationality of any collective decisionmaking institution.
100. These terms are universally used in the social choice literature. Mueller attributes these terms,
which differ from those initially used by Kenneth Arrow, to William Vickrey, Utility, Strategy, and Social
Decision Rules, 74 Q.J. ECON. 507 (1960). MUELLER, supra note 6, at 385. The definitions that follow are
my best attempt to synthesize many variations on the same set of definitions that recur in the literature,
including those offered by Vickrey, into a simple and usable form.
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body would substitute democratic form over substance by presenting a number
of options and then requiring that everyone vote only for some of those
options.
2) Universal Domain: "Universal domain" is essentially the flipside of
"range." In aggregating individually ranked preferences, no particular aggregate
ordering is off limits. Again, this insures that the decisional process is
democratic in substance rather than merely in form. If certain aggregate
orderings are off limits before the votes are cast, then the votes of some
individuals will count for more than the votes of others; persons who voted for
proscribed outcomes will have effectively thrown their votes away.
3) Unanimity: The oddly named "unanimity" assumption'' is really a
substitute for the Pareto optimality requirement of welfare economics.
Unanimity in this context means that if a proposal benefits at least one person
and leaves no other person worse off, the institution must proceed with the
proposal. While this might seem to suggest that one person can control the
process, that is not the case. A proposal that benefits one person will not
proceed unless no one else is harmed, which means that at the very least
everyone else is indifferent to whether the proposal carries. 0 2 In standard
economic analysis, proceeding with such proposals is a requirement of
efficiency.0 3 The term "unanimity" is best understood by considering the
limited category of proposals that a collective decisionmaking body would be
willing to commit to adopting unanimously ex ante, before those proposals are
formally presented to it for consideration. Presumably, any collective
decisionmaking body would agree unanimously ex ante to approve
automatically any proposal satisfying the Pareto optimality criterion, because
such proposals always increase aggregate utility without harming anyone. °4
101. See Vickrey, supra note 100, at 508 (defining unanimity as follows: "If an individual preference
is unopposed by any contrary preference of any other individual, this preference shall be preserved in the
resulting social ordering. (This is, of course, the principle of Pareto optimality.)").
102. For those who have studied microeconomics, this principle is well illustrated by considering the
Edgeworth box in which two persons have concave preference curves. The contract curve is the set of
points satisfying the criterion that any future trade would leave at least one party worse off. In contrast,
all points off the contract curve are inefficient in that through a trade that moves onto the contract curve,
at least one party will be made better off while the other party will not be made worse off. Unanimity
simply requires that all legislative outcomes be on the contract curve when possible.
One caveat is essential here. The traditional Edgeworth analysis involves two players. This is easily
modified, however, to satisfy the Arrow's Theorem requirement. Assume that one side is the preference
curve of the individual favoring the proposal and that the other side is the aggregate preference curve for
all the players who are indifferent. Unanimity simply requires that the players, one of whom favors the
proposal and the second of whom is defined as the indifferent remainder of the group, agree to move onto
the contract curve whenever possible.
103. One of the major benefits of market decisionmaking as a means of allocating resources, setting
aside the problems of externalities and initial endowments, is that market transactions satisfy the Arrovian
unanimity criterion. All market participants agree to the transactions in which they engage. See Levmore,
supra note 10, at 150 ("Every market transaction can be seen as the equivalent of a unanimous decision
(leaving aside the problems of externalities and disparate endowments), because only voluntary transactions
take place.").
104. See generally BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 10, at 171-74 (describing Pareto criterion). For
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4) Nondictatorship: The "nondictatorship" assumption, while the most
obvious for any democratic collective decisionmaking process, ironically turns
out to be quite problematic. Nondictatorship requires that no one person's set
of preferences control the group. This may at first blush sound like a
restatement of the requirement of universal domain, but there is a critical
difference. Universal domain holds that the group will not precommit to
exclude any set of aggregate preferences; nondictatorship holds that the group
will not precommit to exclude the preferences of all individuals but one. In
other words, the first prevents a predetermined set of preferences from
controlling; the second prevents a predetermined individual from controlling.
The difficulty, as demonstrated in the Arrow's Theorem proof presented in the
Appendix, is that nondictatorship is ultimately inconsistent with the concept of
rationality, defined below.'05
The nondictatorship criterion turns out to be extremely controversial in yet
another respect. The criterion essentially prevents the institution from placing
greater weight on the relative ordering of one person than on the relative
ordering of a second person. Put differently, the criterion provides that every
person's rankings receive equal weight regardless of the intensity with which
any individual may hold her relative ordering. Even if Carole only slightly
prefers vanilla to coffee, for example, but greatly prefers coffee to chocolate,
the group cannot provide less weight to the first relative preference, vanilla to
coffee, than to the second, coffee to chocolate, in a series of pairwise votes.
To do so would allow Carole's votes to be weighted more heavily than those
of her colleagues. This requirement stems from the economic tradition of
refusing to engage in interpersonal utility comparisons." 6
5) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: The "independence"
requirement is, along with the requirement of rationality, among the theorem's
most debated assumptions. 0 7 Independence requires that individuals remain
true to their ranked sets of preferences in all pairwise votes, without trying to
an analysis of whether increasing one person's tangible benefits without decreasing any other person's
tangible benefits may still leave the latter person worse off, see Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences,
102 YALE L.J. 1 (1992). The textual explanation of unanimity uses an ex ante perspective because after
the facts take place that would allow a Pareto move that benefits one person and harms no persons, those
not harmed may still prevent the Pareto move by engaging in opportunistic behavior.
105. See infra notes 111-16 (defining Arrovian rationality criterion). While it is not necessary to
understand the Arrow's Theorem proof for the discussion that follows, the Appendix presents interested
readers with a very simplified proof and cites more thorough presentations.
106. While some scholars have attempted to demonstrate that this ironclad requirement of economic
analysis is wrongheaded, see, e.g., Stout, supra note 18, at 1800 (contending that the "argument against
interpersonal utility comparisons essentially is an offshoot of the skeptic's argument against the existence
of other minds"), this Article instead relies on standard economic analysis, eschewing interpersonal utility
comparisons. It does so for two reasons: first, I remain unconvinced that institutions are capable of
engaging in meaningful interpersonal utility comparisons; and second, it is not necessary to modify this
standard assumption of economic analysis to pursue the analysis to follow.
107. See RIKER, supra note 15, at 101 (explaining that while independence "seems a fundamental
requirement of consistency and fairness to prevent the rigging of elections and the unequal treatment of
voters ... it has nevertheless been seriously disputed") (footnote omitted).
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anticipate the future agenda. 08 To use the ice cream cake example by way
of illustration, Carole-who, you may recall, truly disliked chocolate-could
have ensured that her second choice, coffee, prevailed by voting for coffee
instead of vanilla (her first choice) in the first pairwise vote, vanilla versus
coffee. While Carole prefers vanilla to coffee, if she knew the voting agenda
in advance, and if she was not able to convince her friends to provide the final
pairwise vote between chocolate and coffee, then this strategy would have been
entirely rational on her part. 0 9  This strategy would also violate
independence."'
6) Rationality: Finally, Arrow's Theorem holds that the above five
fairness assumptions cannot hold in an institution that is rational."'
Rationality has a specific definition in the theorem: it means that the institution
must be capable of aggregating individual preferences into transitive group
108. While independence is critical to both Condorcet's and Arrow's analyses, each applies it for
somewhat different reasons. Condorcet, echoing Rousseau's concept of the "general will," believed that the
collective decisionmaking body's function was to identify an objectively "best" answer. See Young, supra
note 1, at 1231-32 ("For Condorcet, as for Rousseau, the object of voting is not merely to balance
subjective opinions; rather, it is a collective quest for truth."); see also BAKER, supra note 8, at 230:
All men, Rousseau and Condorcet agreed, have the right to follow their own opinion. But
reason dictates that on entering political society, they consent to submit to the general will-or,
in Condorcet's phrase, 'the common reason'--those of their actions that must be governed for
all according to the same principles.
If the body's goal is to find the objectively "best" option, then each voter must try to identify, among
competing pairs, the option that is "better," until the body as a whole agrees upon that option which is
"best."
Arrovian independence is based upon a different intuition. While the collective decisionmaking body
is not charged with attempting to identify the ultimate truth, it is charged as a condition of fairness with
providing equal weight to each vote. See RIKER, supra note 15, at 101 (explaining that Arrovian
independence "prevent[s] the rigging of elections and the unequal treatment of voters") (footnote omitted).
Independence ensures that no one voter's relative ranking weighs more heavily in the body as a whole than
another voter's relative ranking. See id. Indeed, such processes as strategic voting and logrolling violate
the independence criterion, enabling voters to cardinalize, or place different weights upon, their preferences.
See infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
Condorcet's rationale for independence may provide a better explanation than does Arrow's for why
the criterion applies in the Supreme Court. As demonstrated below, infra notes 153 and 215 and
accompanying text, because the Supreme Court engages in judgment, not preference, aggregation, see
Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 28, at 89 ("[Vle... strongly lean toward a view of adjudication as an
exercise in judgment aggregation; indeed we understand most plausible schools of jurisprudence to embrace
this view.") (footnote omitted), independence ensures that in choosing among competing alternatives, each
voter attempts to identify the better option so that the institution as a whole can render the best decision.
In other words, independence ensures that individual Justices will not be influenced by irrelevant options
or issues when deciding issues within an actual case.
109. As set forth below, infra notes 223-27 and accompanying text, relaxing the independence criterion
in Congress marks a critical difference between the collective rationality of Congress versus that of the
Supreme Court.
110. See RIKER, supra note 15, at 143 (explaining that strategic voting "violate[s] Arrow's
independence criterion in that, for a given profile, the social choice might be x with one chance selection
and y with another.").
Ill. It is worth noting that while the theorem provides that the five assumptions cannot coexist with
rationality, the order in which the theorem is presented is itself somewhat arbitrary. For example, Herbert
Hovenkamp has pointed out that the theorem could just as accurately be stated as follows: "If one wishes
to have a rational (transitive) and democratic (nondictatorial) process for state policymaking, judgments
about social welfare must be based on some criterion other than purely ordinal rankings of preferences."
Hovenkamp, supra note 30, at 973.
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orderings." 2 While not stated as a formal assumption, individual rationality
is implicit in the theorem." 3 If we assume, for example, that Carole prefers
vanilla to coffee and coffee to chocolate, we must conclude that Carole prefers
vanilla to chocolate." 4 This requirement, also known as "transitivity," is a
standard and essential economic assumption."'
112. As Kenneth Arrow has observed, one of the benefits of transitive rationality is that it ensures "the
independence of the final choice from the path to it." ARROW, supra note 6, at 120; see also RIKER, supra
note 15, at 132.
113. Bruce Chapman has recently argued that this definition of individual rationality does not always
hold. See Bruce Chapman, The Rational and the Reasonable: A Comparison of Social Choice Theory and
Legal Adjudication, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 41 (1994). Professor Chapman uses the following hypothetical to
illustrate his point. Assume that an individual, Donor, must choose from among A, B, or C to be the
recipient of a financial grant to be used for a good purpose. Further, assume that as between A and B,
Donor knows that A will do more good and that as between B and C, Donor knows that B will do more
good. Applying the Arrovian definition of rationality, this means that Donor prefers A to B and B to C.
WVe would thus infer that Donor prefers A to C. Chapman goes on to explain, however, that if Donor
chooses A over B in the first pairwise contest, and B over C in the second, that should not necessarily
imply that Donor is irrational if she chooses C over A in a final pairwise contest. To illustrate the point
he offers the following insight; if in the contest between A and C, Donor learns that A owes money to C
and will repay the debt rather than use the money for some good purpose, then Donor might find it
disquieting to give the money to A when C is present in the final pairwise contest. Id. at 24-26.
In fact, this example does not prove that Donor is simultaneously rational and intransitive. Instead,
it shows that as Donor acquires additional information, her ordinal rankings may change. Assume that
Donor had full information in the first two pairwise votes. She would not then have preferred A to B.
While she probably would have preferred B to C, as she did initially, instead of preferring A to B, she
would have preferred B, who will use the money for "the good," to A, who will use it to repay the debt
to C. In fact, the choice between A and C becomes irrelevant; B prevails against either. In short, assuming
that Donor has the same knowledge in all rounds of voting, her preferences will be both transitive and
rational in the Chapman example.
114. This does not, of course, mean that Carole is irrational if she sometimes prefers the flavor that
is generally her second choice to the flavor that is generally her first choice. If, for example, Carole
generally prefers vanilla to coffee but occasionally orders coffee even when vanilla is available, it simply
means that she favors variety over sameness. Contrary to the assertion of Pildes & Anderson, supra note
30, at 2161, this insight does not demonstrate an "ambiguity in the notion of 'preference"' in social choice
theory. Carole remains rational if on those occasions when she prefers vanilla to coffee and coffee to
chocolate, she prefers vanilla to chocolate, and if on those occasions when she prefers coffee to vanilla and
vanilla to chocolate, she prefers coffee to chocolate. This combined group of orderings is consistent with
both the social choice definition of rationality and with the statement: "Carole generally prefers vanilla to
coffee, but on occasion she chooses coffee over vanilla because she would become bored if she invariably
chose the same flavor."
115. In Pildes & Anderson, supra note 30, the authors, in attempting to disprove Arrow's
Theorem-or at least its relevance in evaluating democratic decisionmaking processes-take issue primarily
with the above definition of individual and group rationality. Id. at 2142 ("V]e argue that the theory of
rationality presupposed by social choice is wholly inadequate for evaluating democratic institutions."). The
authors contend that individuals simultaneously hold numerous, often abstract, values. The authors suggest
that Arrow's Theorem demands that individuals be able to rank abstract, and hierarchically and radically
incommensurable, values ordinally when in fact most people are unable to do so. Id. at 2145-66. For a
similar argument based on the independence, rather than the rationality, criterion, see McGrath, supra note
12. Pildes and Anderson explain:
All complex democratic lawmaking institutions are structured to embody diverse,
incommensurable political values and to provide distinct settings that facilitate their rational
expression. Whether the structure of any particular set of democratic institutions does so in ways
appropriate to the values and substantive aims of particular societies can be judged only after
critical reflection and political debate on numerous, substantive grounds. But social choice
theory provides no way even to commence such reflection or debate because it misconceives
the nature of rationality, and hence some of the central functions of democratic institutions
highlighted here. Rationality is not a given property of individuals, but a social and political
achievement that requires appropriate institutional design.
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Arrow's Theorem proves that it is impossible for any collective
decisionmaking body to satisfy simultaneously the above six criteria."t 6 This
simply means that in any collective decisionmaking body that actually reaches
collective decisions, at least one of these criteria must be relaxed. Before
analyzing which criteria are relaxed in the Supreme Court and Congress,
however, it is necessary to consider one additional criterion for evaluating
collective decisionmaking bodies, the ability to yield a Condorcet winner.
B. The Condorcet-Winner Criterion
Saul Levmore has recently analyzed multiple rules of order, including
Robert's Rules of Order, and has developed an extremely valuable evolutionary
hypothesis, based upon Arrow's Theorem, designed to explain where those
rules are consistent and where they diverge." 7 Professor Levmore found that
where rules could be devised that were capable of yielding a Condorcet
Id. at 2183. In addition to rejecting the social choice definition of rationality, the authors further reject the
notion that majoritarian preferences have any value per se in democratic decisionmaking processes: "Indeed,
preferences as such have no weight in the public arena, for one cannot stand up and say 'I want' without
more and expect anyone to listen; preferences must be backed up by publicly acceptable reasons." Id. at
2201 n.211.
The Pildes and Anderson critique of social choice miscomprehends the Arrow's Theorem rationality
requirement. The theorem does not require as a condition of rationality that individuals (or groups) be able
to rank abstract values ordinally. Nor does the theory disclaim that democratic processes can assist in the
process of filtering abstract values to achieve concrete political decisions. The authors' contention that
because democratic processes allow individuals to participate in fora in which hierarchical and
incommensurable values are aired and ultimately resolved in response to real-world situations, those
processes are far more rational than they first appear, see id. at 2201-03, is thus not an indictment of
Arrow's Theorem. Nor does the authors' suggestion that a particular individual may rationally be satisfied
with democratic decisionmaking processes even if the end result of those processes places different weights
on abstract values than did that participant, see id. at 2207, prove the irrelevance of Arrow's Theorem in
evaluating our democratic institutions.
Obviously, many, if not most, individuals would be rendered irrational under a test that requires
ordinal and transitive ranking of abstract values. The rationality requirement is much more modest; when
presented with three or more concrete options, whether they be ice cream flavors or legislative proposals
concerning the proposed situs of a toxic waste dump, an individual must be able to rank those options
ordinally and the individual's ranking must satisfy the requirement of transitivity. In doing so, individuals
may apply numerous hierarchical and incommensurable values. In addition, they may attach different
weights to those values when presented with different legislative issues because those issues may implicate
the same values in different ways. But faced with concrete legislative options A, B, and C, it would be
irrational for an individual to prefer A to B and B to C, but C to A. By the same token, however, the same
individual when ranking options E, F, and G, may well apply different weights to some of the same values
that entered into her ranking: A preferred to B preferred to C.
In short, while Superman might generally rank his hierarchical preferences: (1) truth; (2) justice; (3)
the American way, he might be willing to deceive, if necessary, to prevent a deadly encounter, plotted by
an archvillain, with the dreaded kryptonite, on the ground that his foe's planned injustice is sufficiently
great to warrant departing from strict adherence to truth. Superman's rationality remains intact, however,
if he prefers a plan that allows him to foil his foe's plot without deception to an alternative plan that
requires deception.
116. Recall that the rationality requirement can be stated as a criterion of legislative decisionmaking.
See supra note 111. For a simplified version of the Arrow's Theorem proof, and citations to other proofs,
see the Appendix.
117. See generally Levmore, supra note 8.
1252
Social Choice
winner, the rules tended to be similar, while they tended to vary greatly where
they could not yield such a winner."'
A Condorcet winner-so named because Condorcet posited that whenever
such a winner is available, it should prevail"g--is an option that beats all
other options in pairwise contests. 20 Holding aside the problems associated
with the Condorcet criterion,' the Condorcet criterion remains only a partial
solution to the voting paradox. In the ice cream cake hypothetical, for example,
there is no Condorcet winner and, as a result, for any chosen flavor, there is
always another flavor that could beat it in a pairwise contest. There is no
Condorcet winner because the hypothetical has an empty core. In contrast, by
modifying the preferences slightly, a Condorcet winner emerges. Assume, for
example, the following, slightly modified, preferences:
1) Alice: coffee, chocolate, vanilla
2) Bob: chocolate, vanilla, coffee
3) Carole: vanilla, chocolate, coffee
The only preference changed from the original hypothetical is Carole's; instead
of "vanilla, coffee, chocolate" she now prefers "vanilla, chocolate, coffee."
Now assume a series of pairwise votes. In the first vote, chocolate versus
coffee, chocolate wins, with Alice losing to Bob and Carole. In the second
vote, chocolate versus vanilla, chocolate also wins, this time with Carole losing
to Alice and Bob. There is obviously no need for a final vote, vanilla versus
coffee, because whichever flavor emerges the winner, chocolate, the Condorcet
winner, will beat it in a pairwise contest. 2 It is worth noting that the
Condorcet winner is not the first choice of a majority of the voters. 3
118. See id. at 992-96, 1018, 1019 n.134, and 1034-35.
119. See Young, supra note 1, at 1239 ("Condorcet proposed that whenever'a candidate obtains a
simple majority over every other candidate, then that candidate is presumptively the 'best.' This decision
rule is now known as 'Condorcet's criterion,' and such a candidate (if it exists) is a 'Condorcet winner'
or a 'majority candidate."') (citation omitted).
120. See id.; see also Levmore, supra note 8, at 989 n.55 ("A Condorcet winner is an alternative
which beats all alternatives in one-on-one comparisons.").
121. These problems are described infra at notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
122. This illustrates the two contrasting paradigms. In the first non-Condorcet-winner paradigm, below,
the result of unlimited pairwise votes is endless cycling.
Person 1: A, B, C
Person 2: B, C, A
Person 3: C, A, B
The second Condorcet-winner paradigm, below, in contrast, does not lead to endless cycling with unlimited
pairvise votes; instead, the Condorcet winner, in this case B, prevails.
Person I: A. B, C
Person 2: B, C, A
Person 3: C, B, A
123. Indeed, as shown infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text, the Condorcet winner need not be
anyone's first choice.
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Nonetheless, the Condorcet criterion is attractive when it exists because it will
prevail in a pairwise contest against any choice.1
4
Professor Levmore posits that rules of order are similar where they are
capable of producing Condorcet winners because Condorcet-producing rules
prevent avoidable dissatisfaction. 12 To see why, assume five voters choosing
among five options A, B, C, D, and E. The voters have the following sets of
preferences:
1) A, B, C, D, E
2) A, B, C, E, D
3) C, B, D, E, A
4) C, B, E, A, D
5) E, D, B, C, A
Assume that the voting procedure is a plurality with a runoff; each person
votes for her first choice and the two options that receive the highest number
of votes are pitted against each other in a final pairwise vote. In the first
ballot, A and C each get two votes and E gets one vote. In the runoff between
A and C, C beats A three to two. After the meeting, however, voters 1, 2, and
5 realize that while option C prevailed, each of them preferred option B to
option C and that their three votes should have been sufficient under majority
rule to enact outcome B instead of outcome C. They would presumably be
dissatisfied with this voting procedure because it failed to yield an option that
a majority preferred.
Assume, now, that at the next meeting voters 1, 2, and 5 impose a new
voting regime, motion and amendment. Under this regime, someone moves to
vote for a particular legislative option, and, upon motion, a majority can vote
124. Chevalier Jean Charles de Borda offered an alternative method for resolving intransitivities in
collective preferences in a paper 15 years prior to Condorcet's Essai. For general descriptions of the Borda
method, see BLACK, supra note I, at 59-64; RIKER, supra note 15, at 30-35; Young, supra note I, at 1236.
Assume that each voter ranks her preferences as follows: (1) A,B,C; (2) B,C,A (3) CB,A. This ranking is
the Condorcet-winner paradigm. See supra note 122. Each preference that is lowest on a given list receives
a zero score for that list, the next highest preference receives a one, and the next highest then receives a
two. The votes for all three options are then tallied as follows: A receives 2 (2,0,0); B receives 4 (1,2,1);
and C receives 3 (0,1,2). In this hypothetical, the outcomes of the Borda and Condorcet methods are the
same; option B wins.
Now consider the following modified preferences: (I) A,B,C,D,E,F; (2) B,C,A,E,D,F (3) C,D,E,FB,A.
Options D, E, and F are "irrelevant alternatives" in that none of them would prevail against A, B, or C
based upon either the Condorcet or Borda vote-counting methods. Assume, therefore, that the only motions
involve options A, B, and C. Using the Condorcet method, which entails pairwise contests among any two
of the three relevant options, option B prevails, just as it prevailed without including the irrelevant options
D, E, and F. Using the Borda method, however, option C beats options A and B. In this example, the first
choice receives five points, the second choice four, and so on, down to zero for the last choice. The scores
are as follows: A receives 8 (5,3,0); B receives 10 (4,5,1); and C receives 12 (3,4,5). Thus, if this collective
decisionmaking body adopted the Borda method, option C would prevail even though a majority of the
body preferred option B to option C. This illustrates a critical problem with the Borda method: it violates
Arrovian independence. See also RIKER, supra note 15, at 105 (demonstrating that Borda-count method
violates Arrovian independence).
125. Levmore, supra note 8, at 994.
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to substitute an alternative motion. This process can be repeated.'26 Assume
the same sets of preferences. Now assume that voter 5 moves for a vote to
approve plan E, her first choice. Voter 4, who has ranked E third, moves to
substitute option C, her first choice. Voters 1 through 4 prefer C to E and thus
approve the motion. Now voter 1 moves to substitute her second choice, B, for
C. Voters 1, 2, and 5, who prefer B to C, approve the motion. Thus far, two
options have not been moved, namely options A and D. A review of the
ranked preferences, however, will reveal that neither A nor D can defeat option
B. Thus option B, the Condorcet winner, is the stable outcome that emerges
from the motion-and-amendment procedure.
The Condorcet winner, as in this example, need not be anyone's first
choice. It is, to restate, simply an option that prevails over all others in
pairwise contests. 27  For that very reason, theorists generally favor
procedures that yield Condorcet winners.' 28
Not surprisingly, the Condorcet criterion suffers its own limitations.'29
Foremost, it fails to account for intensity of interest in any particular voter t30
Thus, while B is the Condorcet winner in the given example, voters 1 and 2
may be close to indifferent as between B and C while voters 3 and 4 may
greatly prefer C to B. In that case, notwithstanding the Condorcet criterion, the
B outcome does not appear to be utility maximizing. In addition, there are
times when preferences cannot be ranked ordinally to yield a Condorcet
126. Limiting the permitted number of motions to less than the number of options changes the
analysis. See infra note 171.
127. A motion-and-amendment procedure is not the only device that yields Condorcet winners. Round-
robin voting and sometimes logrolling will also yield such a winner when one is available. In describing
procedures that yield Condorcet winners, William Riker explains:
There are many rules that utilize paired comparisons of alternatives to discover a Condorcet
winner. If a Condorcet winner exists, then all these methods come out the same way. If a
Condorcet winner does not exist, however, these rules typically produce different results, no one
of which, in my opinion, seems more defensible than another.
RIKER, supra note 15, at 69. Logrolling, as demonstrated infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text,
sometimes achieves a result that, although inconsistent with the Condorcet criterion, nonetheless satisfies
Pareto optimality because logrolling processes allow participants to cardinalize their preferences rather than
to merely treat their preferences as ordinal rankings.
128. See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 1, at 58 ("[The Condorcet criterion] appeals, perhaps via
mathematical symmetry, to our sense of justice .... Our own position is that our faith in the Condorcet
criterion is stronger than in any other, but it is not an unqualified faith."); Levmore, supra note 8, at 995
n.69 ("Most writers accept almost as a given that the ability not to miss a Condorcet winner is a basic test
when evaluating a voting procedure."); id. at 994-95 ("[Ilt is reasonable to proceed, as does virtually the
entire collective choice literature, under the assumption that a Condorcet winner is very desirable.")
(footnote omitted); RIKER, supra note 15, at 100 ('This notion [that the Condorcet winner, when available,
should prevail] is closely related to the notion of equality and 'one man, one vote,' in the sense that, when
an alternative opposed by a majority wins,.quite clearly the votes of some people are not being counted
the same as other people's votes.").
129. Accord Levmore, supra note 8, at 995 n.69 ("The Condorcet concept has at least two well-known
defects: Preferences do not necessarily, or even usually, deliver a Condorcet winner [meaning that, at best,
the Condorcet criterion is only a partial solution], and the concept does not take into account intensity of
preference.").
130. See id. In fact, Arrovian independence assumes pure ordinalization of preferences as well.
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winner.' 3' Setting aside these problems, and the fact that collective
preferences will not always yield a Condorcet winner in any event,'32 the
ability to yield a Condorcet winner when one is available is often viewed as
a form of Arrovian efficiency.
33
One of the fundamental distinctions between Congress and the Supreme
Court, as shown below,134 is that congressional voting procedures, and even
the process of logrolling, 135 are better at identifying Condorcet winners than
are Supreme Court voting procedures. Consider, for example, the case of
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.'36 In Kassel, the Supreme Court
issued three opinions: a plurality, a concurrence, and a dissent. To demonstrate
the Condorcet winner it will be helpful to treat the case as if there were only
three votes, any two of which are sufficient to rule on a given issue.'37
In Kassel, the Supreme Court held that an Iowa statute prohibiting, with
exceptions, intrastate use of sixty-five foot twin trailers, violated the dormant
commerce clause.' 38 The Court considered two underlying issues: first,
whether to apply a balancing test first announced in Raymond Motor
Transportation, Inc. v. Rice' 39 or a rational basis test; and second, whether
to allow the court below to consider only evidence used in support of the
statute by the state legislature or instead to also allow the court to consider
evidence submitted at trial by the state's attorneys. 40 In his plurality opinion,
which, because it was the narrowest basis for decision became the rule of the
case,' Justice Powell held, first, that the appropriate test was the Raymond
131. The following example is taken from ROBERT SUGDEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC
CHOICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO WELFARE ECONOMICS 183 (1981); see also Baker, supra note 70, at 725-26
(discussing Sugden hypothetical). Assume, for example, a vote on whether to grant a liquor permit in either
or both of two adjacent towns, A and B, and that a particular voter opposes both on temperance grounds.
Assume further that the same voter is more concerned about drinking and driving than about temperance,
however, and thus would prefer to approve both facilities to just one if either facility is approved. This will
prevent intoxicated persons from having to drive home across town. Even though the voter prefers not to
allow either bar to open, she will change her vote in the second town ballot based upon the outcome of
the first. Moreover, this switch in voting is rational. Another way to state this is that the preferences are
'endogenous,' meaning that the outcome of one vote affects the preferences in the second vote. By
definition, therefore, endogenous preferences cannot satisfy the independence criterion.
132. See supra note 122 (outlining two paradigm cases).
133. See supra note 128 and sources cited therein. This term is simply intended to demonstrate the
universality with which the ability of a collective decisionmaking body to yield Condorcet winners is
accepted as a benchmark of institutional competence among social choice theorists.
134. See infra Parts IV.B and C.
135. See supra note 127 (explaining relationship between logrolling and Condorcet criterion).
136. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
137. This does not change the analysis because the Court had three camps: (I) the Powell group with
four members; (2) the Brennan group with two members; and (3) the Rehnquist group with three members.
Any two-group combination contains the requisite five votes for a majority.
138. 450 U.S. at 671.
139. 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
140. 450 U.S. at 672-74.
141. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court decides a case
and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds .... ') (citation omitted).
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balancing test and, second, that the court below could consider evidence
admitted at trial.' 42
Both Justice Brennan in concurrence and Justice Rehnquist in dissent voted
to apply the rational basis test. 43 While Justice Brennan voted to consider
only evidence that the legislature considered when enacting the statute,
however, Justice Rehnquist agreed with Justice Powell that the court below
could consider trial evidence.' 44
To see the Condorcet winner, consider the following separate votes on
each issue: (1) Justices Brennan and Rehnquist prevail two to one over Justice
Powell in concluding that the appropriate test is the rational basis test; and (2)
Justices Powell and Rehnquist prevail two to one over Justice Brennan in
concluding that the court may consider trial evidence. In pairwise voting,
therefore, for each issue presented, the positions taken by Justice Rehnquist
would have prevailed, when in fact, he voted in dissent. 145 Thus Supreme
Court voting procedures did not identify the Condorcet winner in this case.
Given the value associated with the Condorcet-winner criterion in social
choice theory, any comparative analysis of Congress and the Supreme Court
must explain why congressional voting procedures are better equipped to
identify Condorcet winners than are Supreme Court voting procedures.146 The
next Part will provide such an explanation.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT AND CONGRESS THROUGH AN ARROVIAN LENS
As indicated above, Arrow's Theorem can be stated as follows: No
collective decisionmaking body can simultaneously satisfy the following six
conditions: (1) range; (2) universal domain; (3) unanimity; (4) nondictatorship;
(5) independence of irrelevant alternatives; and (6) rationality. 47 The
theorem says nothing, however, about which assumptions will be relaxed in
any given institution. What is absolutely clear, however, is that no real-world
institution can be held to the standard of an abstract institution that satisfies all
six Arrovian criteria, because the theorem proves that the latter institution is
impossible to devise. Thus, to avoid committing the "nirvana" fallacy, namely
comparing a real-world institution with an institution that does not exist, or in
this case, that has been proven impossible to create, it is essential to analyze
142. 450 U.S. at 678-79.
143. Id. at 680-81 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 689-91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 681 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 702 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
145. For other examples of "shifting majority cases," see John M. Rogers, "I Vote This Way Because
I'm Wrong": The Supreme Court Justice as Epimenides, 79 KY. L.J. 439, 456-58 (1990-91) (collecting
cases to illustrate thesis that individual Justices should not switch votes to achieve a majority ruling in
three-remedy cases). The three-remedy problem is discussed infra note 176.
146. As shown below, this distinction generally holds true for all legislatures and appellate courts.
147. Each of these terms is defined in Part III.A supra.
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each institution under review based on the Arrovian criteria. t4 Once the
Arrovian deficiencies in each institution are properly exposed (and bear in
mind that the theorem proves that each institution must have at least one
Arrovian deficiency), the two institutions can then be studied together to
determine, first, whether each is better suited to perform its assigned tasks than
the other would be if the tasks were transferred to the latter institution; and,
second, whether and to what extent the deficiencies within each institution are
ameliorated when the institutions work in conjunction.
This Part will first analyze both the Supreme Court and Congress based
upon each of the six Arrovian criteria. In the process, it will explain why
congressional voting practices are better equipped to yield Condorcet winners
than are Supreme Court voting practices. This Part will then demonstrate that
the two institutions, by working in conjunction, can ameliorate some of the
Arrovian deficiencies that are exposed. 4 9
A. Range
Perhaps the most notable distinction between legislative bodies, including
Congress, and appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, at least under
traditional theory, involves range. State legislatures have general authority to
deal with virtually any issue except to the extent that the proposed legislation
violates the United States Constitution, other federal laws, or the state
constitution. In that sense, the restraint on state legislatures is that of a ceiling
(barring infringement on higher law) without a floor (requiring no particular
delegation to create a legislative enactment). t0 In contrast, Congress is
bounded by both a floor and a ceiling. Congress cannot legislate unless it has
a specific constitutional grant, based upon Article I, § 8, for general legislation.
In addition, it cannot legislate when doing so will violate independent
provisions of the United States Constitution.
Within these restraints, legislatures generally, and Congress in particular,
have complete range. State legislatures are free, for example, to choose any
option that does not exceed the relevant ceilings, and Congress is free to
choose any option that is between the relevant ceiling and the relevant floor.
This means that Congress, for example, can take multiple bites at the same
policy apple, whether the Supreme Court held the first bite forbidden or
Congress subsequently determined the first bite unwise, provided the second
148. This avoids the "nirvana fallacy" by assessing relative departures across institutions from the ideal
norm. See supra note 33 (discussing "nirvana fallacy").
149. Table I, infra p. 1286, summarizes the analysis to follow.
150. See, e.g., James E. Castello, The Limits of Popular Sovereignty: Using the Initiative Power To
Control Legislative Procedure, 74 CAL. L. REV. 491, 553 n.329, 554 (1986) (distinguishing restrained
legislative powers under California Constitution from delegated legislative powers under United States
Constitution).
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bite falls within its sphere of authority. Included in this legislative range is the
power to do nothing in response to any proposal."' Doing nothing, of
course, allows the status quo to prevail over any other option. As shown
below, this element of range, the power to do nothing, proves to be the single
most important Arrovian difference between Congress and the Supreme Court.
It explains the most critical distinction in their decisional processes, namely,
why congressional voting processes are better equipped to yield Condorcet
winners than are Supreme Court voting processes.
52
The Supreme Court's range is far more circumscribed, at least under
traditional jurisprudential theories. 53 When exercising its power of judicial
151. Indeed, for state legislatures, New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992), strongly
suggests that the power to do nothing as an element of state legislative range is guaranteed by the Tenth
Amendment. Id. at 2428-29. Thus in criticizing Respondent's argument that the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Acts of 1985 provide states with substantial leeway for implementation, Justice
O'Connor stated for the Court: "This line of reasoning, however, only underscores the critical alternative
a State lacks: A State may not decline to administer the federal program. No matter which path the State
chooses, it must follow the direction of Congress." Id. Justice O'Connor hedged a bit in basing the Court's
decision on the Tenth Amendment, providing an alternative basis upon which to invalidate the 1985
amendments-that Congress lacked the power to provide the states with this choice under Art. I, § 8. Thus,
Justice O'Connor stated:
In the end, just as a cup may be half empty or half full, it makes no difference whether one
views the question at issue in this case as one of ascertaining the limits of the power delegated
to the Federal Government under the affirmative provisions of the Constitution or one of
discerning the core of sovereignty retained by the States under the Tenth Amendment.
Id. at 2429.
152. See infra notes 156-88 and accompanying text. As shown below, this Article offers a substantially
different explanation of the differences between Supreme Court and congressional decisional processes than
has been previously offered in the literature.
153. Accord Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 28, at 89 (positing that "most plausible schools of
jurisprudence" embrace the view that judges exercise judgment based upon legal doctrine rather than
express policy preferences in deciding cases). One practice that illustrates the difference between judgment
aggregation in appellate courts, which means that an appellate court aggregates the judgments of individual
judges into a single collective outcome by the court as a whole, and preference aggregation in legislatures
is the contrast between judicial dicta and statements on the floor of the legislature. Because judges are
engaged in judgment aggregation, their dicta are reasonable indicators as to how they are likely to proceed
in the future when faced with similar issues. Legislators making statements on the floor of the legislature,
on the other hand, may do so for any number of reasons, which may or may not include a principled
commitment to the position taken. As a result, statements on the floor of the legislature are less informative
indicators of future legislative conduct than is dicta of future judicial conduct.
The Senate Judiciary Committee hearings for the nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to the Supreme
Court recently illustrated this point. See Litmus Tests, WASH. POST, July 23, 1993, at A22; see also Joan
Biskupic, Ginsburg Deplores Bias Against Gays: Senators Find Nominee Harder To Pin Down on Death
Penalty Issue, WASH. PosT, July 23, 1993, at Al. Judge Ginsburg had refused to respond to a series of
questions by Senator Orrin Hatch about the death penalty, on the grounds that she had not written in the
area and that she may have to decide future cases addressing the issue. After Senator Hatch stated: "It
appears that your willingness to discuss the established principles of constitutional law may depend
somewhat on whether your answer might solicit a favorable response from the committee," Litmus Tests,
supra, Chairman Joe Biden read back an excerpt from the confirmation hearings of then-Judge David
Souter in which Senator Hatch "urged the nominee to 'stand your ground' in refusing to give 'answers
which you clearly cannot provide,"' and "warned against the Senate's imposing 'indirect litmus tests on
specific issues or cases."' Id. (quoting Senator Hatch). In a candid follow-up, however, that illustrates the
distinction between judgment and preference aggregation, Senator Biden then "graciously acknowledged
that he might not like to have all his earlier statements read back to him." Id. In contrast, statements
contained in an appellate judge's published opinions, whether holding or dictum, are always fair game
because they are intended to reflect the judge's assessment of results compelled by law.
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review for a federal statute, the Court is limited to determining whether
Congress has acted within its proper range. When exercising that function for
a state statute, the Court is limited to determining whether the state legislature
has exceeded the relevant part of its range that implicates federal law,
including the Constitution, on the ground that federal law is superior under the
constitutional scheme. 54 This power is in essence a negative check; the
Court is empowered to invalidate only those federal statutes that infringe upon
the Constitution and those state laws that infringe upon federal law, including
the Constitution.
There are two critical restrictions on the Supreme Court's range. The first
restriction, the inability to invalidate federal laws that do not violate the
Constitution or state laws that do not violate federal law, will be considered
in the following parts. 55 The second restriction, which is more important for
present purposes, is the inability to do nothing. 156 Unlike Congress, which
can let bills die without any formal action by the institution as a whole, the
Supreme Court, for any case properly before it, must formally resolve the case
as an institution. In other words, judicial, unlike legislative range, does not
include inaction.
At first glance, justiciability doctrines, which allow courts to preserve the
legal status quo, may appear inconsistent with this analysis. While an extended
treatment of justiciability doctrines would be inappropriate here, a preliminary
analysis demonstrates that these doctrines, and in particular standing, are
consistent with the distinction that judicial range does not include inaction
while legislative range does. Standing enables the Supreme Court to satisfy
two functions simultaneously: (1) institutionally resolving the case before it;
and (2) doing so in a manner that minimizes the extent to which it infringes
upon legislative range.157 Indeed, social choice appears to provide a strong
functionalist explanation for the emergence of justiciability doctrines; without
them, the legislature's power not to act would be undermined because the
154. U.S. CONST. art. VI (Supremacy Clause).
155. See infra notes 245-50, and accompanying text. Under the preemption and dormant commerce
clause doctrines, the Supreme Court can invalidate state laws even when there is no express federal law
on the subject if the Court determines (in the case of preemption) that Congress has chosen to exclusively
occupy the field, see generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUIONAL LAW, §§ 9.1-
95 (4th ed. 1991), or presumes (in the case of the Commerce Clause) without congressional action, that
federal law exclusively occupies the field. Id. § 8.1.
156. The Supreme Court can decline to grant certiorari. When it does so, however, it simply imposes
the obligation to resolve the pending dispute and to resolve the legal issues raised in that dispute onto lower
courts, which, unlike the Supreme Court, lack the power to decline the case. Moreover, the point remains
that whenever the Court does take a case, it must dispose of it through some means of formal action. In
contrast, Congress need not dispose of each proposal through some means of formal action. It can let bills
die.
157. But cf Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (delineating Article III limits on
congressional grants of standing). For critical analyses demonstrating that the Lujan result is not compelled
by Article III case or controversy concerns or by prior standing precedents, see Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice
Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing
After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article 111, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992).
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judiciary, which is obligated to decide cases, would invariably select an option
from within the legislature's permissible range when the legislature itself has
failed to choose. Sometimes the legislature's failure to choose from available
legislative options, thus preserving the legal status quo, will be the product of
an advertent collective choice; other times it will be the product of
cycling.'58 In appellate courts, in contrast, the decision to preserve the legal
158. The point is best illustrated by comparing three cases: Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch)
137 (1803), which established the doctrine of judicial review; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), a
noted standing case; and Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), a criminal procedure case. In
Marbury, the Court held that (1) when Congress engages in a collective action, in the form of a statute,
and (2) when that statute violates the Constitution, the Court will, in a properly presented case, invalidate
that collective legislative action. In other words, the Court will hold that collective action off limits and
in violation of Congress's permissible legislative range. In contrast, in Allen, the parents of black school
children sought to invalidate an IRS policy granting tax exemptions for private schools that allegedly
discriminated against black school children as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. The Court dismissed the case for lack of standing, reasoning that Congress-not the Court-is the
proper branch to monitor executive agency action. Id. at 760. "Carried to its logical end, [respondent's]
approach would have the federal courts as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of
Executive action; such a role is appropriate for the Congress acting through its committees and the 'power
of the purse'; it is not the role of the judiciary .... Id. (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972));
see also id. ("'A federal court.., is not the proper forum to press' general complaints about the way in
which government [namely, the executive branch] goes about its business.") (quoting, in part, Los.Angeles
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983)). While the Allen Court obviously did not use social choice terminology,
one could translate its holding to mean that Congress has a range of legislative options available for
monitoring the IRS and other executive agencies and the Supreme Court is generally unwilling to choose
a single option from within that permissible legislative range.
While choosing an option from within Congress' legislative range would arguably have vindicated
the claimants' constitutional right not to have the government support racially discriminatory schools
through a tax exemption, it might also have effectively foreclosed Congress from choosing a different, and
perhaps more effective, option from within its permissible legislative range. Unlike Marbury, therefore,
which stands for the proposition that the Court will invalidate congressional action that violates the
Constitution, Allen can be translated as follows: (1) where Congress fails to act, and (2) where that failure
to act leads to an arguably unconstitutional result, the Court will not invalidate that congressional inaction
by choosing an option for it. Of course, that alone does not solve the problem that the Supreme Court as
an institution must resolve the Allen case. But the requirement that the Court resolve all cases properly
before it, coupled with the desire to preserve legislative range, per Allen, may well explain the emergence
of justiciability doctrines. Standing, for example, simultaneously allowed the Allen Court to resolve the case
as an institution while, at the same time, preserving the power of Congress to choose from within its range
to resolve the issues presented in that case in the future.
A critical exception to the Court's disinclination to invalidate legislative inaction arises in the criminal
procedure context. For example, in Weeks, which established the exclusionary rule, see also Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule to the states), the Court did in fact choose from Congress'
permissible range to prevent an outcome in violation of the Constitution where Congress had been silent.
The exclusionary rule was not constitutionally compelled; it was, however, consistent with the Constitution.
See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring that an arresting officer provide Miranda
warnings, a remedy that is consistent with the Fifth Amendment, but not constitutionally compelled). That
simply means that had Congress chosen the exclusionary rule as the remedy for illegally obtained evidence,
that remedy would have fallen within its permissible range. The question then arises why the Court was
willing to choose a single remedy from within Congress' permissible range in Weeks when it was not
willing to do so in Allen. One plausible explanation is that in Weeks, the consequences of the constitutional
violation to the actual defendant would have been severe had the Court not chosen a single remedy from
within Congress' permissible range to vindicate the defendant's constitutional right. The Court reasoned
in Allen, however, that the "links in the chain of causation" were sufficiently tenuous that even if the Court
granted the requested relief, there might be no "significant effect on the ability of public school students
to receive a desegregated education." 468 U.S. at 759; see also Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26 (1976) (denying standing based upon similar causal chain analysis). Together, these three cases
stand for the proposition that the Court will employ justiciability doctrines to preserve Congress' legislative
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status quo, e.g., by deciding that a case is nonjusticiable, is always the product
of an advertent collective choice.
This distinction, that legislative range includes inaction while judicial range
does not, proves critical because it explains why Supreme Court decisional
processes sometimes miss available Condorcet winners. Consider, for example,
two 1982 Supreme Court cases, issued on the same day, Washington v. Seattle
School District No. 1159 and Crawford v. Board of Education.60 In Seattle
School District, Washington voters used a statewide initiative to prevent a
school board from continuing mandatory busing for purposes of integration,
except for nonracial reasons, or unless a court determines that the state or
federal constitution requires such busing. 6' To implement integrative busing
not constitutionally compelled, the referendum required either another
superseding referendum or, after two years, a new statute.' 62 In Crawford,
an amendment to the California Constitution prevented state courts from
interpreting the state constitution to compel busing for purposes of racial
integration unless a federal court would so order to remedy a federal
constitutional violation. 63  The effect was to require another state
constitutional amendment as a precondition to mandating busing not required
by a federal court order. In short, the Seattle initiative equated state
desegregation law with both state and federal constitutional law,t64 while the
Crawford amendment equated state desegregation law with the requirements
of the federal Constitution.
65
range, except when it is necessary to choose from within that range to prevent a concrete harm to an actual
litigant. In all cases, however, the Court will employ a voting rule that allows it collectively to decide the
case.
159. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
160. 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
161. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 462-63; see also id. at 490 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting) (explaining
that unlike the Crawford constitutional amendment, the S~attle initiative allowed court-ordered
desegregation based upon a violation of the state constitution).
162. Id. at 462 n.4 (explaining that the Washington Constitution only allows the state legislature to
modify successful citizen initiatives less than two years after adoption through a two-thirds majority vote);
id. at 474 ('Those favoring the elimination of de facto school segregation now must seek relief from the
state legislature, or from the statewide electorate.").
163. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 529. The California Supreme Court had previously interpreted the
California Constitution to prohibit de facto segregation and to require that reasonable steps be taken to
alleviate it. Id. at 530 n.2.
164. Seattle, 458 U.S. at 490; see also id. at488 (Powell, J., dissenting) (observing that while Initiative
350 is "binding on local school districts ... [it] in no way affects the authority of state or federal courts
to order school transportation to remedy violations of the Fourteenth Amendment"); id. at 490 n.3 ("Unlike
the constitutional amendment at issue in Crawford ... Initiative 350 places no limits on the state courts
in their interpretation of the State Constitution.").
165. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 532,535. In striking down the Seattle initiative, the Court relied on Hunter
v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (invalidating ordinance that required proponents of fair housing legislation
to seek approval of both the city council and a majority of citywide voters), for the proposition that the
state cannot restructure its political processes in a manner that imposes a unique burden on a protected
minority seeking favorable legislation. Seattle, 458 U.S. at 470.
One conceivable basis on which to distinguish the two cases is that the initial law requiring busing
in Seattle was local, 458 U.S. at 474 (noting that while those favoring elimination of de facto segregation
must seek a change in state law, "authority over all other student assignment decisions, as well as over
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The Seattle Court held that the Washington initiative violated the Equal
Protection Clause while the Crawford Court upheld the California
constitutional amendment against an equal protection challenge. Despite the
efforts of some commentators to reconcile the two cases, 166 they appear
indistinguishable as a matter of constitutional law. In fact, for purposes of the
present analysis, it does not matter whether the cases are or are not

















The asterisks identify those Justices who made clear that they believed the two
cases were indistinguishable and who voting accordingly. 67 Chief Justice
most other areas of educational policy, remains vested in the local school board"); id. at 477 ("And until
the passage of Initiative 350, Washington law in fact had established the local school board, rather than
the State, as the entity charged with making decisions of the type at issue here."), while the initial law
requiring busing in Crawford, based upon an interpretation by the California Supreme Court, affected the
entire state. This distinction, however, would prevent states from addressing an issue like busing at a
statewide level, e.g., by equating state law with federal law on desegregation, once a local community has
acted more ambitiously with respect to desegregation. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 495 (Powell, J., dissenting)
("It is a strange notion-alien to our system-that local governmental bodies can forever pre-empt the
ability of a State-the sovereign power-to address a matter of compelling concern to the State."); id. at
498 n.14 ("Under its holding the people of the State of Washington apparently are forever barred from
developing a different policy on mandatory busing where a school district previously has adopted one of
its own."); id. at 499 n.14 ("After today's decision it is unclear whether the State may set policy in any area
of race relations where a local governmental body arguably has done 'more' than the Fourteenth
Amendment requires."). In any event, for purposes of the analysis to follow it does not matter whether the
cases can be distinguished, although I remain unconvinced that they can be.
166. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1566 (1990)
(arguing that the Court may have correctly inferred a more illicit motive in Seattle than in Crawford
because passing a constitutional amendment "reflected an augmented rather than truncated version of
lawmaking" but admitting that "none of this is explicit in the two opinions"); see also Baker, supra note
70, at 762 n.220 (observing that "[s]cholars and judges have made many creative attempts to reconcile
Crawford and Seattle").
167. In Seattle, Justice Powell, joined in dissent by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor, suggested that the only relevant distinction between the two cases provided a stronger basis for
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Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor voted to uphold both the
Seattle initiative and the Crawford state constitutional amendment. Justice
Marshall voted to strike down both laws as unconstitutional.
Three relevant majorities thus emerge from these two cases. The first
majority would invalidate the Seattle initiative. The second majority would
uphold the Crawford state constitutional amendment. The third majority,
composed of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor,
and Marshall, would insist that the cases be decided consistently such that the
Seattle initiative and the Crawford amendment are either both upheld or both
struck down.
68
Now assume that the Court, instead of using case-by-case resolution, uses
a motion-and-amendment procedure, which identifies Condorcet winners.'
69
If the first motion is to announce a ruling that upholds the Seattle initiative, a
majority would succeed in a motion to amend that requires that the two cases
be decided consistently. The end result might appear to be (Seattle, not-
Crawford), where each entry denotes the Court's ultimate ruling relative to the
actual case holding under the new procedure. 70 A second motion to amend,
this time to substitute the Crawford rule for the not-Crawford rule, would also
pass, given the position of the six Justices who voted for the outcome in
Crawford. A third motion to amend, again requiring consistency, this time with
the outcome (not-Seattle, Crawford), would also pass because of the majority
that favors consistency. A fourth motion to amend to substitute Seattle for not-
Seattle, thus creating (Seattle, Crawford), would also pass by a majority. A
final motion, based upon consistency, to substitute not-Crawford for Crawford
would pass as well, resulting in (Seattle, not-Crawford). While the Court has
now come full circle, there is no predictable point at which the cycling will
stop.' 7' This is because the preference patterns of the Justices lack a core;
upholding Initiative 350 than the California initiative. Justice Powell observed that unlike the California
initiative, which limited court-ordered affirmative action to that required by the Fourteenth Amendment,
Initiative 350 did not prevent court-ordered desegregation based on a violation of the Washington
Constitution. Seattle, 458 U.S. at 490 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting). To the extent that this distinction matters
at all, it would have compelled deciding the cases in precisely the opposite manner, namely upholding the
law that provides the broader basis for court-ordered desegregation. Moreover, Justice Powell, along with
the three other Justices who joined his Seattle dissent, voted to uphold both state laws, which suggests that
those Justices believed the two cases constitutionally indistinguishable. Justice Marshall (who voted with
the majority in Seattle, and dissented alone in Crawford) expressly stated that he believed the two cases
indistinguishable. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 547-58 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
168. The positions are summarized as follows:
I) Seattle majority: Blackmun, Marshall, Brennan, White, Stevens
2) Crawford majority: Powell, Burger, Rehnquist, O'Connor, White, Stevens
3) Consistency Rule: Powell, Burger, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Marshall
169. Another name for this procedure is issue-by-issue resolution. Each issue is presented in turn for
a vote and a majority, upon motion, may substitute consideration of a different issue.
170. In other words, the Court would have decided to uphold both the Seattle initiative and the
Crawford amendment. The symbol "not-Crawford
' simply indicates that the new ruling is the opposite of
that which the Court actually announced in Crawford.
171. Accord William H. Riker, The Paradox of Voting and Congressional Rules for Voting on
Amendments, 52 AM. POL. Sct. REV. 349 (1958). Riker explains that if collective orderings for alternative
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unlimited motion-and-amendment voting procedure is therefore incapable of
yielding a result.
The problem is that unlike the legislature, the Court lacks the option to
simply walk away and leave the status quo. 7 2 Instead, the Court must
somehow resolve these two cases.173 This is not to suggest that the Supreme
motions are intransitive, as they are in the example offered in the text, and if the collective decisionmaking
body "require[s] for the passage of a motion that [the motion] defeat each alternative to it, then no action
can be taken." Id. at 353. The author adds that "the paradox results in a stalemate, in which, with no
decision whatsoever, it is impossible to decide irrationally." Id. This analysis assumes there is no rule
limiting the number of votes to be taken with respect to pending motions.
If, on the other hand, the collective decisionmaking body limits the number of motions on a given
issue to less than the number of pending alternatives, then the intransitivity will not be revealed and the
body will not endlessly cycle. See id. at 354. In such cases, however, the outcome will be path dependent
and thus arbitrary. Id. To see why, consider a three-person body with the paradigmatic non-Condorcet-
winner preferences: (1) A,B,C; (2) B,C,A; (3) C,A,B. While the preferences are intransitive and there is
no Condorcet winner, revealing the intransitivity requires three votes: (1) A v. B; (2) B v. C; and (3) C v.
A. With only two of these three votes, taken in any order, the body will come to a conclusion but the
conclusion will fail to satisfy the Condorcet criterion. For example if the two votes are A v. B (A wins)
followed by C v. A (C wins), then C will be chosen. If, instead, the two votes are B v. C (B wins) followed
by A v. B (A wins), then A wins. Finally, if the two votes are C v. A (C wins) followed by B v. C (B
wins), then B wins. With only two votes and three alternatives, therefore, the body reaches a conclusion
and fails to reveal the presence of a cycle. Indeed, with two votes on three issues, the agenda setter fully
controls the outcome. See infra note 200 and accompanying text. In each case, the final pairwise vote
reveals the cycle. Thus, in the first case B v. C reveals a cycle demonstrating that C should not prevail;
in the second case, A v. C reveals a cycle demonstrating that A should not prevail; and in the third case,
A v. B reveals a cycle demonstrating that B should not prevail.
Congressional voting practices that limit the number of votes relative to the number of pending
motions may hide intransitivities and produce enactments that a majority disfavors. Id. at 355-56
(identifying circumstances that may arise under congressional voting procedures that fail to reveal
intransitivities). While allowing the same number of votes as pending motions reveals intransitivities, there
is no ready means with which to resolve such revealed intransitivities. See id. at 364 ("Even if both houses
[of Congress] were to provide this method of discover[ing collective intransitivities], they would still need
a procedure for resolving the intransitivities discovered .... But, as Arrow has shown, an intransitivity,
once in existence, cannot be eliminated simply by juggling the techniques of counting.").
172. There is, of course, a school of thought that takes the position that "not to decide is to decide,"
and thus that the very failure to reach a decision is no different than an advertent collective choice.
Professor Sunstein argues that the theoretical basis of the Lochner era, namely the desire to leave markets
unregulated in the name of vindicating the right to due process, was flawed because allowing market forces
to operate is itself a deliberate governmental decision. Sunstein, supra note 22, at 1697, 1718. Sunstein goes
on to state that once it is recognized that the status quo is the product of government action, there is no
theoretical basis with which to hold regulation of the market off limits. Id.
One obvious difficulty with this analysis as applied to Lochner and its progeny is that if everything
is the product of government action, then regulation and deregulation become the same thing. Both are then
governmental choices concerning the extent to which outcomes will be determined by the marketplace or
through nonmarket means. At the very least, defining "regulation" and "deregulation" to mean the same
thing is cumbersome because it makes conversing about the Lochner era virtually impossible. In other
words, to speak intelligently about any policy that involves legislative intrusion into the market place, it
is essential to agree upon certain benchmarks. The most commonly accepted benchmark, and one I find
most meaningful, is to accept that moves away from market decisionmaking are called "regulation," and
that moves toward market decisionmaking are called "deregulation." Defining these terms as such says
nothing necessarily about the merits of any particular proposal but only when these terms are properly
defined and understood, is it possible to discuss the merits of such a proposal.
173. In criticizing a proposed solution to the voting paradox in the context of elections offered by
Dodgson, Kenneth Arrow makes an analogous argument:
Dodgson accepts fully the Condorcet criterion, so much so that he comes to the conclusion that
if a cyclical majority persists, then there should be "no election." This position is rather curious.
Indeed Dodgson elsewhere shrewdly points out that "no election," if it is an allowable
alternative, should be considered on a par with all the candidates. This seems quite inconsistent
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Court cannot issue a decision that has the effect of preserving the status quo.
The distinction is more subtle. This Article demonstrates that there are two
methods of preserving the status quo. One method is by failing to act formally
and collectively. That can result from cycling. This method of preserving the
status quo is not within the permissible range of the Supreme Court and other
appellate courts. The second method is through a formal and collective
decision that preserves the status quo. That method is within the permissible
judicial range. In contrast, both methods are within the permissible range of
Congress and other legislatures 74 Because appellate courts must act
collectively in each case, and because Condorcet-producing rules would not
allow them to satisfy that requirement, appellate courts employ voting
procedures that do not satisfy the Condorcet criterion. A motion-and-
amendment procedure will not allow the Court to meet its obligation to
collectively decide each case, 75 while an alternative rule allowing each
Justice to vote on the binary choice of outcome in each case does, albeit
inconsistently. 7 6  Moreover, the latter rule-unlike the motion-and-
with the previous statement. It does point, however, to an important empirical truth, especially
about legislative matters rather than the choice of candidates: The status quo does have a built-
in edge over all alternative proposals.
ARROW, supra note 6, at 95. As demonstrated in the text, however, the choice of voting rules across
collective decisionmaking bodies is not explained by whether the status quo is a favored option in those
bodies, but rather by whether the status quo is a permissible option in those bodies.
Saul Levmore has also considered why legislative bodies use motion-and-amendment procedures,
which are conducive to identifying available Condorcet winners, while general elections use plurality voting
or plurality voting with a runoff, both of which can miss available Condorcet winners. Levmore posits that
a weak explanation for this difference is the desire for a genuine majority winner (or at least the appearance
of such a winner after all other options are eliminated through pairwise voting) in crafting legislation, and
that a stronger explanation is that replicating a motion-and-amendment procedure, or adopting round-robin
voting, in general elections would substantially increase transactions costs. Levmore, supra note 8, at 1015-
17. Levmore rules out round-robin elections on the additional grounds that "the importance and bias of
order is too obvious," meaning that a candidate who awaits the outcome of all prior pairwise contests
before campaigning against the finalist has an unfair advantage. Id. at 1031.
The explanation offered in this Article for why Supreme Court voting procedures are not designed
to always yield available Condorcet winners, while congressional voting procedures are better suited to
identify such winners, also explains the choice of procedure in legislative versus electoral voting. While
the status quo is within the permissible range of legislative options, it is not within the permissible range
of electoral options. Elections require results; some candidate must actually prevail. Legislatures, however,
need not always produce results; the status quo can prevail. Procedures that guarantee available Condorcet
winners, as demonstrated in the text, do not always guarantee an outcome. See BLACK, supra note I, at 57
("The main weakness of the Condorcet criterion is that when there is no majority candidate it leaves the
election undecided."). Plurality voting or plurality voting with a run-off, in contrast, always guarantees a
winner, but the winner will sometimes fail to satisfy the Condorcet criterion.
174. The statement that appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, must act collectively, however,
does not imply that they must decide the issues in the manner that the litigants present those issues. That,
the courts can, and often do, avoid. But appellate courts must make the (most often) binary choice to affirm
or reverse as a collective institution.
175. This analysis at least holds true for a motion-and-amendment procedure that does not limit the
number of motions based upon the number of issues. Such a limitation, while allowing for resolution of
cases, would render the outcome of underlying issues path dependent. See supra note 171 and infra note
200 and accompanying text.
176. One narrow exception arises in cases involving three or more remedies, none of which has
majority support among the Justices. One solution, offered by Justice White in such a case, Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1989), is to switch a vote to achieve the necessary majority for one
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amendment procedure-will sometimes, as in Kassel, miss a Condorcet
winner.'77
In addition, by making a few minor assumptions we can demonstrate that
an alternative decisional format, designed to avoid the doctrinal incoherence
resulting from the requirement that the Court decide all cases, will still lead the
Court into endless cycling. Under this decisional format individual Justices
rank, then vote upon, packages of resolved issues. This procedure ensures that
the same majority of the Court supports the outcome for each issue that the
Court decides, thus avoiding the shifting majority problem.7 8 This part will
apply the new decisional framework first to Seattle and Crawford and then to
Kassel.
Assume that the Court is now faced with the following issues to resolve:
(1) whether to uphold the Seattle initiative; (2) whether to uphold the
Crawford amendment; and (3) whether to decide the cases consistently. These
issues present each member of the Court with the following options: 79
remedy to resolve the case. Justice Kennedy also followed this course. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.
Ct. 1246, 1266-67 (1991). For a critical analysis of the votes cast by Justices White and Kennedy in these
cases, see Rogers, supra note 145, at 439-42, 475 n.124. Adopting a procedure that identifies Condorcet
winners would not remedy the problem posed by triple-remedy cases that lack majority support for one
remedy, while adopting such Condorcet-producing procedures would create additional indeterminacy
problems in shifting majority cases, as demonstrated in the text.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 139-46; cf. Komhauser, supra note 28, at 457. Professor
Komhauser offers two alternative reasons why courts engage in case-by-case instead of issue-by-issue
decisionmaking. First, he contends that issue-by-issue resolution requires that cases "hav[e] a perspicuous
structure," meaning that the world of disputes must be susceptible to division into issues that can be
"resolved acontextually." Id. at 455. Komhauser adds "[w]e may doubt that [legal] doctrine has this
property." Id. He then argues:
If we believe that individual judges more accurately appraise issues than cases as a whole, we
may be inclined to issue-by-issue adjudication. If, on the other hand, we believe that individual
appraisals of cases are more accurate than appraisals of issues, we might be inclined to adopt
case-by-case adjudication.
Id. He then conflates the two arguments, stating: "A view of the relative competence of judges between
issue and case appraisal will depend on an assessment of doctrinal success in dividing disputes into discrete
issues over which it is likely that judges have separable preferences." Id.
Kornhauser's argument suffers from two difficulties. First, there is no reason to assume judges are
more competent at either case-by-case or issue-by-issue resolution. Second, both forms of case resolution
lead to some form of doctrinal incoherence. Issue-by-issue resolution potentially leads to cycling, as shown
in the Seattle and Crawford examples. Case-by-case resolution leads to rulings inconsistent with the
preferences of a majority of the Court's members on particular issues or, in other words, misses Condorcet
winners, as seen in Kassel.
But there is one critical difference between these two methods of decisionmaking. Case-by-case
resolution guarantees outcomes in all cases, except the narrow category involving three or more remedies,
none of which has majority support. See supra note 176. That narrow category remains indeterminate
regardless of the decisional rule. See id. Using issue-by-issue resolution, however, the Court cannot
guarantee outcomes in all cases. Because the range of judicial, as opposed to legislative, decisionmaking
does not include the power to default to the status quo through institutional inaction, the need to formally
and institutionally resolve each case better explains the choice of case-by-case over issue-by-issue resolution
in appellate courts.
178. In Kassel, for example, two separate majorities each supported the dissent's resolution of the two
major issues in the case, thus creating a decision inconsistent with the Condorcet-winner criterion. For a
fuller reconsideration of Kassel, see infra notes 186-87, and accompanying text. For other shifting-majority
decisions, see Rogers, supra note 145, at 456-58.
179. There is a fourth option, "not-Crawford, not-Seattle." Adding this option only exacerbates the




Each option A through C represents a package that resolves each of the three
issues presented above but does so in a manner that avoids the shifting-
majority problem. By merging the three issues presented in these two cases
and by requiring that the same majority support the outcome of all three issues,
the decisional format ensures doctrinal coherence. Each Justice votes based
upon the package that resolves the above three issues most favorably. The end
result should be a ruling that is consistent across both cases and issues. 8 '
By choosing, for example, option B, a Justice chooses to decide the cases
consistently 82 and to uphold both the Seattle initiative and the Crawford
amendment. A Justice choosing option C also chooses to decide the cases
consistently, except that he has decided to strike both laws. Option A
represents the actual case outcomes, namely a choice to decide the cases
inconsistently by upholding the California constitutional amendment while
striking the Washington initiative.
To simplify the analysis, assume that there are only three voters, any two
of whom can decide for the Court. 8 3 Assume further that while Justice
Marshall states that he favors consistency, he would actually prefer a partly
favorable inconsistent result to a fully adverse consistent result."8 Assume
that Chief Justice Burger genuinely favors consistency over inconsistency, even
if the consistent result is adverse. Finally, assume that Justice White believes
that the cases should not be decided the same way based upon a distinction not
shared by the other Justices. Assume further that Justice White has some
reservation about striking the Washington initiative, given that a majority of
the Court does not accept his basis for distinguishing the two cases but feels
firmly that the California constitutional amendment is constitutionally valid. If
Justice White must uphold or strike both the California amendment and the
Washington initiative, he would prefer upholding both to striking both on the
grounds that he disfavors striking a law that he firmly believes is constitutional
cycling problem.
180. See supra note 170 for an explanation of the term "not-Seattle."
181. This is not to suggest that the two cases will necessarily be decided the same way. Rather, they
will be decided the same way if a majority believes that they should be decided the same way, and they
will be decided differently if a majority decides that they should be decided differently.
182. Consistency has two meanings in this example. Some Justices believe that failing to uphold or
to strike both state laws is inconsistent. Others disagree. The Court as an institution, in contrast, is
inconsistent if a majority favors treating the cases in the same way, but the Court nonetheless treats the
cases differently.
183. This assumption does not change the analysis because the Court had three camps: (I) the Burger
group, with four members; (2) the White group, also with four members; (3) and Marshall. Any two-group
combination contains the requisite five votes for a majority.
184. By modifying the above assumptions, the hypothetical also works if one assumes that Burger
actually prefers inconsistency to an adverse consistent result.
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more than he disfavors upholding a law that is arguably but not clearly
unconstitutional.
The following are the preference orderings for the three Justices based on
the above assumptions:
Burger: B, C, A
Marshall: C, A, B
White: A, B, C
Chief Justice Burger's first choice, for example, is the position he actually
voted for, deciding the cases in the same manner and upholding both state
laws, which is position B. His second choice is the opposite consistent
position, C. His third choice is the actual case outcomes. Justice Marshall's
first choice is option C, deciding the cases in the same manner and striking
both laws. He then ranks option A, the actual case outcomes, which although
inconsistent is partly favorable, ahead of option B, which although consistent,
is adverse. Justice White's first choice is option A, the actual case outcomes.
He then chooses option B, deciding the cases in the same way by upholding
both laws, ahead of option C, the opposite, for the reasons stated above. These
rankings correspond with the non-Condorcet-winner paradigm. 85 The result
may therefore be endless cycling. Thus, while this procedure ensures that the
same majority agrees upon the case outcome and the merits of every necessary
issue to achieve that outcome-thus avoiding the shifting-majority
problem-this procedure does not guarantee a decision in every case presented
for review. In other words, this decisional process may lead the Court to
inaction, which is outside the Court's permissible range. This problem is not
unique to multiple cases presenting similar issues. As shown below, it can
arise within a single case.
In Kassel, for example, the Court also faced three majorities: 186 (1) a
majority composed of Justices Brennan and Rehnquist favoring a rational basis
test over a balancing test; (2) a majority composed of Justices Powell and
Rehnquist favoring consideration of trial evidence rather than limiting review
to legislative evidence; and (3) a majority composed of Justices Powell and
Brennan to strike the Iowa statute. Again, both the motion-and-amendment and
packaged-issue procedures would lead the Court into endless cycling.
Assume that if the Court decides to use the deferential rational basis test
and to admit outside evidence, giving the court below a broader range of
evidence with which to find a rational basis, then the outcome is to uphold the
Iowa statute. Assume further that the first motion is to apply the rational basis
test. That motion passes with Justices Brennan and Rehnquist prevailing over
185. See supra note 122.
186. For simplicity, this again assumes three voters, any two of whom are sufficient for a ruling on
any motion. See supra note 137.
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Justice Powell. A second motion to admit outside evidence also passes with
Justices Powell and Rehnquist prevailing over Justice Brennan. The outcome
should therefore be to uphold the statute, except a third motion, to strike the
statute, also prevails, with Justices Powell and Brennan prevailing over Justice
Rehnquist. Justice Rehnquist can now start the motion process again to achieve
a majority on each issue necessary to uphold the Iowa statute, but the result,
again, may be endless cycling.
Now, with a few minor assumptions, consider packaging the issues for
majority resolution. In Kassel, Justice Powell, for a plurality, held that the
court should apply a balancing test and should admit trial evidence not
considered by the legislature that enacted the statute. Justice Rehnquist, in
dissent, maintained that the Court should apply a rational basis test and should
be able to consider trial evidence. Justice Brennan, in concurrence, maintained
that the Court should apply a rational basis test but should not consider trial
evidence. The positions are summarized as follows:
A (Powell): balancing, trial evidence
B (Rehnquist): rational basis, trial evidence
C (Brennan): rational basis, no trial evidence
Assume that Justice Powell believes that a court should be able to consider
trial evidence even if the substantive test is rational basis. Thus, his
preferences are ranked A, B, C. Assume Justice Rehnquist is more concerned
about applying what he considers to be the appropriate test than he is about the
evidentiary rule and, thus, his preferences are B, C, A. Finally, assume that
Justice Brennan believes that if courts are able to consider trial evidence, then
they should apply the more stringent balancing test, rather than the highly
deferential rational basis test, when considering such statutes; thus, his
preferences are C, A, B. This, again, results in the non-Condorcet-winner
paradigm,187 which may lead to endless cycling.
The Supreme Court does not actually use either of these two voting
procedures, both of which will sometimes lead to endless cycling. Some
scholars have concluded that because the Court's voting procedures do not lead
to cycling, Arrow's Theorem is an inappropriate framework with which to
assess the Court's behavior. 88 With respect, this argument misses the point.
Arrow's Theorem remains extremely useful in assessing Supreme Court
behavior because, as just demonstrated, it explains why the Court has adopted
decisional processes that sometimes appear to thwart the express will of a
187. See supra note 122.
188. See, e.g., Komhauser & Sager, supra note 28, at 109 n.37 (criticizing Easterbrook's application
of Arrow's Theorem to Supreme Court decisionmaking); see also Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan,
Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1094 n.120 (1988) (adopting the
Komhauser & Sager analysis and rejecting the Easterbrook analysis).
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present majority of its members. To avoid the doctrinal incoherence that results
from case-by-case voting, the Court would be forced to choose an alternative
procedure that would not guarantee an outcome in all cases. This would violate
the restriction on the Court's range, risking institutional inaction as an
alternative to resolving all cases. This limitation on the Court's range, the
requirement that it formally resolve all cases properly before it, explains why
its voting procedures, along with those in other appellate courts, are not
designed to yield Condorcet winners. In short, case-by-case resolution
guarantees results in all cases, albeit at the price of occasional doctrinal
incoherence.
B. Universal Domain
In one respect, universal domain relaxes equally in both the Supreme Court
and Congress; neither institutions can aggregate preferences in a manner that
violates the Constitution. The Constitution holds some legislative and judicial
aggregations off limits, or, in the language of social choice, it limits these
bodies' domain. Because of their different voting rules, however, universal
domain relaxes in different ways and thus has different implications for these
two bodies. The Supreme Court must collectively resolve all cases, so its
voting rules allow non-Condorcet winners to prevail. Congressional voting
procedures, on the other hand, ensure a higher degree of consensus among its
members. Congress' ability to do nothing thus reduces the burdens of reaching
a consensus. In another sense, therefore, universal domain poses a second
critical distinction between the Supreme Court and Congress. As shown above,
Supreme Court decisionmaking sometimes appears irrational precisely because
no aggregation of votes is off limits for the Court as a whole. Aggregations are
permitted even when the results are incoherent.
Moreover, the Supreme Court renders decisions in which a majority of its
members have not achieved any meaningful consensus beyond the binary
decision to affirm or reverse. In plurality opinions, for example, the rulings and
the precedents they create, by definition, are not accepted by a majority of the
Court. 89 In an extreme case, like Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 90 only one Justice may agree with all the components of the Court's
ruling. "9 Again, this unusual feature of collective decisionmaking follows
189. Under Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), the ruling is the narrowest opinion
written by a Justice who voted for the outcome; it need not be the plurality opinion. See generally supra
note 141.
190. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
191. In Bakke, Justice Powell, for a plurality, decided two issues: first, whether the Board of Regents
of the University of California Medical School was permitted to consider race as a factor in its admissions
decisions, id. at 311-15; and second, whether, if the Board of Regents was permitted to use race as a factor,
it had used race in a permissible manner, by creating a separate admissions pool for minority candidates,
id. at 314-15. Justice Powell concluded that race was a permissible factor, but that the Regents could not
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from the limitation on range; Justices are not free to default to the status quo
simply because they .cannot achieve a stronger form of consensus than mere
agreement on binary choice of outcome.
9 2
Congress, however, must reach a substantially greater degree of consensus
as a precondition to formal action, since a majority must agree on the precise
language of every bill. In addition, as set forth below, numerous legislative
practices increase this majority requirement to a de facto supermajority
requirement.'93 In other words, while Supreme Court voting procedures
impose the bare minimum requirement of consensus as a precondition to
collective action, congressional voting procedures effectively require
supermajority consensus on matters of substance as a precondition to formal
collective action. While a complete analysis of these legislative voting
procedures is beyond the scope of this Article, a brief discussion of the manner
in which these procedures operate to yield seemingly irrational'94 results will
suffice to illustrate the impact of requiring this high level of consensus in
Congress."'
In Congress, as in many state legislatures, numerous negative legislative
checkpoints 96 render passage of proposed legislation difficult by design. For
example, committee structures, the Senate filibuster, and seniority rules, in
addition to the requirements of bicameralism and presentment, multiply the
use race to create a separate admissions pool. Id. Instead, he endorsed the Harvard plan, in which race was
used as one factor among many in deciding admissions from a unified pool. Id. at 315-19. In an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun, Justice Brennan
agreed that race was a permissible factor in admissions decisions, but disagreed that the Harvard plan was
constitutionally distinguishable. Id. at 325, 378-79 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Brennan would have upheld the Davis plan. Id. Finally, in a separate opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, Justice Stevens concluded that the Davis admissions policy violated
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and he therefore failed to reach the constitutional issues. Id. at 411-
12, 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As a result, Justice Powell alone held that
the Regents could use race as a qualifying factor but could not use separate admissions pools for minority
and nonminority candidates. Even though Justice Powell alone adopted this position, his opinion became
the ruling in the case.
192. This directly contradicts Lynn Stout's assertion that "[A] precedent cannot endure without the
support of a majority of the several judges who may review it at each stage of the appeals process." Stout,
supra note 18, at 1826. In fact, as Bakke illustrates, Supreme Court voting rules, unlike legislative voting
rules, impose virtually no consensus requirement beyond agreement on binary choice of outcome.
193. See Maxwell L. Steams, The Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 385, 416 n.175 (1992) (explaining that procedural devices in Congress ensure that most bills pass with
margins that exceed simple majorities, while the fact that relatively few vetoed bills are overridden suggests
that most bills may lack the requisite two-thirds supermajority for an override).
194. Irrationality is not used here to mean intransitivity. Instead the term is used to illustrate the point
explained below, infra note 220 and accompanying text, that while individual vote trades that result in
procuring pork barrel legislation may be rational to the individual participants, the aggregate effect of such
trades may be irrational to all participants because the end result leaves all participants worse off than had
no such trades taken place.
195. See infra notes 197-205 and accompanying text.
196. See Steams, supra note 193, at 408 n.137 (defining "negative legislative checkpoints" as "the
various loci at which an individual legislator or a group of legislators representing minority interests can




opportunities for interested groups to lobby for or against a bill. 97 In turn,
these devices increase the number of points at which proponents of even the
most high-minded legislation must make concessions, both substantive and by
way of riders, to get favored bills passed.
198
Many of these practices render legislative processes "path dependent." A
corollary of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, path dependency simply means
that the order in which proposals are presented for a vote may influence which
proposals pass. If there is no natural stopping point for legislative proposals
that lead to cycling, then the only means with which to end cycling is to
impose some exogenous and arbitrary rule. Deadlines and limitations on
reconsideration, for example, solve the cycling problem; they also provide the
person who determines the agenda with significant power to predetermine the
path, and thus the outcome, of many legislative proposals.' 99 For example,
if, in choosing an ice cream flavor, Alice, Bob, and Carole were bound by a
rule that prevented reconsideration of any flavor that was defeated in a
pairwise vote,2°° then the person who determines the order of pairwise votes
can actually control which flavor is chosen. Thus if Bob wanted chocolate to
prevail, he would first present a choice between vanilla and coffee (vanilla
wins), then, having ruled out coffee, between vanilla and chocolate (chocolate
wins). Alice and Carole could similarly obtain their first choice if they
controlled the agenda.
Both the costs and the benefits of such seemingly arbitrary legislative
practices have been discussed at length in the literature.2"' Indeed, public
choice scholars have attributed the development of these seemingly arbitrary
practices to the need to resolve the cycling problems associated with Arrow's
Theorem.02 The point here is simply that such practices have a number of
197. See id. at 397-98.
198. See id. at 416 & n.176 (explaining that as a result of legislative bargaining processes "both the
substantive content of a bill as well as [the riders it contains] are the product of a series of negotiated
compromises.").
199. See Riker, supra note 171, at 354. Riker explains that limitations on amendments to bills and
motions in both houses of Congress sometimes prevent the necessary number of votes to reveal the
presence of cycles. In both houses, voting rules allow a maximum of four amendments for a pending bill
or resolution. Id. ("In both houses of Congress, it is permissible to consider simultaneously as many as four
amending motions to a bill or resolution."). If there are fewer options than the permitted number of votes,
"the existence of an intransitivity is easily discovered." Id. But for complex or contested bills, the limitation
on amendments can prevent intransitivities from being revealed, thus rendering outcomes path dependent.
See id. ("When, however, the original matter is an elaborate bill, it is quite possible that the existence of
an intransitivity will not be discovered and that the House or Senate, unaware of the paradox, will
irrationally adopt clauses that are supported only by a minority.").
200. Another way to say this is that the group will allow no more than two votes for three options,
a number insufficient to reveal the presence of a cycle. See supra note 171.
201. For an introduction to the interest group literature within public choice, see generally PETER
ARANSON, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: STRATEGY AND CHOICE (1981); MICHAELT. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND
LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS (1981); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION (1971): BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 10; RIKER, supra note 15.
202. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L.
REV. 873, 906 (1987) ("Legislatures are not characterized by chaos, but the threat of disorder posed by
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implications for the manner in which the Supreme Court and Congress function
as complementary institutions. These practices sometimes appear to have the
effect of causing legislatures, including Congress, to spin out of control,
meaning that multiple vote trades leave everyone worse off than had no such
trades taken place.203 This can take any number of forms. The outcome most
frequently commented upon in the literature is the tendency of such practices
to produce a proliferation of pork barrel legislation.2° Such legislation is
often the price paid to achieve a legislative outcome that is disadvantageous
to particular constituent groups.20 5 For present purposes, however, the more
important consequence is statutes that violate the Constitution" or that are
internally inconsistent. 7
Just as a legislature, in creating off-the-rack rules designed to facilitate
market negotiations, can remove the seemingly insurmountable problem of
market cycling in the absence of a core, so too a court can effectively restore
rationality that might result from legislative cycling. If, for example, a
legislature codifies intransitive preferences, thus creating an internally
inconsistent statute, ordinary rules of statutory interpretation require that courts
Arrow's Theorem may determine much of their structure. Understanding the threat can illuminate the
importance of legislative procedures."); see also Elhauge, supra note 91, at 105 (describing legislative
procedures that reduce cycling and give closure).
203. But cf. Ehauge, supra note 91 (arguing that any normative proposal for statutory interpretation
based upon the effects of such institutional devices as those mentioned in the text contains an unstated
independent normative baseline concerning the appropriate extent of interest group involvement in the
political process).
204. See, e.g., BRIAN KELLY, ADVENTURES IN PORKLAND (1992) (describing practices that lead to
proliferation of pork barrel legislation); WILL, supra note 24 (advocating term limits as means to ameliorate
effects of many congressional practices that lead to undesirable legislation, including abundant special
interest legislation).
205. For my own critical analysis of one proposal to address such irrational legislative results, namely
the item veto, see Steams, supra note 193. That article demonstrates that the item veto is likely to have the
opposite of its intended effect of allowing the President to excise pork while leaving unaffected matters of
substantive legislative policy. First, the President has substantially greater control in choosing which bills
to support than with whom he must bargain to get those bills passed. Second, even with the item veto in
place, Congressmen will insist that the President promise not only to give their district a bridge or dam,
but also not to exercise the item veto, before they agree to support a bill the President favors. Thus, the
item veto is likely to provide the President with substantial control over general legislative policy but
relatively little control over the most egregious pork needed to get his favored bills passed. See generally
id. at 412-22.
206. The same vote trading that can create a proliferation of pork barrel legislation can also create
statutes that violate the Constitution. Consider, for example, Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980),
and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). The Fullilove Court upheld a provision
in the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 that defined minority business enterprises (MBE's) as
businesses owned or controlled by citizens of the United States "who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking,
Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts," for purposes of a set-aside, even though the provision obviously
emerged as the product of vote trading. In contrast, the Croson Court nevertheless struck down a
substantially identical provision adopted by the Richmond City Council for its MBE set-aside on the ground
that absent specific fact findings as to discrimination against the affected groups, the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibited a municipality (as distinguished from Congress) from adopting even benign race-
based discriminatory policies.
207. See infra note 208.
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attempt where possible to avoid the inconsistency.2 8 In addition, if the
legislature, as in the hypothetical based upon New York v. United States,20 9
fails to act in response to cycling, the courts, when faced with an actual legal
controversy involving related issues, will devise appropriate rules to resolve the
case, establishing a precedent, subject to legislative correction.2t0 Again,
together, legislative and judicial action avoid cycling if the two institutions do
not cycle in the same manner and in response to the same factual
phenomena.1
More notably, when the legislature enacts a statute that violates the
Constitution, in a properly presented case the judiciary will strike the statute
as a violation of legislative domain. In addition, because members of the
legislature, including Congress, are given extremely wide range to resolve a
208. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (explaining that in construing
statutes, "authoritative administrative constructions should be given the deference to which they are entitled,
absurd results are to be avoided and internal inconsistencies in the statute must be dealt with"); Trans
Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 643 (1978) ("This Court, in interpreting the words of a statute,
has some scope for adopting a restricted rather than a literal or usual meaning of its words where
acceptance of that meaning would lead to absurd results ... or would thwart the obvious purpose of the
statute... [b]ut it is otherwise where no such consequences would follow and where ... it appears to be
consonant with the purposes of the Act .... ) (quoting Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571
(1965)) (internal quotations omitted).
For a recent example of an appellate court "avoiding" a potential statutory inconsistency, see Fugere
v. Derwinski, 972 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In Fugere, the court considered the validity of a provision
in the Veterans Administration (VA) Adjudication Procedure Manual M21-1, 50.13(b), that prevented the
reduction of a disability benefit based upon changed testing criteria, rather than upon a change in disability.
Id. at 332-33. After the VA Chief Benefits Director (the "Director") rescinded 50.13(b) on the grounds
that by statute the Secretary of Veterans Affairs (the "Secretary") was not permitted to create a dual
schedule of benefits, the VA reduced the disability benefits of a World War II veteran, who had been
retested under newly adopted criteria, from thirty to twenty percent. Id. at 333. The Court of Veterans
Appeals restored the veteran's thirty percent disability rating on the ground that in setting aside 50.13(b),
the Director had enacted a substantive rule for which notice was required under the Administrative
Procedure Act. Id. at 333-34. The Secretary then appealed to the Federal Circuit. Id. at 334.
The issue on appeal was whether the Court of Veterans Appeals had improperly restored the veteran's
rating by applying an administrative provision, I 50.13(b), that violated 38 U.S.C.A. § 1155 (West 1991).
Id. Section 1155 provides: "The Administrator [now Secretary] shall adopt and apply a schedule of ratings
of reductions in earning capacity from specific injuries or combination of injuries." Id. at 335 (emphasis
added by Fugere court). While the appeal was pending, Congress amended § 1155 to add a provision that
paraphrased the essential provisions ofI 50.13(b). ld. As a result, if § 1155 were interpreted to allow only
a single schedule of benefits and if I 50.13(b) created a dual system of benefits, the statute itself became
internally inconsistent. Id. at 335-36. The Fugere court rejected the Secretary's argument that the regulation
(and the amended statutory provision) created a dual benefit schedule stating:
If the Secretary's interpretation of the "a schedule" language of § 1155 is correct, then there is
an internal inconsistency within the amended version of § 1155. Since we must assume that
Congress does not write internally inconsistent statutes.., we must conclude that either § 1155
permits more than one schedule or 50.13(b) does not create a dual schedule, or both.
Id. (citations omitted). The court avoided the potential internal inconsistency by construing "a schedule"
to mean a method for determining ratings based upon disability, and by holding that I 50.13(b) merely
allowed a claimant to retain a previously determined rating, without providing the Secretary a method for
determining that rating in the first instance. Id. at 335. The Fugere court upheld 50.13(b), thus affirming
the increase in the veteran's benefits based upon a thirty percent disability. Id. at 336.
209. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). For a discussion of the New York decision, see supra notes 80-85 and
accompanying text.
210. Indeed, many off-the-rack rules were precisely such judicial creations.
211. In that respect, the relationship between courts and legislatures is analogous to that between
markets and lawmaking institutions generally, as shown in Part II, supra.
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virtually unlimited number of policy proposals at any one time, it is not
surprising that Congress occasionally stumbles over the border of its
permissible legislative domain. When this happens, the judiciary, with its
limited range,212 may be better suited to correct these errors than is Congress,
with its broad range. In this respect the two institutions are complementary.
C. Unanimity and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
2 13
The "unanimity" assumption requires that a collective decisionmaking
institution proceed with any proposal that leaves one person better off and no
persons worse off. While Judge Easterbrook concludes that this criterion
applies to the Supreme Court because it "means ... that the Justices do not
delegate their authority to someone else, 214 this conflates the requirements
of nondictatorship with the requirement of unanimity. In fact, this criterion
applies with less force in the Supreme Court than in Congress, although it is
relaxed to a significant extent in both institutions.
In the Supreme Court, the Justices engage in judgment rather than
preference aggregation.215 This follows directly from the relaxation of the
range requirement. Individual Supreme Court Justices, although they no doubt
render opinions consistent with their own political ideology, are not
empowered under most, if not all, widely accepted jurisprudential theories
1 6
to render decisions because of consistency with their own policy
preferences." 7 In fact, they are required to vote based on the law even if the
212. Another way to say this is that the limited range increases the likelihood that in resolving such
legislative errors a court will achieve meaningful consensus because it is more likely to be uni-peaked than
the legislators who created the error initially.
213. These two Arrovian criteria are discussed together because in the legislative context, the former
cannot be explained without the latter.
214. Easterbrook, supra note 28, at 824.
215. See Komhauser & Sager, supra note 28, at 88-89. The distinction between judgment and
preference aggregation lies at the core of virtually all traditional jurisprudential theories. Law, if indeed
an autonomous discipline, depends upon choices by decisionmakers restrained by judgment, whereas
politics does not. Indeed, rejecting the distinction between judgment and preference aggregation is one of
the major characteristics that distinguishes the critical legal studies movement from virtually all traditional
jurisprudential theories. See Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 467, 539-40 (1988)
(reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)) (characterizing critics of the
critical legal studies movement as observing that "[i]f law is 'just politics,' . . . then there is no way for
judges to decide cases legitimately; they can appeal only to their personal, subjective intuitions about
justice, or to theories of economics or morality external to the law. This is the death of law and the
possibility of social justice."); cf. Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional
Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1447 (1990) (positing that "[a]lthough the critical legal studies critique of
liberal legalism has made important contributions, its concomitant adoption of the indeterminacy and 'law
is politics' arguments invites endless problems of skepticism and incommensurability.").
The collective action problems posed by Arrow's Theorem apply whether the collective
decisionmaking body is trying to aggregate judgments or preferences. As the discussion in the text
emphasizes, however, judgment and preference aggregation have different implications for the application
of the Arrovian unanimity criterion.
216. Cf. Komhauser & Sager, supra note 28, at 88; see also supra note 153 (illustrating the difference
between judgment and preference aggregation).
217. Cf. Komhauser & Sager, supra note 28, at 88.
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law flatly conflicts with their preferences. Similarly, a particular Justice is not
empowered to vote based upon the judgment or preference of another Justice
even if the first Justice is personally indifferent to the outcome of a case." 8
The failure to decide cases where one Justice strongly favors the outcome and
the others are indifferent, violates the Arrovian unanimity condition. For
Supreme Court Justices, limited range compels the violation of unanimity." 9
It may seem counterintuitive to claim that the unanimity criterion, which
is essentially a requirement of Pareto optimality, applies in Congress, an
institution in which, as we have seen, achieving simple majority consensus is
particularly burdensome. In fact, however, the Pareto criterion applies with
greater force in Congress, and in legislatures generally, than in the Supreme
Court, and in other appellate courts220 because another Arrovian criterion,
independence of irrelevant alternatives, is relaxed in Congress.22'
Independence requires that members of a collective decisionmaking body,
in this case legislators, vote in accordance with their ordinally ranked
preferences in any pairwise vote regardless of extraneous agenda issues. For
example, even if Carole knows that Bob's agenda will lead to chocolate, which
she dislikes intensely, Carole cannot vote strategically for coffee, her second
choice, in a pairwise vote between vanilla and coffee. While such a vote will
218. The range restriction arguably undermines the legitimacy for any particular Justice of assuming
a position of indifference, given that the judicial task for that Justice is to ascertain to the best of her ability
the result compelled by law.
219. See supra Part IV.A.
220. This analysis is not intended to suggest that the outcomes of legislative processes are Pareto
superior in terms of wealth maximization. Instead, the analysis demonstrates that legislative voting
processes generally satisfy the Pareto criterion, given the preferences of the legislators. The legislators'
preferences, however, if satisfied by legislative voting processes, may produce outcomes that are actually
Pareto inferior in that they frustrate rather than enhance wealth maximization. See William H. Riker &
Steven J. Brams, The Paradox of Vote Trading, 67 ANi. POL. SCI. REv. 1235, 1236 (1973) (positing that
the "paradox [of vote trading] has the property that, while each trade is individually advantageous to the
traders, the sum of the trades is disadvantageous to everybody, including the traders themselves"); RIKER,
supra note 15, at 166-67 (explaining that individually rational logrolls can lead to aggregate legislative
results that are Pareto inferior); Steams, supra note 193, at 401; see also infra notes 245-50 and
accompanying text (describing processes that result in proliferation of pork barrel legislation, which may
be Pareto inferior).
While it may appear counterintuitive that in achieving Pareto superior legislation from the standpoint
of legislators' preferences, the legislature can achieve a Pareto inferior aggregate result in terms of
frustrating wealth maximization, this result is consistent with the insight from interest group theory that
Congressmen, in seeking to provide concrete legislative benefits to their constituents to ensure reelection,
engage in individually rational trades that impose costs on everyone and that ultimately leave everyone
worse off. See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 16 (1974) (positing that
"[tihe electoral goal... has to be the proximate goal of everyone, the goal that must be achieved over and
over if other ends are to be entertained"); MORRIS P. FIORINA, REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALLS, AND
CONSTITUENCIES 31 (1974) (positing that "reelection is the primary goal that the constituency controls: the
district gives and the district can take away"); cf. ARANSON, supra note 201, at 385 (positing that "the
members of Congress have solved their prisoners' dilemma while perpetuating the associated dilemma
among constituents and interest groups").
221. As shown below, the independence criterion applies with relatively greater force in the Supreme
Court. See infra notes 233-36 and accompanying text.
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prevent chocolate from emerging the ultimate winner, it will also violate the
independence criterion. 22
Of course, legislators violate the independence criterion all the time. Some
call this strategic voting; others call it logrolling. Strategic voting allows
legislators to place relative, or cardinal, weights on preferences instead of
merely ranking their preferences ordinally. Similarly, vote trading, or
logrolling,223 allows legislators to reveal intensity of preferences rather than
222. In contrast with this positive explanation for the relaxation of the independence criterion in
Congress, McGrath provides a substantially different normative explanation of why the independence
criterion should be relaxed in our constitutional system. See McGrath, supra note 12. His analysis largely
mirrors the Pildes and Anderson criticism of Arrow's Theorem, based upon the rationality criterion. See
supra notes 30 and 115.
McGrath contends that Madison assumed our collective decisionmaking institutions would have to
foster interdependent preferences among citizens to remain stable. McGrath, supra note 12, at 9-10, 13
(explaining that Madison, strongly influenced by the writings of David Hume, believed that in a republican
form of government the violence of factions could only be avoided if citizens' preference orderings were
interdependent). McGrath further contends that individual and societal preference orderings are inherently
different and that both sets of preferences will be altered through those filtering processes designed to
produce "affectionate orderings." Id. at 10 ("[Madison] believed that this interdependence can be destroyed;
and that to survive, therefore, a republic needs institutions which foster interdependence. . . . 'Virtuous'
citizens are those whose preferences are entangled, by sympathy, with the preferences of other citizens.");
id. at 80-81 (explaining that Arrow's independence condition "assumes that the things ordered by the
individuals are identical to the things ordered by society," an "identity assumption" that Madison expressly
rejected).
McGrath explains that:
Madison created a theory which attempts to save democracy from the evils he presumed
to be incident to it: instability, confusion, and injustice. His primary strategy was to "enlarge
the scope" of the society. His reason for this strategy was that enlarging the scope would, he
believed, foster affectionate ties.
Id. at 98. McGrath argues that while it may appear counterintuitive that extending the sphere fosters
affectionate ties, Madison believed that the vice of factions (which served to reduce interdependent
preferences) increased as individuals became strongly affiliated with particular segments of society. Id. at
118 ("Madison felt if he could just keep majority groups from forming, majorities would not be 'blinded'
by the sympathy for those 'close' to them, for those in the same groups, and they will then be able to
reflect and see that they do care for those 'far away."'); id. at 160 ("The danger to democracy is not from
some total disregard of all others, which to Madison was inhuman, but from disregard of some others
because of being so close to a group."). Thus extending the sphere, Madison hoped, would diminish
harmful allegiances.
As a result of interdependency, McGrath contends, Madisonian republicanism relaxes the
independence criterion by design, since individual and group orderings are altered through deliberative
processes. Id. at 9 ("Arrow's theorem only holds for individual preference orderings not entangled by a
kind of sympathy with the preferences of other citizens."). One interesting implication of McGrath's
analysis is the extent to which the filtering processes, used to foster interdependent ties, increase stability
by rendering collective preferences uni-peaked. Cf id. at 50. While Madison believed, for example, that
even "[if] every Athenian citizen were a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob,"
id. at 104 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 55), he also believed our system of government, with a more
ordinary population, capable of much greater stability. In any event, McGrath admits that his understanding
of Madisonian republicanism does not correspond with the manner in which our collective decisionmaking
processes are understood and operate today. Id. at 164-69. He further expresses doubt as to whether the
present system is likely to evolve in a manner that will inculcate the necessary affectionate ties for the
vision of republicanism he offers. See id.
223. Assume, for example, that Bob is the agenda setter, with the following, original, non-Condorcet-
winner preferences.
Alice: coffee, chocolate, vanilla
Bob: chocolate, vanilla, coffee
Carole: vanilla, coffee, chocolate
1278
1994] Social Choice 1279
mere ordinal ranking of preferences. 4 While this commodification of votes
may not reveal preference intensities as precisely as do market
transactions," it nonetheless provides some reasonable proxy for intensity
of interest, or in the language of game theory, may provide some proxy (or
substitute) for a core.226
The legislator's ability to reveal intensity of preferences, rather than mere
ordinal ranking of preferences, through strategic voting and logrolling, both of
which violate Arrovian independence, allows legislatures, in a manner that
more closely resembles markets than courts, to move toward Pareto
If Carole knows Bob's planned two-vote agenda is (1) vanilla versus coffee (coffee wins); (2) chocolate
versus vanilla (chocolate wins), she can derail his plans by voting strategically for coffee, Bob's last choice,
in the first pairwise vote. Because coffee beats chocolate, coffee will prevail overall.
Instead of engaging in this mutually disadvantageous behavior, namely each attempting to ensure that
the other's least-favored choice emerges the winner, Bob and Carole can logroll. If Bob will agree to
change the agenda to (1) coffee versus chocolate (coffee wins); (2) coffee versus vanilla (vanilla wins),
Carole will agree to vote in accordance with her originally ranked preferences in both pairwise votes. The
compromise, or logroll, leaves both Bob and Carole better off than if each engages in their original
optimizing strategy since neither ends up with his or her last choice. This occurs, however, at Alice's
expense.
In MUELLER, supra note 6, at 82-83, the author provides another useful illustration of a mutually
beneficial logroll. Assume two proposals, X and Y, with three voters: A, B, and C. Further assume that
each has the following utility function with respect to the two legislative proposals.




without vote trading, both proposals fail. If, however, B and C trade votes, such that each agrees to support
the proposal she disfavors, both proposals pass, and B and C are each benefited to the extent of three utils.
ld. Mueller explains that the "existence of beneficial trades requires a nonuniform distribution of
intensities." Id. at 82. Thus if the 5's are changed to 2's, B and C gain nothing by vote trading. /I
224. In BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 10, the authors explain how logrolling allows moves
toward Pareto optimality:
A man who is passionately opposed to a given measure and a man who is slightly favorable but
does not care greatly about it are given equal weight in the process of making final decisions
[through ordinary voting processes, including majority rule]. It seems obvious that both of these
individuals could be made better off, in terms of their own expressed preferences, if the man
strongly opposed should be permitted in some way to "trade" or exchange something with the
relatively indifferent supporter of the proposed measure.
Id. at 132. The authors add: "Applying the strict Pareto rules for determining whether one social situation
represents an improvement over another, almost any system of voting that allows some such exchange to
take place would be superior to that system which weights all preferences equally on each issue." Id. at
132-33.
225. Cf. id. at 158. The authors explain that as logrolling becomes increasingly complex, embracing
more issues and expanding the nature of payments, the analogy to markets is strengthened. Id. The authors
explain:
Complex logrolling ... remains a "barter" system, but it merges into a pure "monetary" system
(that is, one with full side payments) as the range of issues undertaken collectively is
broadened.... If the voter is enabled to choose from among a sufficiently large number of
alternative sets, his effective "purchasing power" approaches the limit that would be available
to him under a "monetary" system.
226. See supra Part II.
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optimality.227 As stated above, Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey
221
reject Judge Easterbrook's contention that agendas in legislatures are "an
additional source of arbitrariness and unpredictability," claiming instead that
"recent public choice literature suggests that agenda rules make outcomes more
predictable and therefore more understandable." 229 Farber and Frickey
erroneously suggest that because legislative outcomes are predictable and
understandable, they cannot simultaneously be arbitrary.230 Nevertheless, the
above analysis can be used to strengthen their argument to a limited extent.
Increasing the participants' abilities to predict and understand outcomes also
increases their power to prevent outcomes that are arbitrary and irrational.
While congressional procedures sometimes disallow a sufficient number of
votes on amendments to reveal all cycles,23' the predictability (as
distinguished from rationality) of these procedures may enable legislators to
respond through logrolling to enhance legislative rationality. Specifically,
legislators can exert appropriate pressure through logrolling to ensure that those
empowered to control outcomes through arbitrary (and path dependent)
procedures will not choose paths that lead to strongly disfavored outcomes.
In that manner, logrolling, coupled with predictable (but arbitrary) procedures,
may serve to enhance both legislative predictability and rationality. Thus, the
removal of the independence criterion in legislatures increases the extent to
which the unanimity criterion applies in legislatures, increasing legislative
rationality.
In the Supreme Court, however, the independence criterion applies with
substantially greater force. If Justices vote based on their analysis of applicable
law, rather than in response to their personal preferences,233 their decisions
on particular issues should not be influenced by the order in which those issues
are presented. The difficulty, though, as we have already seen, is that the
order, or "path," in which options are presented to a body that votes strictly
in accordance with previously set preferences can control substantive issue
resolution. Compliance with the irrelevance criterion can thus render Supreme
Court decisional processes, and appellate court decisional processes generally,
path dependent.
Path dependence simply means that the outcome depends upon the path,
or order, in which choices are presented. As demonstrated above, an agenda
227. Cf RIKER, supra note 15, at 160 (explaining that sophisticated vote trading enables legislators
to "force the choice of the Condorcet winner.").
228. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 29, at 431.
229. Id.
230. See id.
231. See Riker, supra note 171, at 354.
232. For a very simplified example, see supra note 223.
233. See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 28, at 88-89; see also supra note 215; Elhauge, supra note
91, at 105 (positing that aggregation problem for appellate courts may be greater than in legislatures
because "under prevailing ethical norms judges cannot engage in the sort of logrolling that legislators
commonly employ").
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setter can control the flavor of Diane's ice cream cake through the order of
pairwise votes.'" Similarly, if the Court decided Seattle and Crawford one
year apart, instead of on the same day, the order in which the cases reached
the Court would have controlled the outcome of the second case, assuming
either compliance with a rule of stare decisis or that the majority favoring
consistency prevails in the second case. 5 In other words, because the
independence criterion applies in the Supreme Court, stare decisis renders the
evolution of legal doctrine path dependent.23
6
D. Nondictatorship
The nondictatorship criterion is relaxed in both institutions, but
substantially more so in Congress. Both institutions relax nondictatorship by
giving agenda control to less than a majority of the institution as a whole. In
the Supreme Court, the Rule of Four for granting petitions of certiorari
modifies the nondictatorship criterion by allowing a minority of four to control
the Court's agenda. 7 While developing a certiorari theory is beyond the
scope of this Article,"8 three points are relevant. First, the certiorari process
is unique, at least in federal practice 39 Thus, in appellate courts generally,
which lack discretionary appeals processes, the nondictatorship criterion is not
relaxed. Second, votes on certiorari petitions may be substantially closer to
preference than to judgment aggregation in that the standards governing the
certiorari process are extremely broad and susceptible of contrary interpretation
as applied in particular cases.240 Finally, after the petition is granted in a
particular case, except in the fairly rare instance when the Court determines
234. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
235. If, for example, Seattle were decided first, then a majority of the Court who believed the cases
indistinguishable would have felt obligated to follow the Seattle rule in Crawford. Applying the same
assumption, the opposite outcome in both cases would result if Crawford were decided first.
236. In recent years, constitutional stare decisis has come under sharp attack, from among other
sources, Chief Justice Rehnquist. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2861 (1992)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Erroneous decisions in such constitutional cases are uniquely durable,
because correction through legislative action, save for constitutional amendment, is impossible.").
. 237. Cf. Levine & Plott, supra note 15, at 594 ("[Tlhe Supreme Court, through its power to limit
grants of certiorari to particular issues in a case, may itself consciously attempt to neutralize or accentuate
agenda influence.").
238. For a thorough analysis of the Rule of Four for granting petitions for certiorari and the related
Rule of Three for granting stays pending certiorari, see Revesz & Karlan, supra note 188.
239. Many states provide their appellate courts with similar certiorari jurisdiction. See, e.g., VA. CODE
ANN. § 17-123 (Michie 1988) (providing circuit courts with certiorari jurisdiction).
240. See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COuRT PRACTICE § 4.2, at 194 (6th ed. 1986) (observing
that Rule 17, which lists factors the Supreme Court considers in evaluating petitions for writs of certiorari,
"reveal[s] nothing significantly new or different; no bright lines are drawn as to what the Justices deem
relevant or decisive in reaching their subjective and collective judgments"). Rule 17 provides that the
factors it lists as relevant are "neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion." Id.; see also
id. at 195 ("Certiorari is a discretionary jurisdiction, one that can be invoked or withheld for any reason
that the Court sees fit.").
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that it granted certiorari improvidently,24' the Court proceeds with the case
as if there had been no agenda manipulation by a dictator, or in this case, by
the minority of four.242 In analyzing actual decisions based on Arrow's
Theorem, therefore, the Rule of Four is likely to be of limited value.243
Aside from this notable exception,244 the nondictatorship criterion
generally applies in the Supreme Court in that cases, once taken, are decided
based upon assessments of the merits by individual Justices without agenda
manipulation. Indeed, the avoidance of procedures that would allow agenda
manipulation, as shown above, causes the Court to miss available Condorcet
winners.
Congressional procedures, in contrast, provide individual members with
powerful opportunities to set the agenda and to exact rents for procurement of
legislative benefits. Perhaps the most noted current member who illustrates this
is Senator Robert Byrd, the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee,
a master at charging substantial tolls benefitting his home state of West
Virginia as a precondition to getting favored bills out of his committee.245
While these processes may lead to seemingly irrational, or Pareto inferior
legislative outcomes,246 this form of irrationality is not subject to Supreme
Court correction unless it independently violates the Constitution.247
241. See Revesz & Karlan, supra note 188, at 1082-95 (describing process to determine improvident
grant of certiorari); see also STERN ET AL., supra note 240, at 262-63, 288-93.
242. But cf supra note 158 (discussing standing).
243. Certainly if we would predict doctrinal confusion even with majority rule, we would predict even
greater doctrinal confusion with minority rule. Cf Revesz & Karlan, supra note 188, at 1131-32 (positing
that the Court's treatment of certiorari process has defied consistency and coherence).
244. One additional exception is the opinion assigning function. The Chief Justice, if he votes with
the majority, or the senior Justice who agrees with the majority, if the Chief Justice does not vote with the
majority, assigns the opinion. See Jon 0. Newman, The Second Circuit Review-1982-19S3
Term-Foreword: In Banc Practice in the Second Circuit: The Virtues of Restraint, 50 BROOK. L. REV.
365, 378 n.85 (1984) ("In the Supreme Court, when the Chief Justice is in the minority, the opinion writing
assignment is made by the senior judge in the majority."). Authorship can have a substantial effect on an
opinion's content. This function can be so significant in affecting development of legal doctrine that former
Chief Justice Warren Burger is reputed to have sometimes voted with a majority with which he disagreed
in order to control the opinion assignments. He would then switch sides and dissent after the opinion was
written, a tactic for which he was criticized. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE
BURGER COURT IN ACTION (1990). Schwartz quotes an unnamed Supreme Court Justice as stating in an
interview: "[AIIl too damned often the Chief Justice [Burger] will vote with the majority so as to assign
the opinion, and then he ends up in dissent." Id. at 14. Schwartz adds: "Voting with the majority in this
way certainly appears contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of the Court's assignment practice." Id.; see
also LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 165 (4th ed. 1992), quoted in CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH,
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE CASES, 81 Ky. L.J. 187, 189 n.13 (1993). Of
course, if the opinion as written is unacceptable to others who formed part of the plurality or majority, the
latter Justices can decline to sign the opinion and instead write separately. In at least some cases, however,
there is little question that the assignment function can affect the development of legal doctrine.
245. For a recent popular account of Senator Robert Byrd's acumen in obtaining pork for his home
state, see generally KELLY, supra note 204.
246. See, e.g., RIKER, supra note 15, at 166-67; see also supra note 220.
247. Pork barrel legislation per se, however, is not unconstitutional, which is why proposals for
constitutional amendments like germaneness rules and the item veto have each gained substantial support
in recent years. These proposals are intended to render this form of legislative irrationality unconstitutional.
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The aggregate effect of procedural rules that provide dictatorial, or at least
agenda-setting, power to individual members of Congress is to broaden the
constituent base required for many, if not most, bills.24 These procedures,
which often result in substantive legislative compromises, can further result in
a proliferation of special interest legislation that remains unchecked by the
judiciary.249 They can also contribute to outcomes that extend outside of
Congress' permitted range, thus requiring the Supreme Court to exercise its
negative check in the form of judicial review."
E. Rationality
For the reasons outlined above, the Supreme Court's major Arrovian
deficiency is its inability to guarantee that the preferences of a majority of its
members will be reflected in resulting doctrine-even within particular
cases." In short, the requirement of rationality in Supreme Court
decisionmaking is subordinated to the requirement that the Court decide all
cases before it.
This is not to suggest that we are inevitably stuck with wholly irrational
law. It is to suggest, however, that proposals to expand the scope of judicial
review must themselves be closely scrutinized. 2  One factor that may
enhance rationality in Supreme Court decisionmaking, at least under more
traditional jurisprudential theories of judicial review, is uni-peakedness. To the
extent that the Justices share a doctrinal framework, whether it is based upon
original intent, utilitarianism, federalism, or something else entirely, the Court
is more likely to achieve meaningful compromise even absent majority
consensus on particular outcomes. While the analysis does not suggest that
Arrow's Theorem itself proves any particular doctrinal framework to be
superior, it does suggest that the theorem demonstrates that some common
doctrinal framework is superior to none, to the extent that rationality is
considered important in judicial decisionmaking253
248. Cf. WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS 54-66 (1962) (evaluating
instances in which Congress has achieved supermajorities that appear inconsistent with principle of
minimum winning coalitions); see also Steams, supra note 193, at 408 (positing that "[iln the language of
public choice theorists, these negative legislative checkpoints serve to increase the size of coalitions
necessary to succeed in achieving procurement of desired legislation").
249. See supra note 247.
250. Cf. note 206 and citations therein.
251. See supra Part IV.A.
252. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 18 (arguing that social choice theory justifies broadly expanded
judicial review).
253. One implication of the analysis is that it may add to the burden of those advancing nontraditional
theories of judicial review. The merits of any particular proposal aside, the issue remains whether it is likely
to be adopted by the requisite number of Justices to render Supreme Court decisionmaking uni-peaked. If
less than a majority, for example, adopts even a superior normative framework, the end result may be to
decrease, rather than to enhance, institutional rationality because the effect may be to increase the extent
to which the judicial preferences are multi-peaked.
1994] 1283
The Yale Law Journal
In contrast, within Congress, a common doctrinal framework among
participants is not a precondition to achieving institutional rationality because
Congress is better able to achieve meaningful compromise through logrolling
or strategic voting. These processes allow legislators to cardinalize preferences,
even when preferences are multi-peaked. In other words, by commodifying
votes, legislators can achieve consensus acceptable to all, even if no member
would rank the -resulting package of legislation as her first choice. 4
Cardinalizing preferences thus provides legislative bodies with a proxy for a
core. 5 This is not intended to suggest that legislatures are incapable of
codifying intransitivities1 6 or that the logrolling process itself is entirely path
independent. The point instead is that various forms of legislative compromise,
whether through logrolling or strategic voting, serve to enhance legislative
rationality, whereas Supreme Court voting procedures, coupled with the
requirement that the Court decide all cases properly before it, undermine
rationality. Again, because both institutions are imperfect, proposals to shift
decisional authority from one to the other must be analyzed with the following
question in mind: which institution contains the imperfections that are least bad
in resolving the cases or issues in question?
Ironically, proposals to expand judicial review, based on social choice
theory, would transfer issues for which legislatures have a proxy for a core, to
appellate courts, when those courts lack a proxy for a core. Courts lack a
proxy for a core over those issues because the cases presenting those issues are
not obviously resolved through reference to the Constitution. If they were so
resolved, there would be no need to rely on social choice theory for expanded
judicial review. As a result, in the very cases for which expanded judicial
review is sought, the preferences of Supreme Court Justices are least likely to
be uni-peaked. There is no obvious means, therefore, to ensure that the Court's
254. This may provide a better explanation for general acceptance of our constitutional lawmaking
bodies than that advanced by Pildes and Anderson, see supra notes 30 and 115 (explaining and critiquing
the Pildes and Anderson thesis). This analysis is not intended to suggest that legislatures are incapable of
arriving at compromises that virtually everyone finds unacceptable. President Clinton's proposed "Don't
ask, Don't tell, Don't pursue" solution to the issue of whether gays should be admitted to the military
appears to be a good example of the latter form of compromise. See, e.g., Maia Davis, Both Sides Dislike
New Gay Policy; Military: Some Ventura County Residents Say Clinton's Compromise Goes Too Far,
Others Say it Doesn't Go Far Enough, Los ANGELES TIMES, July 20, 1993, at BI.
255. Buchanan and Tullock make an analogous argument: "The more perfect the vote-trading 'market,'
the wider the range of collective activities that will tend to ba selected at the stage of constitutional choice.
The less perfect the 'market,' the more restrictive must be the range and scope of collective action."
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 10, at 209. The authors conclude: "The society that is characterized
by strong and effective ethical and moral restraints, which prevent vote-trading, will find it more essential
to place constitutional curbs on the political decisions of the majority than will the society in which these
restraints are less effective." Id. (footnote omitted). Because legislatures encourage vote trading, legislators
are able to achieve a more rational form of consensus on issues lacking majority support for one option
than are appellate courts, in which commodification of votes is not an accepted practice. See supra notes
223-32 and accompanying text; cf Levmore, supra note 10, at 150-51 (describing methods through which
legislative preferences can be expressed with near-market precision).
256. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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members will apply a common doctrinal framework to achieve rational
outcomes. Any commonality is a matter of coincidence and coincidence, of
course, is just that.
Moreover, while legislatures, especially when allocating benefits of capital
gains and burdens of capital losses, can cycle, 57 they can avoid irrationality
by defaulting to the status quo through inaction. Appellate courts, including the
Supreme Court, do not have that option. In addition, when Congress does enact
incoherent, because intransitive, policies, the Supreme Court can restore
coherence without any additional justification. 8 That, along with the
requirement that in construing statutes, courts are to avoid absurd results, is a
traditional judicial task. 9 No separate institution is available to restore
rationality to intransitive judicial decisions rendered under the guise of
constitutional judicial review.
F. Summary
To summarize the discussion thus far, Table 1 analyzes the Supreme Court
and Congress based upon the Arrovian and Condorcet criteria.
257. As shown above, legislative practices are most likely to be rational when preferences among
legislators are uni-peaked, and preferences are most likely to be uni-peaked when the legislature is not
allocating the burdens of a capital loss or the benefits of a capital gain. Of course, most legislative
proposals are far more complex and not susceptible of such precise classification. Many, if not most, laws
contain both distributive and nondistributive elements.
258. For examples, see cases cited supra note 208.
259. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,580 (1981); Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S.
631, 643 (1978).
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Arrovian Criteria Supreme Court Congress
Range Limited to negative check Wide range, except as
based upon constitutional limited by Art. I, § 8
text (Congress) or federal delegation (floor) and
law (states); range does not independent constitutional
include inaction provisions (ceiling); range
does include inaction
Universal Domain Restricted by constitutional Restricted by constitutional
ceiling but otherwise floor and ceiling
applies, allowing
aggregations that do not
reflect issue-by-issue
preferences of majority
Unanimity Does not apply because Pareto optimality
Court engages in judgment approximated by strategic
not preference aggregation voting and logrolling
Nondictatorship Applies, except in grants of Relaxed through procedures
certiorari that provide individual
members with substantial
agenda control
Independence of Applies, resulting in Relaxed through strategic
Irrelevant Alternatives development of doctrine that voting and logrolling
is path dependent
Rationality Subordinated by requirement Assisted by judicial review;
that all cases be formally but Pareto inferior pork
resolved barrel legislation remains
Condorcet Criterion Not satisfied because Better satisfied, but because
Condorcet-producing rules logrolling accounts for
result in endless cycling preference intensity,
absent a Condorcet winner, Congress sometimes
thus infringing upon judicial maximizes utility by
range missing Condorcet winners
TABLE 1. The Supreme Court and Congress Through an Arrovian Lens
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V. COLLECTIVE DECISIONMAKERS THROUGH A WIDE-ANGLE ARROVIAN
LENS
At the risk of unduly extending what has already been a rather long walk,
this Part will offer one final snapshot of some scenery along the way, this time
with the benefit of a wide-angle Arrovian lens. This Article has demonstrated
that while Arrow's Theorem provides an invaluable framework for analyzing
the collective decisionmaking institutions created in the Constitution, the real
benefit of the theorem is in explaining how these institutions operate in
conjunction to achieve a greater level of rationality than each would achieve
if it operated alone. At the same time, the Article demonstrated the importance
of avoiding the "nirvana," "isolation," and "composition" fallacies when
studying virtually any collective decisionmaking body.
This Part will offer a final snapshot designed to place legislatures and
appellate courts, generally, within a broader framework of collective
decisionmaking bodies, one that includes markets at one extreme and agencies
at another. A final table will summarize this discussion.
A. Markets
Assuming preexisting wealth allocations and zero transactions costs,
markets-which allow full cardinalization of preferences-are superior (or
"least inferior")2 6' at allocating resources to their best and highest uses. The
problem of the empty core is often viewed as a phenomenon associated with
noncompetitive markets. 261 This is only partially correct. Although the empty
core problem does arise when markets are noncompetitive, the problem also
is a function of timing, regardless of whether the market is competitive.
Opportunities to negotiate in the absence of a core notoriously arise
postcontractually, even when parties entered into the initial contract in
competitive circumstances.262 The cycling problem is ameliorated to the
extent that ex ante legal rules clarify postcontractual obligations in situations
that the parties failed to consider and to provide for in terms. In that respect,
legislatures and courts can increase the rationality of markets as collective
decisionmaking bodies.
260. See supra note 33.
261. See, e.g., Bittlingmayer, supra note 68, at 202-04 (describing properties of markets that lead to
cycling); see also supra note 86 and accompanying text.
262. Cf. Hovenkamp, supra note 68, at 297.
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B. Legislatures and Appellate Courts
Legislatures, like private markets, can cycle, especially when allocating the
benefits of capital gains or the burdens of capital losses.263 In those
situations, legislatures may opt for inaction, leaving the status quo by default.
In crafting ex ante rules, however, legislatures are less likely to cycle because
the preferences of legislators are more likely to be uni-peaked. In this respect,
legislatures are most beneficial in enhancing private market rationality when
market participants negotiate in the absence of a core.
Legislative outcomes, however, are often path dependent and, as a result
of logrolling, may extend beyond the legislature's permissible domain.
Appellate courts, because they do not cycle in the same manner and in
response to the same factual phenomena, can render legislative processes more
rational through judicial review and statutory interpretation that avoids internal
inconsistencies. These processes allow courts, first, to ensure that legislatures
act within their permissible domain; and, second, to ameliorate codified
intransitive preferences. These procedures, however, do not prevent pork barrel
legislation which is often Pareto inferior.26
Unlike legislatures, however, appellate courts do not have the option of
declining to resolve necessary issues contained in cases properly presented for
review. As a result, their decisional processes must be structured to ensure an
outcome in every case. Motion-and-amendment or packaged-issue
decisionmaking,265 while capable of yielding available Condorcet winners,
can lead to cycling and thus do not guarantee outcomes in every case. Case-
by-case resolution, in contrast, does guarantee an outcome in nearly all cases,
but sometimes leads to doctrinal incoherence. This form of incoherence is
exacerbated when the Court's members lack a common doctrinal foundation
because their preferences are less likely to be uni-peaked. Proposals for
expanded judicial review would remove issues from legislatures, which have
a proxy for a core even when preferences are multi-peaked, and would place
them in appellate courts, in precisely the circumstances in which those courts
lack any proxy for a core and in which judicial preferences are most likely to
be multi-peaked. Moreover, to the extent that resulting decisions under the
guise of constitutional judicial review are irrational, no separate collective
263. This form of legislative cycling is not limited to capital losses and capital gains; it also can arise
in negotiating redistributive legislation. Dividing benefits and losses is likely to be negotiated in the absence
of a core. Cf supra note 86 and accompanying text (comparing the need for facilitating legal rules in empty
core negotiations with the need for facilitating legal rules in other contexts, such as postcontractual
negotiations).
264. See Steams, supra note 193, at 396 (observing that "there is no [federal] judicial decision
prohibiting the attachment of nongermane riders"); see also supra note 220 and citations therein.
265. These processes are discussed supra notes 169-87 and accompanying text.
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While a complete analysis of legislative delegation is beyond the scope of
this Article, the foregoing discussion has some implications for agency
decisionmaking. Specifically, traditional notions of agency expertise are well
rooted in the notion of legislative irrationality resulting from problems posed
by Arrow's Theorem.2 67 One often cited difficulty is that legislative
delegation is frequently used to avoid difficult decisionmaking rather than to
ensure enactment of more cogent policies.268 The nondelegation doctrine,
which has been largely abandoned,269 may be viewed as a judicial attempt
to ensure that delegation is employed only to achieve greater policy rationality
through sufficiently clear legislative mandates that ensure uni-peakedness,
rather than as a legislative avoidance device.
In any event, by providing a small group of decisionmakers with a
common legislative mandate, legislatures can ensure that agencies create
policies with the benefit of uni-peaked preferences. The problem is that while
delegating to agencies increases the likelihood that uni-peaked preferences will
yield rational policies, it does so by removing the most basic element of
collective decisionmaking, namely the requirement that such bodies act
collectively. In other words, to achieve rationality, legislatures, through such
delegations, eviscerate the Arrovian nondictatorship criterion. Of course,
because agencies operate in a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial capacity, they
266. The obvious caveat is the ultimate collective decisionmaker, namely the power to amend vested
in the people and in the states. The amending process has only been used to reverse Supreme Court
decisions four times in more than 200 years. See U.S. CONST. amends. XI (limiting jurisdiction of federal
courts to hear suits brought against states); XIV (providing that all persons born and naturalized in the
United States are citizens); XVI (broadening Congress's taxing power); XXVI (establishing 18 as voting
age).
267. See JERRY L. MASHAW & RICHARD A. MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
LAW SYSTEM 29-30 (1985) (explaining that while Arrow's Theorem appears to justify broad delegations
of legislative power to promote rational policies, scholars have observed that Congress more often uses
delegations to avoid making difficult decisions); Farber & Frickey, supra note 202, at 903 (positing that
"[t]he likelihood of having sufficiently 'well-behaved' preferences to avoid Arrow's theorem is presumably
much greater in a small group such as a legislative committee").
268. See, e.g., THEODORE J. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 59 (1979) (describing legislatures'
abdication of control over policymaking to interest groups and administrative agencies); HAYES, supra note
201, at 108 (discussing factors that lead legislators to opt for delegation).
269. See, e.g., 1 JACOB A. STEIN Er AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3.03[5] (1993). The authors observe
that "with the exception of the Panama Refining [v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)] and Schechter Poultry
[Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)] decisions, the Supreme Court has regularly validated the
delegation by Congress to the President, to federal officials, and to administrative agencies of extremely
broad-virtually standardless-legislative powers." Id. The authors add: "Yet, the Court in doing so has
repeatedly stated that legislative power as such cannot lawfully be delegated." Id.; see also FARBER &
FRICKEY, supra note 24, at 79 ("Yet, it would be a mistake to view the [nondelegation] doctrine as wholly
moribund. On occasion, it has served as a justification for narrowly construing a grant of authority to an
administrative agency.").
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are also subject to many of the same aggregation problems described
previously.2 0
D. Summary
Table 2 summarizes the above discussion, thus demonstrating the manner
in which each of these four collective decisionmaking bodies acts to enhance
the collective rationality of the overall system.
Markets Legislatures Appellate Courts Agencies
Major Cycling in the Cycling when Requirement that all Nondictatorship
Arrovian absence of a core allocating cases be resolved criterion is
Deficiency capital losses or leads to occasional removed
capital gains doctrinal
incoherence
Major Optimizing Creating ex ante Limited range and Administrative
Arrovian resource allocation rules to facilitate uni-peakedness uni-peakedness
Attribute assuming market enables courts to provides substitute
preexisting wealth transactions in increase legislative for multi-peaked
distributions and the absence of a rationality by legislative
zero transactions core and ensuring that preferences, thus
costs advancing legislatures act increasing





TABLE 2. Collective Decisionmakers Through a Wide-Angle Arrovian Lens
270. See supra Part IV.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Arrow's Theorem is a useful tool for explaining and comparing
congressional and Supreme Court decisionmaking processes. The analysis
presented in this Article demonstrated why decisional processes in the Supreme
Court, like those of most appellate courts, are not designed to yield Condorcet
winners, even when such winners are available. It questioned arguments for
expanding judicial review based on social choice theory by showing that
legislatures have a superior proxy for a core relative to appellate courts in the
very range of issues for which advocates argue for judicial, as opposed to
legislative, resolution.
While Arrow's Theorem proves that every collective decisionmaking body,
including the Supreme Court and Congress, will inevitably contain some
deficiency, no single institution can be viewed in isolation to determine its
rationality in aggregating collective preferences. When Congress and the
Supreme Court are properly analyzed and then compared through an Arrovian
lens, it becomes clear that most social-choice-based normative proposals
undermine, rather than enhance, the rationality of these institutions. Finally,
placing legislatures and appellate courts within a broader framework of
collective decisionmaking bodies, including markets and agencies, the Article
showed that each institution under review behaves more rationally when
operating in conjunction with other collective decisionmaking institutions than
it would if it operated alone.
Like core theory, social choice theory reveals the shadow cast by the
invisible hand over our constitutionally established collective decisionmaking
bodies. Perhaps the flaw, rendering the social choice renaissance at least
partially misguided, is the failure to recognize that the Framers gave us two
hands, albeit with two shadows, rather than one.
VII. APPENDIX
A. Arrow's Theorem Proof
As previously stated, understanding the Arrow's Theorem proof is not
essential to following the analysis in the text. Nonetheless, the proof is
edifying in that it further illustrates the nature of the underlying assumptions
and demonstrates why they inevitably conflict. A very simplified proof is
therefore presented below.271
271. For those familiar with other Arrow's Theorem proofs, the proof that follows will be overly
simplified. It is taken from Hovenkamp, supra note 68, at 319-21. Those readers, and others who find all
equations a precursor to cold sweats, can disregard this appendix altogether. For additional, and more
elaborate, proofs of the theorem, see MUELLER, supra note 6, at 385-87 (1989); AMARTYA K. SEN,
COLLECTVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 41-46 (1970); Vickrey, supra note 100.
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Assume that A and B are two groups of voters, of unequal size, in a state
legislature. They must again choose where to locate a toxic waste dump and
the choices are townships X, Y, and Z. Assume further that A contains the
minimum number of voters necessary to pass a piece of legislation; in other
words, A is a simple majority. Group A prefers location X to location Y. This
is noted as A: XpY, where "p" is defined as "preferred to." Because A is the
bare minimum needed to impose its preferences upon the group, A minus one
person is insufficient to control the group. Now assume that A is subdivided
into two groups A, and A2, such that A1 consists of a single person and A2
consists of the remainder of the individuals in group A.
Because all members of group A prefer X to Y, then for both A, and A2,
XpY. Assume that the two groups do not otherwise share the same preference
orderings. Thus, for A,, XpYpZ and for A2, ZpXpY. Assume further that group
B, all the voters not in A, has the preference ordering YpZpX. It should be
readily apparent that all three groups, A,, A2, and B have different preference
orderings.272 While A2 prefers Z to Y, neither A, nor B share that preference.
This means that, consistent with the requirement of majority rule or, stated in
Arrow's Theorem terms, the condition of nondictatorship, the group's
preference as between Z and Y must either be YpZ or YiZ, where "i" means
"indifferent to."
Recall that XpY for the entire group, including A and B, based upon the
preference of A, a simple majority. Given that YpZ or YiZ, it follows that
XpZ. In other words if the group prefers site X to site Y, and prefers site Y
to site Z, then under the requirement of transitivity, the group must prefer site
X to site Z. Alternatively if the group prefers site X to site Y but is indifferent
as between sites Y and Z, then the group must again prefer site X to site Z.
The problem is that only one person, A,, actually prefers site X to site Z,
which means that to satisfy the requirement of transitivity, the group must
agree to make A, the dictator.
B. Arrow's Theorem Explanation
The logic of the proof may require a bit more explanation. The proof
assumes that for the legislative choice between two options X and Y, there is
some nonunanimous subset that satisfies the majority criterion, such that XpY.
Within that first nonunanimous subset, A, however, is another nonunanimous
subset, A2, that alone prefers Z to Y. Because neither A, nor B prefer Z to Y,
that means that A2, the subset of A, cannot control. But this also means that
the opposite relation, either in the form of a preference or an indifference, such
that YpZ or YiZ, must control the entire group. Applying transitivity, then
272. A brief comparison will also show that the three preference orderings in the proof are identical
to those in the ice cream cake hypothetical, supra p. 1221-22.
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XpZ. The difficulty is that another subset of A, this time A1, is the only group
with this preference. This, in turn, means that the group must choose between
satisfying the requirements of rationality or nondictatorship, which means that
both cannot coexist simultaneously. 273
273. In Hovenkamp, supra note 68, at 319, the author explains the logic of the proof as follows:
The Theorem ... proceeds by assuming that on any choice between two alternatives there must
be some minimum nonunanimous subset of voters that is decisive-that is, who constitute a
sufficiently large proportion of the whole that their preference for any alternative will make that
alternative the social choice. The Theorem then shows that if there is such a nonunanimous
subset, this subset will in turn contain a nonunanimous subset which is itself decisive of the
outcome; this second subset will then contain yet a third decisive nonunanimous subset, and so
on until the final subset is a single individual, or dictator. Because nondictatorship is an
assumption of the Theorem, there cannot be a decisive, nonunanimous, and nondictatorial
subset.
Id. at 319. Hovenkamp's proof, upon which the proof in the text is based, dispenses with all but one
iteration to get to the dictator. Other, more elaborate, proofs add degrees of complexity at every turn, e.g.,
numbers of groups and preference orderings. Each additional complexity simply exacerbates the cycling
problem.
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